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ABSTRACT 
 
The expansion of financial access has been promoted as a method to promote financial 
development for structural transformation. However, the linkages between expansion of financial 
access, financial development and financial stability are under-researched. The thesis seeks to 
contribute to research on these relationships using a mixed methodology with quantitative 
analysis of the balance sheet structures of institutions and interpretative fieldwork material from 
Kenya. 
Its finds that as financial access has expanded there have been increases in credit, liquidity and 
foreign exchange risk at institutions and increasing systemic risks. Private capital inflows have 
encouraged these trends. There is limited mitigation of these risks through improved institutional 
capacity and financial architecture. Increased deposit mobilization has been achieved but it is not 
clear that it is incremental. Credit expansion has increased but has been developmentally sub-
optimal because of increased consumption lending. Interviews with the poor in urban and rural 
areas in Kenya found that barriers continue to the use of formal financial services but they are 
primarily “voluntary”. 
The implications of the thesis are that alternative policy approaches need to be developed 
including macroprudential regulation, capital controls and cooperative banking. The thesis finds 
that the balance sheet approach offers a promising framework for further research, including 
developing a structuralist approach to financial development. 
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1. Thesis Outline 
 
1.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
At the core of economic development is structural transformation. The processes of structural 
transformation are complex because they are ill-defined, numerous and interdependent. However, 
they result in the transformation of sectors, especially agriculture and industry, from low to high 
productivity sectors. Where such transformation is pro-poor, it includes employment creation, the 
creation of public services and the equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
Structural transformation requires investment to achieve these goals. The fundamental function 
of the financial system in structural transformation is to mobilise and intermediate financial 
resources into this investment. This includes via the financial system, providing pooling of 
resources, risk sharing, liquidity provision, inter-temporal transformation and efficient financial 
services. 
Empirical studies are consistent with this role for the financial system in economic development 
and they have found that the deepening of the financial sector is closely correlated with – although 
not necessarily causative of – economic development. However, this deepening has also been 
associated with financial fragility and crisis in developing economies, which has had negative 
impacts on economic growth trajectories. 
Furthermore, in many lower-income countries today (2014), and especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
(the focus of this thesis), development of financial systems remains weak and financial systems 
shallow. They are typically characterized by low levels of savings and investment, oligopolistic 
market structures, weak prudential regulation, poor institutional capacity, and financial fragility. 
Such characteristics have resulted in constrained credit and investment – particularly for the much 
needed long-term, low cost financing required for structural transformation – and in low levels of 
financial access for those with low-incomes. 
Policy approaches to tackling these issues have been varied. Among the recent policies employed 
has been the expansion of financial access. Broadly defined as enabling households and firms to 
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use financial services if they chose to do so, financial access is seen as being able to contribute to 
a number of core outcomes of financial and economic development. These include: 
x Financing investment 
x Mobilization of savings 
x The development of financial architecture 
x Building institutional capacity and 
x Benefits for poor households or individuals 
However, the links between the expansion of financial access and financial and economic 
development remain under-researched. This applies to both the development of a theoretical 
framework to analyse transmission mechanisms as well as the understanding of how financial 
access and financial and economic development are causally related. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to closing this research gap. 
 
1.2 THE THESIS’S ORIGINALITY 
Financial access policy has been adopted because of its potential to contribute to the core 
functions of the financial system, and hence economic development, including savings 
mobilization and investment. However, despite current policy being underpinned by the 
assumption that these contributions are being made, relatively little research has been conducted 
that tests whether or not this proposition can be substantiated. This includes not only the impact 
of the expansion of financial access on the development of the financial system, but also its impact 
on financial fragility. 
Instead, the majority of research to date has focused on the microeconomic, pro-poor impact of 
the expansion of financial access (Khan, 2011; Adasme, 2006). Commentators, particularly those 
concerned with financial stability, have identified this gap in knowledge. For example, H.R. Khan 
(Deputy Governor of the Bank of India), whose country has experienced financial instability 
resulting from problems with microfinance, has called for more research into the issue and the 
relationship between financial instability and the structure of the financial system. He comments, 
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“The transmission channels and potential feedback loops between financial stability and inclusion 
could be a subject of further research” (Khan, 2011). 
This thesis makes three original contributions. First, it explores the relatively under-researched 
question of the potential benefits of expanding financial access and the risks it poses to financial 
system development and fragility. It does this by examining the sources and nature of 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk related to the expansion of financial access. The thesis seeks to 
examine these issues in relation to institutions in a detailed and systemic way. It does this by 
presenting an original analysis based on the balance sheet structures of microfinance-orientated 
institutions and their relevance to financial soundness or the fragility of both the individual 
institutions and the financial system. 
Second, the thesis challenges the predominant theory relating to microfinance – agent-based 
theory – that represents the financial system as a “credit network” (Stiglitz, 1981; Corrado et al., 
2011), arguing that it is an inadequate representation of the financial system. The thesis develops 
an alternative proposition, proposing a balance sheet approach to the role of financial access in 
the financial system. It provides a new definition of financial sector development, one based on 
its contribution to structural transformation, rather than mere growth in credit. 
Third, it presents new primary research material from Kenya. This includes primary fieldwork 
material from interviews with regulators, investors and microfinance practitioners, and with the 
poor in urban and rural areas in Kenya. It also includes original analysis of the balance sheets of 
microfinance-orientated institutions drawn from the financial statements of these institutions. 
 
1.3 THESIS METHODOLOGY 
Development Economics is an interdisciplinary field. It employs many methodological 
approaches, including quantitative and qualitative methods. Depending on the research question, 
financial market development can be examined using both approaches. Each provides its own 
important insights that can illuminate and support the findings of the other. 
As such, the thesis adopts a mixed methodological approach. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, 
the thesis adopts a theoretical framework based on balance sheet analysis. This is reflected in 
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quantitative work that examines the balance sheets of microfinance-orientated institutions. 
Interview material then provides additional confirming or interpretative material. 
The thesis also focuses on a single country, Kenya, in order to allow granular balance sheet 
analysis. Kenya has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, Kenya has a financial sector 
that is reasonably representative of a low-income2 country’s economy. Moreover, although the 
formal financial sector remains relatively small and shallow, it has experienced significant growth 
in the last decade. This includes the increased financial access that the government has adopted 
as official policy. 
Secondly, its microfinance sector has experienced the main microfinance trends identified 
elsewhere in in recent years: Shifts from group to individual lending; an expanding range of 
financial products; a diverse pool of suppliers; strengthening regulation and supervision; and 
moves towards financial profitability (Armendariz & Labie, 2011). 
In Kenya, there are also many institutions engaged in the expansion of financial access. They 
include small, unregulated microfinance institutions (MFIs) and large, regulated microfinance-
orientated institutions. There has been a proliferation of financial products including lending and 
deposit-taking. Supervision and regulation has been developed (including regulation) under the 
Kenyan Banking Act 2014 (and its pre-2014 predecessors), the 2006 Microfinance Act and the 
2008 SACCO Act. Mobile banking is widely used by microfinance-orientated institutions in 
Kenya, especially in rural areas where population density is low. This includes M-PESA, an 
electronic platform for financial services. However, alongside these changes, there remains a 
large informal sector with many saving and credit organizations that compete with formal sector 
financial services. 
Thirdly, the microfinance sector in Kenya has seen increasing integration into the domestic 
financial system, with large microfinance-orientated institutions engaging in interbank markets, 
domestic payment systems and capital markets. This has been facilitated by domestic and 
                                                             
2 This is according to the World Bank’s IDA classification as at 2013. In October 2014 the GDP of 
Kenya was rebased by the World Bank, resulting in its reclassification as a MIC.  
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international private capital flows from investors that are actively investing in the Kenyan 
microfinance sector. 
Using Kenya as a national study presented challenges that are reflected in the methodology. First, 
the data available for Kenyan financial systems is, in common with other developing countries, 
limited. For example, institutional coverage in the data collected and made publically available 
by the central bank is limited and excludes many of the institutions and sectors of interest to the 
thesis. As a consequence, the thesis draws on the financial statements of microfinance-orientated 
institutions to produce an original analysis of the microfinance industry. 
However, the thesis seeks to interpret that data using qualitative research relating to formal 
financial system institutions, such as banks and regulators, and the poor who actually use them. 
Interviews were conducted with regulators, investors and financial institutions, and with the poor 
themselves, examining the broad context of their financial lives and their experiences and 
engagement with the microfinance sector. 
Indeed, in relation to the latter, the thesis seeks to incorporate strongly “the voices of the poor” in 
order to examine microfinance and financial access and to build on current themes of research 
relating to the “financial lives of the poor”. Quantitative interview data was collected and 
qualitative interviews were conducted. The interviewees were selected on the basis of those who 
were not amongst the “poorest of the poor” but rather were either conducting stable subsistence 
livelihoods or were generating excess income above a subsistence level. The latter, in particular, 
were interesting because, as the economy grows, the financial lives of individuals with such 
surpluses will determine not only their own paths out of poverty, but also the success of important 
macroeconomic goals in development such as savings mobilization and productive investments. 
Detailed discussion of the thesis methodology is included in two sections – Section 6.1.1, which 
discusses the methodology that was used for the balance sheet analysis and fieldwork interviews 
with institutions, regulators and investors – and Section 8.1, which discusses the fieldwork 
interviews with poor individuals. 
Access to data and to research subjects is important for the quality of fieldwork. In particular, it 
allows one to incorporate confidential information from institutions unavailable from public 
sources. As a consequence, the generous agreement to provide help with fieldwork as proffered 
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by the Central Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Financial Sector Deepening 
Program Kenya3  (FSD) and the non-governmental organization (NGO), Farm Africa, were 
important practical considerations in deciding to study Kenya. 
Finally, it should be noted that due to practical limitations, such as access and resources, the 
interviewees were not randomly selected. Interviewee selection differed according to the type of 
interviewee. All members of the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Kenya (AMFI) were 
invited to be interviewed by the author and the Financial Sector Deepening Program, but only 
some agreed. Investors and Central Bank officials accepted interviews through academic contacts. 
Individual interviewees were accessed through local community contacts and Farm Africa. This 
means that there is the possibility of selection bias amongst interviewees. Nevertheless we believe 
that the interviews provide strong interpretative material that is also of clear research value. 
 
1.4 THE THESIS STRUCTURE 
This chapter has given a broad overview of the research question, the originality of the thesis and 
the thesis methodology. Thesis definitions are included at the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 2 examines existing neo-classically based theories of financial system development. 
These include endogenous growth theory, the theory of asymmetrical information and 
“augmented” liberalization. It highlights economic theory relevant to microfinance and access to 
finance, most notably theories of asymmetrical information. It comments that agent-based 
theories, even when they have been extended into “networks of agents” do not adequately 
represent the systemic nature of financial systems. Instead, the thesis proposes adopting the 
“balance sheet” approach that views the economy as comprising interdependent balance sheets of 
all its agents as a theoretical framework to examine the impact of the expansion of financial 
systems on financial development and its contribution to structural transformation. 
Chapter 3 discusses theoretical ideas specific to the expansion of financial access and its impact 
on financial sector development and stability and that underlie recent policy supporting the 
broadening of financial access. The limitations of the existing theoretical frameworks are such                                                              
3 See http://www.fsdkenya.org for more details. 
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that this chapter explores relevant theoretical themes derived from the basic functions of financial 
systems. Topics addressed include expansion of financial access and its contribution to: 
x Investment intermediation 
x Savings mobilization 
x Strengthening of financial architecture 
x Strengthening of institutional capacity; and 
x Benefits for households or individuals. 
Chapter 4 discusses the nature and causes of financial instability in developing countries and its 
relationship to financial sector development. It explores processes relevant to financial access and 
which are transmitted though institutions’ interdependent balance sheets as the basis of an 
analysis of financial fragility and stability. It examines in depth the role of private capital flows 
in financial crises in developing countries and the characteristics of recent private capital flows 
to sub-Saharan Africa 
Chapter 5 uses the framework set out in Chapters 3 and 4 to examine the relationship between 
microfinance and the expansion of financial access, financial sector development and financial 
instability. It charts the expansion of microfinance from its small-scale, charitable origins to 
becoming a large-scale, commercial industry and describes the crises that microfinance has 
suffered in a number of countries in recent years, including the part played by private capital 
flows. It also considers the impact that expansion of microfinance using private capital flows by 
microfinance-orientated institutions has had on: 
x “Mission drift” 
x Balance sheet structures 
x Composition and purpose of lending  
x Level of financial access. 
It concludes that while private capital flows can provide important sources of financing for the 
expansion of institutions, they also can also induce mission drift (including decreasing lending to 
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the poor), increase consumption lending, reduce consumer protection and increase institutional 
fragility. Furthermore, in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, financial access remains 
stubbornly low and explanations of the “barriers” deserve deeper examination. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the thesis’s original research on Kenya, including further detail 
concerning the methodology. 
Chapter 6 examines the institutions serving the poor, including the evolution of institutional risks 
as financial access has expanded. It does this by presenting an original analysis of the balance 
sheets of institutions based on their financial statements. This is combined with interpretative 
material drawn from primary fieldwork interviews with regulators, investors and microfinance 
practitioners. The chapter examines the restructuring of the balance sheets of microfinance-
orientated institutions as financial access has expanded, including increases in credit, liquidity 
and foreign exchange (FX) risk, and the mitigation of these increasing risks through institutional 
capacity and the development of financial architecture. It concludes that, while expansion of 
access is bringing benefits, the institutions through which it has been expanded are experiencing 
increasing financial fragility because the risks involved are not fully mitigated. 
Chapter 7 extends the analysis to systemic implications of the expansion of financial access and 
shows how linkages within the financial system are deepening, including in domestic interbank 
markets and payment systems. The impacts are improved risk management capabilities and 
efficiency, but also heightened financial fragility because of contagion risk. An examination of 
how the expansion of financial access has impacted on the financial sector development follows. 
Although increased deposit mobilization has been achieved by microfinance-orientated 
institutions, it is not clear that the increased mobilisation is incremental in terms of the financial 
system as a whole. Furthermore, much of the credit expansion has been developmentally sub-
optimal because credit has not been intermediated into investments thus assisting structural 
transformation, but into consumption lending and microbusinesses. 
Chapter 8 presents the research findings from the perspective of the “financial lives of the poor”. 
It reports findings from interviews with the poor in urban and rural areas in Kenya that explore 
their financial lives and the place of the expansion of financial access in these lives. Findings 
suggest that barriers to the use of formal financial services by the poor are primarily “voluntary” 
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and may undermine the goals of financial sector development, including mobilization of savings 
and the use of credit for investment in small and medium-sized enterprises in the formal sector. 
In Chapter 9, the thesis concludes by examining the implications of the thesis findings for policy 
and theory. It examines alternative policy approaches that balance financial access and financial 
stability and deepen the contribution of the expansion of financial access to structural 
transformation whilst also ensuring that the expansion of financial access serves the poor. It 
proposes, in conclusion, that using the balance sheet approach as a theoretical framework for these 
discussions has been promising including a potential to link more clearly financial sector growth 
to structural transformation but that it requires further development including extending it to 
examine the overall financial systems of developing economies and the development of new 
metrics that will allow further empirical research. 
 
 
1.5 THESIS DEFINITIONS 
The thesis adopts the following definitions for key terms, drawing on definitions used by the 
World Bank, the OECD and the African Development Bank: 
Access to finance is defined as the share of households, individuals and firms that are able to use 
financial services if they choose to do so. 
A bank run is defined as a series of unexpected cash deposit withdrawals caused by a sudden 
decline in depositor confidence or fear that the bank will be closed with many depositors 
withdrawing cash simultaneously. 
The financial system is defined as the interlocking balance sheets of all financial “agents” and 
real economy agents as they interact with the financial agents. Financial agents include regulated 
banks, non-banking financial institutions, non-regulated and informal savings and credit 
organizations and regulatory bodies. Real economy agents include firms, households and 
individuals. Interaction includes transactions in relation to any financial markets and services, 
including credit, savings and services such as money transfers, and the financial infrastructure 
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such as regulation, credit information–sharing systems and payment, settlement and transfer 
systems. 
The thesis assumes that the financial systems fundamental functions within an economy are as 
follows: 
1. To facilitate the mobilization and pooling of savings, allowing for larger capital sums to 
be applied in investments. Although such pooling is typically through bank deposits, it 
can also take other forms such as capital markets, investment funds and cooperative 
societies. 
2. To provide screening and monitoring that reduce agency problems. Such problems arise 
from asymmetric information in credit markets, without which credit rationing can occur 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). They can take many forms, but include credit project analysis, 
credit information monitoring, and financial and economic monitoring. 
3. To allow for risk-sharing and diversification, including the pooling of investments such 
as within a bank’s lending portfolio, and the creation of tradable investments. 
4. To allow for inter-temporal exchange between borrowers and lenders, removing the 
“double wants” problems between them and allowing for maturity transformation from 
short-term deposits to long-term investments. 
5. To allow for efficient exchange, the provision of liquidity and reduced transaction costs. 
This can be achieved in various ways including through, respectively, economies of scale 
within institutions, market creation, and provision of payment systems. 
 
Financial development is the contribution of the financial system to structural transformation, 
primarily through productivity increases within the real economy and via economic stabilization. 
Financial banking crisis is defined as: (1) Bank deposit runs that lead to the significant 
curtailment of deposit-taking or closure, forced merging, or takeover by the public sector of one 
or more financial institutions; (ii) Borrower runs that lead to the material curtailment of lending 
or closure, forced merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; 
and (iii) if there are no runs, the closure, forced merging, takeover, or large-scale government 
assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a 
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string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions (adapted from Rogoff & Reinhart, 2009; 
Ashok & Bond, 2009). 
Financial fragility is defined as a state where the pre-determinants of institutional failure or 
financial crisis are present and there is an absence of effective shock absorbing mechanisms, 
making a financial institution or system susceptible to endogenous or exogenous shocks that could 
cause a financial crisis. 
Financial architecture is defined as the framework for safeguarding and ensuring the efficient 
and stable functioning of the financial system. Its goal is to strengthen financial systems by 
encouraging sound regulation and supervision, greater transparency, more efficient and robust 
institutions and markets, promoting financial stability by facilitating better-informed lending and 
investment decisions, improving market integrity, and reducing the risks of financial distress and 
contagion. It includes macroeconomic policy, legal structures, macro-prudential and micro-
prudential financial supervision, and institutional and market practises and standards. It relates to 
crisis resolution, deposit insurance, insolvency, corporate governance, auditing and accounting, 
payments and settlement systems, and market integrity. It includes both domestic and 
international structures (material drawn and elaborated from FSB, 2014). 
Financialisation is defined as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein, 2003). 
Institutional failure is defined by a financial institution suffering from events that lead to the 
significant curtailment of deposit-taking or lending, or is otherwise unable to meet its obligations 
and/or its closure, merger or takeover by the public sector. 
Microfinance as defined as the provision of financial services, including savings, credit, 
insurance and payment services, to low-income households or individuals, thus basing the 
definition on the users, not the providers, of microfinance services to the poor. As such it is broad 
and satisfactorily encompasses the proliferating types and forms of institutions that are providing 
“financial access” to the poor. 
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Microfinance-Orientated Institution (MFOI) is any financial institutions with a tendency to 
serve poor households or individuals. It includes all of the following institutions: 
1. Microfinance-orientated banking institutions (MFOB): Which are regulated banks 
designated as such by the Central Bank of Kenya based on the predominant customer 
base and subject to full banking regulation with oversight by the microfinance 
supervisory teams 
2. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions (DTM): Which are non-banking institutions 
licensed for deposit-taking by the Central Bank of Kenya and are subject to specific DTM 
regulation with oversight by the microfinance supervisory teams 
3. Microfinance institutions (MFI): Which are unregulated microfinance institutions. 
Mission drift is defined by the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it is defined as a tendency for 
microfinance-orientated institutions to reduce lending to the poor and increase it to wealthier 
clients, thus drifting away from their social mission to serve the poor (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2001). Secondly, it refers to a tendency to reduce lending for purposes that 
contribute to long-term poverty alleviation and structural transformation, such as lending for 
microenterprise, and increase lending for purposes contributing less or not at all to these goals 
such as, for example, consumption. 
Non-banking financial institution is a financial institution is not regulated as a bank. They can 
include microfinance-orientated institutions as well as insurance companies, housing finance 
providers, pension funds and investment funds. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is defined in line with the IMF sub-Saharan Africa Lower Income and 
Lower Middle Income Countries. Specific countries are: Angola4, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
                                                             
4 Angola graduated to Upper MIC in July 2012 but as it was a Lower LIC for the duration of the thesis 
analysis, therefore it has been included in the data analysis.  
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Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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2. THEORIES OF FINANCE DEVELOPMENT 
 
The theoretical framework which links financial sector development to economic development is 
based upon the financial system’s role in intermediation that mobilizes resources for investment 
and, hence, productivity increases (e.g., Arestis & Demetriades, 1997). This process takes 
multiple forms. Among the most important are those that shift resources from low, labour-
intensive sectors to high-productivity, capital intensive ones which establish infrastructure and 
human capital. 
Empirical studies involving cross-country and time-series regression analysis support the 
correlation of financial sector development with economic growth. Cross-country regression 
analysis examines the relationship between financial development typically measured as the ratio 
of bank deposits or stock market capitalization to GDP and long-run economic growth. It aims to 
explain differences in growth rates between countries by appealing to an isolated factor, in this 
case financial development. A number of studies have taken this approach and found a positive 
relationship. This includes, for example, Gelb (1989), World Bank (1989), Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin (1991), Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Fry (1997), King and Levine (1993), Levine and 
Zervos (1996), and Levine et al. (2000). 
However, such studies cannot establish causality and it remains open to debate. King and Levine 
(1993) propose that finance causes growth, commenting that “higher levels of financial 
development are significantly and robustly correlated with faster current and future rates of 
economic growth, physical capital accumulation and economic efficiency improvements” 
(pp.717-8). Others suggest that causality runs in the opposite direction, namely from economic 
growth to financial development. For example, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) found that 
causality tests suggest that causality runs from growth to finance. 
Given this, a theoretical framework is needed to understand the interaction of financial systems 
with structural transformation. This chapter discusses the existing theories that have been applied 
to this issue which are based in neo-classical frameworks of optimizing agents, and suggests an 
alternative drawn from non-development economics, balance sheet approaches. 
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2.1 EXISTING THEORIES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1.1 FINANCIAL REPRESSION THEORY 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw’s (1973) seminal works set the agenda for linking liberalized 
financial markets to economic growth through neo-classical models of an economy in which 
savings equal investment. Their hypothesis was that removing restrictions in financial markets 
would allow equilibrium interest rates to stimulate supply and demand of deposits and credit 
respectively. They critiqued policies that “repressed” financial markets, such as interest rate 
controls, as suppressing the level of savings and investment capital and distorting the efficient 
allocation of resources. Additionally, McKinnon proposed that financial repression could lead to 
dualism in which firms that have access to subsidized credit have an incentive to favour relatively 
capital-intensive technologies. The implicit assumption underlying the hypothesis is that, with 
liberalization, interest rates will rise and stimulate savings that will then finance higher levels of 
investment and thus growth. 
The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis has been tested in many studies covering a wide range of 
countries and time periods (Gemach & Struthers, 2006). However, the relationship between real 
interest rates and savings rates in liberalized financial systems, including in developing countries, 
has been found to be ambiguous. For example, in a recent study examining developing countries, 
Bandiera et al. (2000) created an index of financial liberalization on the basis of eight different 
measures5 for the period 1970-94 for Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey 
and Zimbabwe. He found that the real interest rate had no positive effect on saving. Instead, he 
found a long-term decline in savings associated with a rise in real interest rates in some countries. 
Similarly, Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001), examined 50 countries, including 36 developing 
countries, and found that although financial liberalization was correlated with higher real interest 
                                                             
5 These included interest rates, reserve requirements, directed credit, bank ownership, prudential 
regulation, securities markets deregulation and capital account liberalization. 
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rates it was also associated with lower investment and lower savings. Overall, therefore, the 
relationship seemed variable between countries. 
 
The concept of financial repression was developed further as part of endogenous growth theory. 
From the 1970s onwards, it incorporated a wider range of variables, more sophisticated 
transmission channels between financial market development and economic growth, and the 
development of formal models. Studies included Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga 
and Smith (1991), Levine (199la), Gregorio (1992), Itoubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986). This theoretical base addressed the issue of causality between 
financial development and economic growth. It examined how financial development, defined as 
levels of intermediation, affects growth and how growth interacts with the growth of financial 
intermediation (Roubini & Sala-i-Martin, 1991). Most analysts proposed that a greater level of 
financial intermediation increases economic growth through improved efficiency of resource 
allocation (e.g,, Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). This literature also examined variables’ 
relationship to policy choices6 (Roubini, 1991; Montiel, 1995) empirically – most commonly 
through regression analysis, as well as the political economic aspects of financial repression8 
(Bird, 1996). However, such analysis did not provide a substantial theoretical framework to 
explain how such variables might act in either the financial sector or structural transformation. 
As this theoretical body of work evolved, financial market liberalization became widely adopted 
as policy. IMF structural adjustment programs in developing countries included them, especially 
after the onset of debt management problems in developing countries from 1982 onwards. By the 
early 1990s, it was apparent that the results of this financial liberalization were disappointing 
(Rodrik, 1990; Nissanke, 1999) and had failed to be straightforwardly associated with growth. In 
                                                             
6 These featured taxes, trade constraints (Roubini, 1991), introduction of technologies, anti-usury laws, 
directed credit policy, restriction of entry into banking, restriction on foreign capital, public ownership of 
major banks and high reserve ratios (Montiel, 1995). 
8 These included directed and subsidized credit policy to chosen sectors, financing of deficits, the raising 
of taxes, and the impact of oligopolistic and foreign dominated ownership of private financial institutions 
(Bird, 1996). 
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addition, they came to be associated with financial fragility and crisis. This is discussed further 
in Chapter 4. 
 
2.1.2 ASYMMETRICAL INFORMATION 
Credit rationing remained a feature of financial markets in many developing countries, despite 
their widespread liberalization. This challenged the financial repression hypothesis based on the 
neo-classical theory of clearing in long-run, equilibrium markets with independently acting, 
rational agents. Thus, “macroeconomics and the financial network is reduced to the behaviour of 
individual agents” (Guilmi et al., 2012, p.2). Such a reductionist approach to a financial system 
allows for little insight into, not only its internal interdependencies, but also its interaction with 
the macroeconomy. 
In 1981, Stiglitz and Weiss proposed a competing neo-Keynesian model based on the theory that 
markets are not necessarily self-equilibrating, but can fail to clear in the long-run. They suggest 
that this can occur in financial markets and results in credit rationing. Stiglitz and Weiss comment, 
“In equilibrium a loan market may be characterised by credit rationing… deriv(ing) from the 
residual imperfect information which is present in loan markets” (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981, p.2). 
This is because in a perfect market credit funds would be unlimited and equilibrium would be 
achieved through increased “price” – that is higher interest rates – matching supply and demand 
for such borrowers and projects. 
However, where there is imperfect information relating to the credit worthiness of borrowers, this 
process does not occur. Instead there is adverse selection, moral hazard and non-clearing markets. 
This is because, in the presence of imperfect information about creditworthiness, lenders cannot 
distinguish between inherently risky and safe borrowers. As a consequence they use “screening 
devices” in order to attempt to differentiate between borrowers, including high interest rates so 
that borrowers self-select based on their willingness to pay high rates. There are two effects of 
this process. First, if a borrower is willing to pay high interest rates then this indicates to lenders 
that the proposal is high risk and this will lead them to reduce the supply of credit. This was 
termed “adverse selection”. Second, there is an incentive effect, because the higher the interest 
rate the lower the chance that projects financed by borrowing will succeed and this induces firms 
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to take on projects with a low chance of success but with very high returns if they do succeed. 
However, only borrowers who either cannot borrow elsewhere because of poor credit worthiness, 
or who have high-risk, high-return projects that can bear higher rates self-select themselves to 
borrow. This means that either the lenders lend and “adverse selection” takes place whereby only 
high risk borrowers and project get credit or borrowers refuse credit altogether and credit rationing 
occurs. Thus higher interest rates lead to reduced credit. 
Further, moral hazard occurs because lenders are unable to monitor and enforce the borrower and 
their project effectively, meaning that the borrower can have a perverse incentive to not repay or 
to not make a full effort to ensure the success of their project or the repayment of funds from it. 
A criticism of this theory is that it is an agent-based theory and, as for the approach of liberalised 
markets, it does not provide a systemic view of a financial system. This issue has been partially 
addressed through models that build on this agent-based approach to represent the credit economy 
as a network of linked heterogeneous agents (e.g., Guilmi et al., 2012), but they remain essentially 
microeconomic, agent-based models, despite their network innovations. Because of this they 
provide limited insight into financial market dynamics including the growth and deepening of 
financial systems and causes of systemic fragility. 
Nevertheless, this theory has important implications for policy because it implies that perfecting 
information would lead to closure of gaps in credit markets. Stiglitz proposes that the policy 
implications of the theory are that it supports a role for state regulation and intervention to correct 
markets. Stiglitz (1994) proposes that pervasive market failures can be closed by governments 
and that to do so would facilitate market functioning and economic performance through 
improving the efficiency with which capital is allocated. He suggests that this occurs because 
there would be an improvement in the quality of borrowers due to the market mechanism of lower 
interest rates creating demand and though direct policy of state selection of borrowers. 
The theory of perfect information and its role in credit markets is particularly important for the 
thesis as it has been applied to microfinance. Stiglitz (1994) draws on his theory of asymmetrical 
information to explain microfinance group lending. In the absence of microfinance, the poor in 
developing countries often do not have access to the formal financial sector. Stiglitz approaches 
this as being a market gap due to asymmetrical information that is closed through group lending. 
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Without group lending, in underdeveloped credit markets little information is available relating 
to the credit worthiness of the poor borrower, leading to moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Further, in developing countries, this cannot be compensated for, as in developed credit markets, 
by collateral and contract enforcement. This leads formal banks to withdraw from the market 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2007). 
In this framework, microfinance is a method to overcome the issues of asymmetrical and 
incomplete information through group lending. The group self-selects members known to them, 
ensuring that only the creditworthy are included, and self-selects projects to be financed, which 
they are able to do more effectively because of their social and economic links with one another. 
As the group is held jointly liable for any loan and the members are able to more easily monitor 
each other, it provides more effective “social collateral” and “peer monitoring” through group 
pressure on individuals within the group in order to avoid the negative economic and social impact 
on the group of a failure to repay. Such group lending thus avoids moral hazard and adverse 
selection and improves the efficiency of capital allocation. These gains should then allow interest 
rates to fall, further mitigating the moral hazard problem. Thus group lending overcomes credit 
market deficiencies created by asymmetrical information for formal sector lenders to poor 
borrowers (Stiglitz, 1990; Armendariz & Morduch, 2007). 
This theory examines the microeconomics of group lending as an example of agency-based credit 
markets. However, two issues arise in applying it to microfinance. Firstly, it assumes group 
lending is taking place. As will be discussed later, in fact, in microfinance, group lending has 
been increasingly replaced by individual lending. Such individual lending has taken a number of 
forms. For example, it has included progressive lending, which refers to the practice of increasing 
loan size to borrowers with good credit histories and collateral arrangements. This requires a re-
examination of the theory to consider its continued relevance. This has featured in a number of 
studies that look at alternative mechanisms within agency-based theory (e.g., Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2010; Giné & Karlan, 2009). 
Secondly, such theoretical innovations do not address the main critique of these theories – that 
they do not provide systemic insights relating to the financial system. This is discussed further in 
Section 2.1.5.  
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2.1.3 THE INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH  
Simplistic liberalization – the policy recommended by the theories of financial repression – 
yielded disappointing effects on financial system deepening. Moreover, it was increasingly 
associated with financial fragility and crisis. Alongside the development of imperfect markets 
theory, new ex-post approaches emerged in response to these shortcomings. 
They remained based on the neo-liberal paradigm which led to liberalizing private financial 
markets, but were augmented by features designed to defend the original theory despite its 
disappointing empirical record (Fry, 1997; Rodrik, 2005). These approaches were as focused on 
policy as on theory as they sought to address the practical problem of what policy approaches 
build a financial system that materially assists development. 
The key approach was a focus on institutions. In terms of financial systems, institutions were 
defined as financial intermediaries, markets and regulators. This represented a move away from 
neo-classical and imperfect information approaches based only on individual agents, although 
and as will be discussed in the next section, the approach remained firmly entrenched within the 
neo-classical framework. 
This approach was supported by empirical studies, which linked long-term economic growth to 
well-functioning institutions. For example, Rodrick et al. (2004) estimated through regression 
analysis the respective contribution of institutions, as well as geography and trade, to the 
determination of income levels. They concluded that institutions “trump everything else”. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) examined the role of “property rights institutions”, which protect against 
private property expropriation, and “contracting institutions”, which enforce private contracts, 
and found a strong relationship between both types of institutions and long-term economic 
growth, investment and – importantly for the present argument – financial development measured 
as private sector credit to GDP and stock market capitalization. 
It has been proposed that regulation and supervision contributed to the development of financial 
institutions. For example, McKinnon (1991) suggests that adequate regulation and supervision is 
required to control moral hazard problems within the financial system. Banks can be incentivized 
to take excessive risks relative to their capitalization when protected by government safety nets. 
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In these circumstances they have a “one way bet” on risks whereby they are the beneficiaries of 
gains, but governments bail them out in the instance of losses. Similarly, depositors may be dis-
incentivized from monitoring the creditworthiness of banks where deposits are guaranteed 
explicitly through deposit insurance or through the market belief in an “implicit guarantee” due 
to the presence of contagion fears so that, in the event of the bank failing, the government will 
bail it out, ensuring they do not suffer a loss. 
Empirical studies have supported the role of certain aspects of institutions in financial market 
development. For example, Porta et al. (1997, 1998) found a correlation between the strength of 
legal protection given to minority shareholders and creditors, and the extent of the development 
of capital markets. More recent research also supports the need for “enabling institutions” in 
financial systems. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) provide evidence that suggests that the causal 
link between finance and growth is crucially determined by the nature and operation of the 
financial institutions and policies pursued in each country. Honohan and Beck (2007) suggest that 
in Africa “two main factors discourage lending … the difficulty of obtaining information … to 
assess clients’ credit worthiness … (and) the difficulty of enforcing creditor rights” and propose 
that “a well-functioning legal system… procedural regulations and strong institutions, backed by 
proper enforcement mechanisms… are essential for financial system development” (Honohan & 
Beck, 2007, p.77). 
However, it remains an open question as to what form an “enabling environment” should take. 
Honohan and Beck recommend addressing issues such as “reforming the legal systems, 
improving financial information and transparency… establishment of credit registries and 
training of financial professionals” (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p.7). 
However, these approaches are essentially a replication of “best practice” taken from advanced 
economies’ financial infrastructure of microprudential regulation in liberalized markets. As the 
financial crisis in advanced markets underlined, such an approach, even when instructional 
capacity and development is “modernist” (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p.10) does not prevent 
financial fragility and crisis. Indeed, such approaches were heavily criticized post-crisis for failing 
to sufficiently control moral hazard within the banking system, especially in relation to excessive 
risk-taking, and for not engaging in macroprudential regulation (e.g., Independent Commission 
for Banking, 2011). 
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In addition, “financial development” was defined simply as the growth of finance relative to GDP. 
The relationship of this to economic growth – and especially structural transformation of the 
economy defined as productivity increases – was not examined in the Institutional approach. 
Furthermore, despite these empirical studies mainly based on regression analysis, the institutional 
approach was increasingly challenged by the historical experience of a lack of a clear relationship 
between the adoption of the recommended institutions and reforms and sustained economic 
growth (Rodrik, 2014). This took two forms. Firstly, developing countries who followed the 
prescribed policies experienced financial instability accompanied by sharp retractions in their 
economic growth trajectories. This included countries in Asia and Latin America. Secondly – and 
more challengingly because it could not be dismissed as an episodic bout of financial excess – 
countries that had very different institutions and economic policies saw strong and persistent 
economic growth. Countries that did not deregulate or liberalize their trade and financial sectors 
saw rapid and deep economic growth and poverty reduction. This was most notable in East Asia, 
including in China. Conversely, countries that followed policies of significant liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization saw disappointing and only episodic growth. This includes many 
countries in Africa and Latin America (Rodrik, 2007). 
 
2.1.4 STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES 
These failures led to a rethink – but not an abandonment of – the neo-liberal approach which was 
adapted to a new framework focused on structural transformation. 
In this approach, structural transformation is defined as the shift of resources from low to high 
productivity activities (Rodrik, 2013) (and as adopted by the thesis). This results in sustained 
economic growth where this takes place under “first-order principles” which ensure that markets 
function. For example, the principles include protection of property rights, contract enforcement 
and market-based competition. However, these are presented at a greater level of abstraction than 
under previous approaches (Summers, 2003; Rodrik, 2007).  
These first-order principles are able to function because of effective institutions. “Institutions” in 
this context are understood as broadly-defined mechanisms that create or enforce these first-order 
principles. For example, they include institutions for enforcing property rights and contracts, 
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establishing macroeconomic stability, creating supportive environments for private sector 
development or integrating economies into world trade (Summers, 2003; Rodrik, 2005). They can 
include broadly-defined mechanisms such as informal and social arrangements and have been 
extended to include government actively adopting a role in coordinating investments for industrial 
upgrading and diversification and in compensating for externalities (Lin, 2012). 
Because this approach allows for a much broader range of context-specific policy approaches and 
institutional structures than the Institutionalist approach it is able to provide insight into a much 
wider range of historical experiences – as discussed further below. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
framework is still built on the foundations of a “self-sustaining, market economy” and embedded 
in a more generalised, but still firmly neo-classical theory. 
In relation to financial systems, the main “first order principle” is “sound money” (Summers, 
2003; Rodrik, 2007). “Sound money” is defined as the first-order principle of “not generat(ing) 
liquidity beyond the increase in nominal money demand at reasonable inflation” (Rodrik, 2007, 
p.33). Institutions of relevance to finance include central banking, fiscal policy and regulation 
(Rodrik, 2007). 
Finance can also be a binding constraint – that is the key constraint that prevents structural 
transformation taking place. For example, this might include constraints such as a high cost of 
financing of investment, low investment returns or low savings returns (Rodrik, 2007). 
This approach has been developed into a more sophisticated framework that proposes an “optimal 
financial structure” for development. It is argued that the optimal financial structure is 
exogenously determined by the factor endowments of the real economy because they determine 
“efficient” mobilisation and allocation of capital. The optimal structure is also dynamic, changing 
as the endowment structure of an economy changes during development (Lin & Xu, 2012). The 
exogenous determinants of an optimal financial structure include firm size, risk and financing 
needs. If the financial structure does not complement the factor endowments of the real economy 
then the financial system is inefficient and hinders economic growth. Such a mismatch can be the 
cause of crisis. This includes mismatch through the failure of critical institution for finance, 
regulation (Lin, Xifang & Ye, 2011).  
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2.2 CRITIQUING EXISTING THEORIES 
Theories of financial development have evolved. Early work did not address issues of causality 
between the financial sector and economic development, or were limited to addressing only 
selected variables and so do not present a sophisticated analysis of the financial system and its 
development. 
Subsequent theories have aimed to develop such an analysis. Financial repression theory purports 
to examine how intermediation by the financial system between savings and investment allows 
efficient resource allocation within the economy, thus accelerating growth. 
Stiglitz’s theory of asymmetrical information links information to the clearing of financial 
markets and examines how incomplete information leads to market failures, including credit 
rationing. 
However, these theories present limited insights into financial systems and economic 
development. This is because they are underpinned by neoclassical economics where economic 
systems are represented as systems composed of optimising representative agents subject to 
constraints. In the strong version, this implies that an economic system is not more than the actions 
of individual agents and that there is no interaction between agents. In the weak version, the theory 
allows for interactions between agents to modify the economic system’s properties with a 
feedback loop to individual behaviour, providing for a system to be represented as a “network”. 
This is most explicit in Stiglitz’s work as discussed above (Bezemer, 2011). 
However, two critiques can be made. Firstly, financial systems are not composed of independent 
agents or “networks” of agents. Financial “agents” are highly interdependent and this 
interdependency means that the financial system acts as a single system. This determines 
phenomena that are important in financial systems and cannot be adequately explained by theories 
relating to individual agents. These include market herding, pro-cyclical behaviour and processes 
underlying financial instability such as contagion and coordinated institutional failures. 
Furthermore, a theory of financial markets – and particularly one that seeks to explain the links 
between financial systems and structural transformation – requires a framework of specified 
transmission channels. These are mechanistic in existing agent-based theories. For example, the 
critical intermediation functions of the financial system between savings and investment is 
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represented as a mechanistic process of choices by these independently-acting agents determined 
by simple variables such as interest rates or the level of “perfect” information. However, 
transmission channels within the financial system are more complex than this because financial 
institutions do not simply pass money on from saving to investment but, in addition to individual 
agents decisions, act in interdependent ways and respond to risk (Bezemer, 2011). 
Secondly, these neoclassical-based theories present the economy as a system in equilibrium. The 
outcome of individual optimization processes is a stable equilibrium (or several equilibria) that 
only deviates from equilibrium due to external shocks. There is no endogenous instability or 
structural change. However, financial systems are not stable but are subject to repeated instability 
with endogenous origins (Minsky, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Further, financial systems in 
developing countries are undergoing structural (not cyclical) change, which cannot be represented 
by an equilibrium model. 
These criticisms are valid for the structural transformation approach where – consistent with neo-
classical economics – finance and financial systems are represented as a pass-through from 
savings to investment. The pass-through is represented as mechanistic. The financial sector is 
absent as a system or a sector in its own right. The concept of “sound money” and binding 
constraints on finance are essentially monetarist views where money supply and demand move 
towards equilibrium as determined by interest rates. Institutions relevant to finance are limited to 
microprudential regulation of markets and the agents that comprise them. The approach does not 
take account of the repeated historical failures of such regulation (Toporowski et al., 2013; Rodrik, 
2015). 
The structural transformation approach does, however, have a number of key advantages over 
other neo-classical approaches. It defines growth through productivity change in the real economy, 
arguably the central process of economic development. It also incorporates the empirical findings 
about the importance of institutions in development discussed earlier. 
This means that it provides a stronger framework than earlier approaches for explaining the 
diversity of historical growth patterns in developing countries. It does this by allowing common 
first-order principles to function effectively through multiple institutional forms. It can then 
explain, for example, the economic convergence in Asia that adopted policy that did not follow 
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the simplistic neo-liberal policies of earlier approaches but that still experienced strong and 
sustained convergence with advanced economies. It also allows insights into the development 
constraints in Africa and Latin America where – in contrast to Asia – neo-liberal policy 
approaches were adopted but sustained economic growth did not materialise (Rodrik, 2005, 2013, 
2014, 2014a, 2015). 
The approach allows a more nuanced role for governments in development, one which is 
compatible with historical experiences – especially in Asia – where governments played an active 
role in promoting industrial diversification and upgrading. The latter role is represented in the 
structuralist approach as government acting to solve coordination problems and manage 
externalities (Lin, 2012). 
However – despite these advances over previous approaches – the structuralist approach provides 
weaker insights into financial systems and their relationship to structural transformation.  
Firstly, this is because the central framework is focused on the real economy and presents a three-
sector model of it that is comprised of agriculture, industry and services. There is no financial 
sector in the model and the financial sector remains the mechanistic pass-through of neo-classical 
economics. 
In the extension of the framework that discusses the optimal financial structure, the approach is 
more sophisticated because it links the real and financial sectors through the interaction of finance 
with factor endowments and productivity. This is an important theoretical innovation and one that 
the thesis seeks to build on. However, the transmission mechanisms within the financial system 
that make this link remain unexplained.  
The empirical support for these theoretical innovations also remains weak. For example, empirical 
studies define financial structure as the balance between banks and stock markets but with an 
undeveloped rationale as to why this parameter is the crucial factor that relates finance to factor 
endowments and productivity (Lin, Xifang & Ye, 2011; Cull & Xu, 2011; Lin & Xu, 2012). 
Instead, financial development remains largely defined by the growth of credit (Cull & Xu, 2011).   
Also problematic is that – despite stating that one of the central aims of the approach is to explain 
historical development patterns (Rodrik, 2007) – the framework relating to financial systems 
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excludes one of its most notable features – financial instability and crisis. Instead, financial crisis 
– one of the most important experiences of developing countries in Asia and Latin America – is 
demoted to being just one possible “constraint” on savings and investment (Rodrik, 2007) or a 
problem of institutional weakness (Lin & Xu, 2012). Even after the 2007 financial crisis in 
advanced economies and the subsequent impact on developing countries, there was no rethink of 
this position (Rodrik, 2007, 2012).  
These weaknesses in relation to incorporating finance and financial systems into the structuralist 
approach makes the insights it provides into finance – unlike those it provides into the real 
economy – limited.  
 
2.3 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS 
These criticisms of existing theory are of particular relevance to developing economies. In such 
economies, the critical function of the financial system is its contribution to stable economic 
growth and structural transformation.  
As we have seen, existing theory is of little assistance in understanding the ways that financial 
development interacts with structural transformation nor how financial fragility evolves and can 
result in a financial crisis. Their neo-classical analysis marginalises finance and financial systems 
to an essentially mechanistic intermediation of savings and investment, with binding constraints 
relating to the quantity of credit that is determined by interest rates.  
However, there is an alternative offered by non-development economics, namely the “balance 
sheet” (also known as “flow of funds” or “stock flow consistent”) approach. This approach 
derives from the work of a number of heterodox economists including, most notably, Keynes 
(1936) and Minsky (2008) as well as Fisher, Veblen, Schumpeter, Kalecki, Tobin and Godley.  
The approach seeks to examine financial systems through the balance sheets of the agents that 
interact with it. This includes the balance sheet assets and liabilities of households, firms and 
governments. The economy is represented as a system based on the interlocking balance sheets 
of all its agents (Allen et al., 2002; Eichengreen et al., 2005).  
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It argues that in the financial system, interlocking balances sheets are the transmission 
mechanisms for both economic growth and financial fragility. Such financial fragility results not 
from cost – as presented in the neo-classical view – but from a more sophisticated understanding 
of the balance sheet operations of financial institutions and the risk within them. This includes 
examination of liquidity, temporal and currency mismatches and their relationship to balance 
sheet structures (Cozzi & Toporowski, 2006). 
Analysis using the balance sheet approach can take two forms. Firstly, it can use a simplified 
formal matrix that represents all financial transactions as double-entry booking-keeping based on 
credit or debit transactions, with the system represented as offsetting debits and credits between 
the interlocking balance sheets of multiple agents. These can be presented both as stock and flow 
matrices (Godley & Lavoie, 2007; Caverzasi & Godin, 2013). 
The second approach in empirical research is to examine the aggregate ratios such as leverage, 
temporal and currency ratios. For example, the empirical analysis of aggregate ratios for the 
financial sector such as leverage and liquidity ratios can be examined (e.g., Cozzi & Toporowski, 
2006). This second approach is the one adopted by this thesis.  
This approach has a number of key advantages over other frameworks discussed in this chapter. 
It provides a sophisticated representation of the financial system and how its relates to the non-
financial sector through a specified transmission mechanism – the interlocked and interdependent 
balance sheets of financial and non-financial agents – and places the financial structure of the 
economy at the core of its wider economic processes.  
It nevertheless, rests upon agent-based micro-foundations, because agents continue to act in 
relation to their individual balance sheets. However, because the financial system is formed by 
the interlocking and interdependent balance sheets of the individual agents, the macroeconomy is 
fully integrated with its micro-foundations.  
Research using these approaches has been used mainly in relation to advanced economies. 
However, they have also been deployed to examine developing economies, especially in relation 
to financial crisis. For example, Krugman (1999) explains the Asian crisis in terms of firms’ 
balance sheets with fragility resulting from leverage and mismatches in currency exposures 
(Krugman, 1999). Eichengreen et al. (2005) argue that developing country financial fragility 
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results from their inability to borrow in domestic currencies, thus resulting in currency 
mismatches with balance sheets (Eichengreen et al., 2005). Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) used 
the approach to examine the Asian financial crisis of 1997 through the interlocking balance sheets 
of firms and banks and their interdependence for liquidity.  
We suggest that the approach can be extended beyond this focus in order to examine the process 
of financial system development where the central concern is how the  financial system 
contributes to structural transformation. Such an analysis needs to move beyond the neo-classical 
approaches discussed earlier in this chapter that focus on the “quantity” of credit and related 
binding constraints. Instead a more sophisticated analysis is needed that examines the “quality” 
of intermediation as the key determinant of the financial system’s relationship to structural 
transformation.  
This challenges the current definition and measurement of “financial development” in terms of 
the quantity of credit. Current typical quantitative indicators of “financial sector deepening” 
include the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to GDP, the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, and 
the ratio of deposits to GDP. No transmission mechanisms are specified or measured (source: 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database; Beck et al., 2008).  
By contrast, we propose that a theory of financial sector development must specify the 
transmission channels through which it contributes to structural transformation and must be 
measured by its contribution to structural transformation and economic stability. Most explicitly, 
this includes its contribution to increasing and shifting resources from low to high productivity 
activities within the economy. 
Because of these potential advantages, we adopt the balance sheet approach to guide our 
exploration of access to finance in developing economies. Therefore, much of what follows 
involves the detailed examination of the balance sheets of microfinance-orientated institutions 
and the “agents” – the institutions and poor households – that act upon them.  
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3. Theory of Financial Access and Financial Development 
 
In recent years, improved financial access – measured by an increased proportion of households 
and firms that are able to use financial services if they choose to do so – has been linked to the 
broad financial sector and economic development with increasing frequency. Expansion of 
financial access has become a policy of many international development agencies and national 
governments based on the assumption that it can contribute to the development of a stable and 
efficient financial and economic system (Department for International Development, 2013). The 
African Development Bank, for example, describes financial access as “a driver of inclusive 
growth” and “necessary to ensure economic growth performance is inclusive and sustained” 
(African Development Bank, 2012, p.25). International development agencies that have adopted 
the expansion of financial access as policy include the World Bank Group, the G20 (through its 
Financial Inclusion Action Plan), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), 
the African Development Bank, and the United Nations. This chapter considers the theoretical 
and empirical evidence that supports this link. It will discuss this issue with a focus on sub-
Saharan Africa, in the context of the thesis focus on Kenya. 
As will discuss further in this chapter, the theoretical and empirical basis for this link is limited. 
In part, this results from the methodological challenges of determining the impact of 
microfinance. The methodologies employed have included comparative group studies, 
randomized control trails (RCTs) and pipeline studies. However, all suffer from methodological 
weaknesses (Department for International Development, 2011). Comparative group studies suffer 
from the problem of identifying a well-founded control group that permits an adequate 
comparison between those with access to microfinance and those without. Consequently, such 
studies are often unable to effectively isolate the effects of microfinance or access to finance from 
other possible factors. This is particularly the case because participants may exhibit selection bias, 
whereby individuals in a programme self-select or are selected by criteria that make them differ 
from the comparison population. Selection bias can be related to observable characteristics such 
as employment status, age, sex, educational attainment, or unobservable characteristics, such as 
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motivation, entrepreneurial ability or business skills (Armendáriz & Morduch 2007). Many early 
studies of this type found microfinance to be beneficial but the results are questionable because 
they failed to address these methodological problems with comparative groups and selection bias 
(Goldberg, 2005; Department for International Development, 2011). 
Because of these issues, randomized control trails (RCTs) – which select random groups to 
receive or not receive microfinance in otherwise similar circumstances – were completed and also 
expected to provide a more robust methodology. They randomly assign subjects to either 
treatment or control group in order to ensure that potential outcomes are not contaminated by 
selection bias (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2008). Randomized control trial studies include: Duflo et 
al. (2008); Field and Pande (2008); Karlan and Zinman (2008); Banerjee et al. (2009); Mel et al. 
(2009); Dupas and Robinson (2009); and Karlan and Zinman (2010). However, methodological 
problems have undermined randomized control trials, such as ethical issues, pseudo-random 
allocations and attrition, and thereby made the results generated difficult to interpret (Department 
for International Development, 2011). 
A further alternative method are “pipeline” studies which compare a sample from the population 
which has had access to finance to an equivalent population that is about to receive the treatment 
for the first time in order to combine an appropriate control group with randomised selection. 
Studies include: Coleman (1999, 2002, 2006); Copestake (2001, 2002, 2005); Cotler and 
Woodruff (2005), Kondo et al. (2008); and Deininger and Lui (2009). However, the study design 
has not been sufficiently rigorous (Department for International Development, 2011) and there 
has been a failure to replicate the results (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
Evidence limitations also relate to the fact that the majority of research has usually been directed 
at more constrained questions than the relationship between financial access and financial 
development. For example, much of the existing research to date has focused on the impact on 
poverty. This has explored the impact of financial access on microenterprises and pro-poor 
employment creation but with little enquiry into macroeconomic investment and employment. 
Similarly, there has been research into the savings behaviour of the poor but not savings 
mobilization at the macroeconomic level.  
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Limitations in methodology and scope mean that research into the relationship between financial 
access and economic growth has yielded ambiguous results. This is true even in relation to poverty 
alleviation and some studies have concluded that there is no clear quantitative evidence that 
microfinance programmes alleviate poverty (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2007, 2010; Sebstad & 
Chen, 1996; Gaile & Foster, 1996; Goldberg, 2005; Odell, 2010; Orso, 2011; Department for 
International Development, 2011). 
Research results are made more ambiguous because microfinance can result in multiple outcomes. 
These include not only economic effects but also social outcomes, such as female empowerment 
or strengthened social relations (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
DfID concluded negatively, stating that  
it remains unclear under what circumstances, and for whom, microfinance has been and 
could be of real, rather than imagined, benefit to poor people … microfinance activities 
and finance have absorbed a significant proportion of development resources, both in terms 
of finances and people. Microfinance activities are highly attractive, not only to the 
development industry but also to mainstream financial and business interests with little 
interest in poverty reduction or empowerment of women ... There are many other candidate 
sectors for development activity which may have been relatively disadvantaged by ill-
founded enthusiasm for microfinance (Department for International Development, 2011, 
p.75). 
Hence, whilst the thesis examines the links between financial access and financial development, 
there is no established framework to guide us. As a result, the thesis adopts an approach based on 
the basic functions of the financial system set out in Chapter 1 and the current academic literature 
relating to microfinance. Using this approach we have identified five hypotheses concerning the 
processes that may link the expansion of financial access to financial development as defined by 
its contribution to structural transformation. These are as follows: 
x Financing investment: An essential function of the financial system that provides capital 
for increases labour productivity. This can be invested by households in small and 
medium-sized enterprises and agriculture or, via pooling of resources, in larger-scale 
investment for industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture. 
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x Mobilization of savings: An essential function of the financial system that provides a 
source of capital for pooling and intermediation to investment. 
x Development of financial architecture: Which can contribute to financial development 
and stability. 
x The building of institutional capacity: To ensure stable and effective institutions 
including financial, legal and regulatory institutions. 
x Benefits for poor households: Which requires consideration because microfinance  
specifically target poor households.  
These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
3.1 INVESTMENT FOR STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
An essential function of the financial system is to intermediate mobilized savings into investment. 
In developing countries structural transformation requires investment to be directed at the 
transformation of low-productivity sectors into high-productivity sectors. This includes, for 
example, investment in establishing and developing manufacturing and service sectors, 
transforming agriculture from low-productivity subsistence agriculture to high-productivity 
agriculture, and building infrastructure. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, such financing of investment is often absent for microenterprises and small 
and medium-sized enterprises and for important areas such infrastructure, agriculture and large-
scale private sector investment (African Development Bank, 2012). For example, the African 
Development Bank (2012) reports that in sub-Saharan Africa, on average, only 22% of small and 
medium sized enterprises have a loan or a line of credit, compared to 43% in other developing 
economies. Similarly, 45% of firms cite access to finance as a “major constraint to growth” 
(Demirguic-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). Furthermore, this problem is more acute for smaller firms 
with the majority of domestically and internationally-generated credit flowing to large firms and 
70% of small and medium-sized enterprises funding themselves through the exclusive use of 
internal funds (African Development Bank, 2012; OECD, 2006). 
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It has been proposed that expanding financial access will lessen these credit constraints and help 
close the “missing markets” in areas essential for structural transformation. Policy has focused 
largely on microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises because of the high level of 
informal and self-employed individuals amongst poor households in most developing countries 
(e.g., Collins et al., 2009; Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). 
Research has provided ambiguous guidance, partially due to contradictory results and 
methodological issues leading to the ineffective assessment of impacts. Some studies have found 
positive correlations between access to finance and small and medium-sized enterprises’ 
performance10 (e.g., Thio et al., 2006; Ahiahar, 2013). Others have found positive impacts in the 
short term, but not in the long-term (e.g., Ssendi, 2009), or negative or neutral results in terms of 
small and medium-sized enterprises’ growth (Department for International Development, 2011). 
A number of studies have suggested that finance may not be the binding constraint in growth in 
microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises. Instead, other binding constraints are 
identified, such as the relatively high risks faced by the small and medium-sized enterprise sector 
that causes financial institutions to refuse credit (Kauffmann, 2005) and that results in high rates 
of business failure, estimated at 40% in some sub-Saharan African countries (African 
Development Bank, 2012), and the quality of management and entrepreneurship (McKenzie, 
2010). 
As with microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, credit for agriculture remains 
constrained. This is of particular relevance to sub-Saharan Africa because its economies remain 
concentrated in subsistence agriculture, representing 40% of GDP and 65% of employment 
(African Development Bank, 2012). Agricultural GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa has 
accelerated from an average of 2.3 per cent per year in the 1980s to an average of 3.8 per cent per 
year between 2000 and 2005. However, this growth reflects the expansion of cultivated areas – 
not productivity increases – with farm yields remaining among the lowest in the world (source: 
World Bank). Furthermore, only 10% of Africa’s total private bank lending goes to agriculture 
                                                             
10 Impact studies examining household impacts are discussed in a subsequent section. However, it should 
be noted that given the nature of informal employment for poor households, there is an overlap between 
enterprises and households’ respective impact.  
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and agro-industries, a small fraction of which makes its way into rural subsistence agriculture 
(African Development Bank, 2012). 
Recent policy has shifted from an emphasis on direct government financing of agricultural 
development to providing access to finance for agriculture via microfinance-orientated 
institutions (Morvant-Roux, 2011). Financing of agriculture requires access to finance in rural 
areas and credit suitable to agriculture. Both have been found by empirical studies to be 
inadequate. Financial access in sub-Saharan Africa’s rural areas remains stubbornly low with only 
19% of the rural population having a banking relationship, compared to 34% of the urban 
population (African Development Bank, 2012), and insufficient levels of credit even where access 
is available (Morvant-Roux, 2011). 
The credit available is also often unsuitable. Agriculture needs working capital to finance inputs 
throughout the agricultural cycle with repayments scheduled post-harvest. It also needs long-term 
finance for investments to improve productivity such as irrigation, soil enhancements and 
mechanization. 
However, research has found many microfinance products are unsuitable for these agricultural 
financial needs. For example, repayment structures are not matched to agricultural cycles (Collins 
et al., 2009; Morvant-Roux, 2011). Credit suffers from small loan amounts and short maturities 
that are inadequate to address long-term investment needs (Miller et al., 2010). Specific case 
studies have confirmed these general results. For example, in Ethiopia, financing for agricultural 
cycles and value-chain finance for coffee farmers suffered from insufficient supply, excessive 
costs and inadequate timing, length and scale (Bastin & Metteucci, 2007; Rosengard, 2007). 
Overall, the impact of expanding financial access in rural areas has had a limited effect in terms 
of relieving constraints on agricultural finance. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that micro-savings are used largely in consumption 
smoothing or short-term working capital for informal business (Dupas, 2010; Rosenberg, 2010), 
rather than the long-term investment needed for structural transformation. Such consumption 
smoothing may have benefits for the poor – as discussed further below – but it also suggests that 
most credit provided through expansion of access to finance is not being channelled into 
investments that drive productivity improvements in manufacturing, services or agriculture. 
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3.2 SAVINGS MOBILIZATION 
Mobilization of savings by the financial system is fundamental to the provision of financial 
resources for investment. Savings by households provides a stable, low cost and low risk source 
of financing compared to, for example, international private capital flows (African Development 
Bank, 2009). Because of these advantages a key component of stable and efficient financial sector 
development is savings mobilization. 
In relation to financial access, its role in the mobilization of savings within the economy is an 
explicit theoretical and policy goal. For example, the African Development Bank comments that 
improving “domestic resource mobilization ... will require deepening domestic financial 
intermediation to mobilize savings” (African Development Bank, 2009, p.1) and that “Domestic 
savings may turn out to be significant and, possibly, a cheaper alternative to external sources of 
financing (than bond financing)” (African Development Bank, 2009, p.3). 
However, concerns have been raised about whether such savings mobilization is possible because, 
by definition, poor households have very limited surplus funds for savings. This dynamic of 
savings being constrained by income at a macroeconomic level was first raised by Keynes (1936), 
but can also be considered at a microeconomic level. Research in microfinance has argued that 
poor households with subsistence incomes had no saveable surpluses and that this was the reason 
for them having no savings (Bhaduri, 1977). More recent household survey data has found that 
the most frequently cited reason for not having a formal savings account is a lack of income 
(Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009; African Development Bank, 2012). Also, there is 
some indication that formal savings may be pro-cyclical in relation to deposit bases as 
withdrawals are made rapidly in response to negative shocks to households (Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor, 2009), although Consultative Group to Assist the Poor found that “under 
normal circumstances” aggregate balances for low-income savings accounts are stable. 
However, there have been a number of challenges to this. Firstly, savings is a very common goal 
in the informal sector, including, for example, savings clubs or rotating lending organizations, 
and poor households actively use them to accumulate savings, especially for lump sum needs such 
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as education, health care or life events, such as marriages or funerals (Collins et al., 2009). A 
number of studies of microeconomic financial behaviour have demonstrated that both within the 
formal and informal sector poor households have a savings capacity and are able to provide for 
non-subsistence expenditure (e.g., Patten and Rosengard, 1991; Rutherford, 2000; Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2007; Collins et al., 2009). Many microfinance-orientated institutions offer savings 
accounts, with 92% of microfinance-orientated institutions in 2008 having saving accounts, up 
from 41% in 2003, and research has indicated that, where specific and structured products are 
offered, these assist in helping the poor to achieve savings (Ashraf et al., 2006b; Collins et al., 
2009; Duflo et al., 2006). Because of this, some researchers have suggested that savings from 
poor households may be able to contribute to savings mobilization and increases in capital stock 
(e.g., Karlan, 2009a; Central Bank of Kenya, 2010a; African Development Bank, 2009). 
However, these studies examine short-term savings, but these results do not hold for long-term 
savings and asset accumulation. Research using “financial diaries” found that whilst poor 
households can save for short-term lump sums, they remain very constrained in their ability to 
save long-term (Collins et al., 2009). This suggests that the basic constraint of savings being 
constrained by income and consumption over the long run remains relevant. 
This is further supported by macroeconomic level findings that savings – measured by, for 
example, savings as a percentage of GDP – are strongly correlated with increased income at both 
an individual and national level. Indeed for developing countries it is estimated that, with a 
doubling of income per capita, there is an increase in the long-run private savings rate of 10 
percentage points of disposable income (Loayza et al., 2000). Furthermore, the use of formal 
financial services in developing economies is correlated with income, with adults in the top 
income quintile being five times more likely to save formally than the median household (African 
Development Bank, 2012). In addition, current savings rates have high serial correlation to past 
saving (Loayza et al., 2000), suggesting that savings are not only a function of disposable income, 
but also a habit which has to be established. 
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These access issues are reflected in low African savings rates, with a median savings rates for 
Africa of 10.2% of GDP, the lowest for any region globally with the exception of the Middle East 
(African Development Bank, 2012)11. 
Currently poor households’ savings remain largely outside of the formal banking system. 
Informal savings clubs are more common than formal savings accounts, with 100 million adults 
using them in sub-Saharan Africa and 34% of savers making only informal savings (African 
Development Bank, 2012). This continued dominance of informal savings amongst poor 
households means that intermediation and pooling of funds from them through the formal 
financial system remains limited. 
Overall, it is possible that financial access could mobilise savings but this requires a shift of 
savings from informal to formal institutions. To date such a shift has been limited in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Further, income is an important barrier to formal savings by poor households and this is 
a problem that can only be solved by broader economic development. 
 
3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
An important feature of financial system development is the evolution of financial architecture. 
Financial architecture is the framework that strengthens financial systems through sound 
regulation and supervision, greater transparency, more efficient and robust institutions and 
markets. It promotes financial stability by reducing risks of financial distress and contagion. It 
includes legal structures, financial supervision, institutional and market practises and standards. 
It can relate to market integrity, crisis resolution, deposit insurance, insolvency, corporate 
governance, consumer protection, auditing and accounting and payments and settlement systems. 
It can include both domestic and international structures (Basel Committee, 2010). 
                                                             
11 A compounding problem for the growth of domestic savings in Africa countries, particularly 
commodity-exporting ones, is the high levels of capital flight (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011). Indeed, 
Africa is the continent with the highest share of national wealth held abroad (Collier & Dollar, 2001) and 
a high ratio of offshore to onshore deposits (Beck et al., 2011).  
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In many developing countries, financial liberalization and deregulation was implemented to lift 
“financial repression”. In sub-Saharan Africa, this financial liberalization and deregulation was 
accompanied by a greater frequency of banking crisis throughout the 1990s (Aryeetey & 
Nissanke, 1998). Weakened and ineffective regulation were considered to be contributing factors 
in these crises, as well as broader corporate and public governance problems, such as corruption 
and bad banking practices (Laeven & Valencia 2008). Beck et al. [year], comment that 
“widespread fragility (was) mostly caused by governance problems at the bank level and at the 
regulatory level or simply by bad banking practices” (Beck et al., 2011, p.194). 
Sub-Saharan regulatory frameworks have undergone significant legislative change since 2000 
(Beck et al., 2011). For example, legislative reforms have imported “best practices” from 
international frameworks such as Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(BCPs) (Beck et al., 2011; Murinde, 2012). These approaches are, however, problematic as, not 
only is there almost no relationship between BCPs and banking sector stability (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2008), but, even when the application of these principles are well executed, they 
can be unsuited for African financial systems (Murinde, 2012). In addition, some commentators 
have found that they do not address adequately the problems of politically-connected corruption 
and fraud. Such issues have been at the core of a number of recent banking problems in Africa, 
including those in Nigeria (Cull et al., 2010), Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana and Kenya (Beck et al., 2011). 
In relation to microfinance specifically, initially microfinance-orientated institutions were largely 
unregulated. However as microfinance has commercialized, microfinance-orientated institutions 
have increasingly converted into regulated entities with assets becoming concentrated into fewer 
(but larger) regulated financial institutions (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). 
Development of regulation has also been driven by increased deposit-taking, which represents a 
risk to the depositors as opposed to lending where the risk is borne by the lending institution 
(Beck & Maimbo, 2013). 
In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published guidelines for deposit-taking 
microfinance-orientated institutions and this has generally formed the basis of the enacted 
regulation and legislation. The guidelines highlight the need for regulation and legislation to 
“weigh the risks posed by this line of business against supervisory costs and the role of 
microfinance in fostering financial inclusion” (Basel Committee, 2010, p.1). The guidelines 
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examine the need for licensing and for setting of permissible activities and limitations on risk-
taking relative to the risk management capacity of institutions and the risk characteristics of micro 
lending (Basel Committee, 2010). However, it offers little concrete guidance on the nature of such 
risks. 
Different countries have adopted different regulatory regimes. Some have introduced specialist 
microfinance legislation and regulatory bodies, while others regulate microfinance-orientated 
institutions under general banking frameworks and regulators, with still others having no 
legislation or regulation of microfinance (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2009). 
This has included consumer protection and consumer credit bureaus. Consumer protection has 
also gradually developed, including deposit insurance, disclosure requirements and business 
practice standards. Deposit insurance aims to ensure financial stability by providing protection to 
the depositors from loss of deposit values up to a specified level in the event of bank failure, thus 
reducing the chance of bank runs and contagion effects. To date, only four countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) have an explicit deposit insurance system 
in place (IMF, 2009) and only some of these cover microfinance. Other aspects of consumer 
protection remain limited. Disclosure requirements exist in only 40% of African economies and 
microfinance-orientated institutions are often excluded from them (Beck & Maimbo, 2013). 
Similarly, business practices, such as advertising and debt management, remain poorly regulated 
(Beck & Maimbo, 2013). 
Credit bureaus provide information-sharing mechanisms relating to the creditworthiness of 
borrowers. Potentially, they will allow poor households, who are unable to offer collateral, to 
establish good credit records, while excluding bad debtors. Equally, they can prevent multiple-
indebtedness and over-indebtedness. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, only Burundi, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have integrated 
microfinance-orientated institutions into credit bureau infrastructures, although most other 
countries have public or private registries (Beck & Maimbo, 2013). 
The expansion of financial access poses a risk and offers an opportunity in relation to financial 
architecture. The opportunity is that the rising scale and capacity of microfinance-orientated 
institutions and regulators will enable the development of a financial architecture to support the 
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stable, efficient and fair expansion of financial access. However, the risk lies in the expansion of 
financial access without such strengthening of the financial architecture or that it expands without 
the architecture matching increases in scale or complexity. Indeed, according to Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, there is a “worrisome gap between the adoption and enforcement of 
new regulation” (Beck & Maimbo, 2013, p.28) and microfinance remains a “gap in regulation 
and supervision” (IMF, 2009), indicating that there is also a risk that expansion of financial access 
could create financial instability. This will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING 
The development of a dynamically stable financial system that contributes to economic 
development depends upon the soundness of its financial institutions 12 . Strong and stable 
institutions underpin financial growth and stability. Conversely, weak and unstable institutions 
create, not only institutional failures, but also the contagion effects that can lead to coordinated 
systemic failure within the financial system. 
The Bank for International Settlements Core Principles for Banking Supervision outlines key 
elements of institutional soundness. Of particular relevant to microfinance are principles relating 
to corporate governance, capital adequacy, operational risk, audit and internal control, accounting 
and compliance with supervisory standards (Basel Committee, 2012). 
Thus, the contribution that the expansion of financial access will make to financial sector 
development is dependent upon the soundness of microfinance-orientated institutions. 
Microfinance-orientated institutions have rapidly increased their scale and complexity since 2000. 
While increase in scale and complexity leads to greater outreach, it must be matched by increasing 
institutional capacity. This is because such increasing scale and complexity places increasing 
demands on management capacity, operational ability and risk management within organizations. 
To date, there has been little quantification of the institutional capacity of microfinance-orientated 
institutions in terms of academic research (Hermes & Meesters, 2011). This is partially because 
there are some weaknesses in methodologies required to measure “institutional capacity”.                                                              
12 Regulatory institutions are discussed in the section relating to financial architecture.  
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Methodology to date has sought to measure, for example, “strength of stakeholder ownership” or 
“effectiveness of organizational arrangements,” and has sought to measure these through, for 
instance, the presence of certain functions or processes or through household, customer or 
employee surveys (World Bank, 2011a). However, the “capacity” of an institution is, by its 
nature, “more than the sum of its parts” and has subjective – as well as objective – dimensions. 
Alternatively, to research approaches, regulators assess institutional soundness – of which 
capacity is a part – as an aspect of their supervisory practises. Detailed approaches have been 
developed based on BIS standards under Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015). They typically use regulatory reporting – such as on capital and liquidity ratios – and audits 
of regulated institutions. However, the outcomes of such regulatory supervision are not public 
and so cannot be used for research. 
Because of these issues, there is limited information with which to make an assessment of the 
institutional capacity of microfinance institutions. However, there has been some information 
published by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (a World Bank sponsored research body), 
including the “Microfinance Banana Skins” report13, a survey of opinions from microfinance-
orientated institutions’ reporting to the Microfinance Information Exchange. The survey provides 
a subjective ranking of concerns from practitioners. Although it lacks a measure of the level of 
concern and is subjective, it nevertheless provides some useful information about institutional 
capacity. 
Tables 1 and 2 below report information from these reports. Table 1 shows that practitioners 
report credit, liquidity and foreign exchange risk as being amongst their top concerns. Credit risk 
has been ranked as the top risk from 2009 to 2012. Liquidity risk was ranked as the second most 
concerning risk during 2010.. Foreign exchange (FX) risk was ranked as the second most 
concerning risk during 2009. 
 
                                                             
13 “Microfinance Banana Skins” is an annual survey of microfinance practitioners conducted by the 
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, a non-profit think-tank and is sponsored by Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor and Citi Microfinance. 
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Table 1. “Microfinance Banana Skins” ranking of credit, liquidity and FX risk 
“Biggest 
Risks” 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Credit 10th 1st 1st 1st 4th 
Liquidity 12th 8th 2nd 16th 10th 
FX 20th 2nd 8th 24th 20th 
Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2008-2012) 
 
Table 2 shows that practitioners are concerned about dimensions that are related to institutional 
capacity. These include ranking “management quality” as the top concern in 2008 and “corporate 
governance” as the second concern in 2012 and 2008. 
Table 2. “Microfinance Banana Skins” ranking of institutional capacity 
“Biggest Risk” 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Management 
Quality 
1st 4th 4th 7th 3rd 
Corporate 
Governance 
2nd 7th 7th 4th 2nd 
Staffing 5th 14th 14th 8th 14th 
Managing 
Technology 
8th 15th 15th 11th 16th 
Back office 
Operations 
18th 22nd 22nd 13th 12th 
Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2008-2012) 
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For microfinance-orientated institutions, credit risk is the key risk because of the inherently poor 
credit worthiness of poor borrowers. The Bank for International Settlements Core Principles for 
Banking Supervision in relation to credit risk set standards for “prudent policies and processes to 
identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate credit risk ... (During) the full 
credit lifecycle … (of) credit evaluation, and the on-going management of the bank’s loan and 
investment portfolios… problem assets, provisions and reserves and concentration risk and large 
exposure limits” (Basel Committee, 2012, p.27). 
As discussed previously, traditional microfinance-orientated institutions have overcome this 
inherent poor credit risk through group lending. However, as commercialized microfinance-
orientated institutions have increased the scale and complexity of their credit portfolios, the nature 
of their credit risk has altered because their group lending has declined in favour of individual 
lending. As shown in Table 3, from 2003 to 2008 all types of lending grew. However, individual 
lending grew most rapidly with the number of microfinance-orientated institutions involved 
exclusively in individual lending nearly quadrupling from 74 to 281 and the percentage increasing 
from 32% to 41%, with related assets increasing from $5.5 billion to $15.6 billion. Microfinance-
orientated institutions offering both individual and group lending also increased from 96 to 272, 
although the percentage was stable at about 40%, with related assets increasing from $1.6 billion 
to $6.6 billion. In contrast, microfinance-orientated institutions offering only group lending 
increased in number from 61 to 125, but fell in percentage terms from 26% to 18%, with related 
assets growing more slowly that overall market growth from $0.3 billion to $1.9 billion. Overall, 
by 2008, 81% of all microfinance-orientated institutions offered individual lending with a 
majority offering only individual lending. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Types of lending practices (2003 and 2008) 
2003 2008 
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Type of 
Lending 
Practice 
MFOIs 
(% & number) 
Total Assets 
($ billion) 
MFOIs 
(% & number) 
Total Assets 
($ billion) 
Individual 32% (74) 5.5 41% (281) 15.6 
Individual & 
Group 
41% (96) 1.6 40% (272) 6.6 
Group 
lending only 
26% (61) 0.3 18% (125) 1.9 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange elaborated by the author. 
 
This shift towards individual lending in microfinance-orientated institutions has meant a growing 
exposure to uncollateralized lending to individuals with low incomes in circumstances where 
formal contracts or collateral are uncommon, and, if they exist, problematic to enforce, meaning 
that in the event of default there is little recourse available to lending institutions. Some 
microfinance-orientated institutions have resorted instead to new debt collection techniques, such 
as public humiliation of those in default, but such techniques have proved controversial and led, 
in extreme cases, to negative political and social repercussions. These events are discussed further 
in Chapter 5. 
In addition – and little discussed by either practitioners or academics – more complex risks such 
as portfolio credit risk are increasing in scale and complexity and may not be complemented by 
increasing institutional capacity or more rigorous regulatory approaches. This is discussed further 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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3.5 BENEFITS FOR POOR HOUSEHOLDS 
Structural transformation is defined by macroeconomic outcomes, which have microeconomic 
foundations within firms or households. The foundations of microfinance and access to finance 
have been examined largely at the household level because of the focus on poverty alleviation. 
This section will discuss two themes identified by others 14  from this literature relevant to 
financial sector development, namely poverty alleviation, risk management, and coping 
strategies. 
We adopt an alternative approach to these themes based on research into the financial lives of the 
poor. This approach evolved from earlier qualitative work that related to broader interests in the 
lives of the poor compared to their financial lives. For example, “Voices of the Poor” (Narayan 
et al., 2000), a World Bank-assisted study, conducted direct interviews with the poor in a number 
of countries. It describes the poor’s need to create an “adequate and secure livelihoods” as the 
“central concern of poor people’s well-being” (Narayan et al., 2000, p.45). Income is low and 
volatile with “constant juggling and struggle” (p.45). The poor seek to manage by diversifying 
income sources, often through informal employment. Informal credit and moneylenders are 
frequently used as an important coping mechanism in relation to volatile income and are 
commonly used for managing daily necessities and emergencies, but not entrepreneurship. Fear 
of debt and its consequences “run deep” and “the act of borrowing itself can set people on a 
downward slide rather than providing them with a bridge to a better life” (Narayan et al., 2000, 
p.58). The study also sought out interviews specifically with the minority who had improved their 
situation and were relatively affluent compared to their communities. Where circumstances have 
improved substantially for more than a minority, this was attributed to “changes in government 
economic and social policy” (Narayan et al., 2000, p.63). However for individuals 
“entrepreneurship”, income diversification and “building assets and developing secondary 
                                                             
14 For example, the Africa Development Bank comments that access may enable “individuals and 
businesses currently excluded from the formal financial sector … to engage in income-generating 
activities and manage risks associated with their livelihoods” (African Development Bank, 2012, p.23).  
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sources of income” (p.63) are the “most frequent paths out of poverty”. Individuals considered 
credit as a minor factor in their success. 
These approaches are philosophically close to the work of Amartya Sen who discusses the 
concepts of “capabilities” and “unfreedoms” (Sen, 1999). He describes “unfreedoms” as 
constituted by the “prevalence of preventable disease, needless hunger, premature mortality, 
unceasing illiteracy, social exclusion, economic insecurity and the denial of political liberty” 
(Sen, 1999). He describes the poor’s ability to participate in economic growth as being dependent 
upon a variety of “enabling social conditions” (Sen, 1999). He comments that, “if one has no 
capital (not even a tiny plot of land in the absence of land reform), and no access to micro-credit 
(without the security of collateral ownership) it is not easy to show much economic enterprise”. 
Although this lists lack of access to micro-credit as one of the “unfreedoms”, Sen places it in the 
context of an enabler of social and political freedoms and empowerment. 
Such perspectives can be criticized because they lack a strong quantitative approach. This has 
been partially resolved by the adoption of mixed methodologies in recent studies. For example, 
“Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day” (Collins et al., 2009) uses 
financial diaries to generate a much richer understanding of the financial lives of the poor and to 
gather quantitative and qualitative longitudinal data. The study collected year-long financial 
diaries from hundreds of low income households in South Africa, India and Bangladesh and 
sought to understand the assets and cash flow of the poor, the types of risks they sought to manage 
and the methods by which they did so. The study presents a rich picture of the sources of financial 
vulnerability of the poor. In particular, it highlights that the poor are impacted by low and volatile 
income, high vulnerability to shocks and a lack of long term assets to provide for security and life 
events. 
Of particular interest regarding the financial vulnerability of the poor in developing countries is 
their employment. Typically, the poor work in informal employment. Such employment includes 
subsistence agriculture and informal sector work, and is characterized by low productivity, low 
capital intensity and low incomes combined with susceptibility to shocks. At a macroeconomic 
level, both are impacted by the existence of surplus labour or “disguised employment” (Robinson, 
1937) and are highlighted in development economics in theories of surplus labour (e.g., Lewis, 
1954). 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  62 
The diaries show us how the poor manage these issues through the frequent use of informal 
financial services. Such informal services vary widely between countries, but often include 
various community savings and lending organizations, moneylenders and informal trade 
associations. Such organizations typically address the need for borrowing and savings over short 
time periods and for relatively small amounts. They are crucial to the financial lives of the poor 
and enable “risk management” of low and erratic income (Collins et al., 2009). Low levels of 
access to formal financial services are balanced by the high use of informal financial services 
such as savings clubs, moneylenders and social networks. Financial diaries have become a 
common focus of research and are likely to provide valuable findings. When financial services 
are placed in this context, the potential it offers to assist the poor in managing their “portfolios” 
becomes clear. For example, the need to provide safe and reliable savings, insurance and 
flexibility that reflect volatility in cash flow and shock management are more important needs of 
the poor than simple credit. 
Overall these studies have the key advantage of providing a richer qualitative and quantitative 
approach to examining the financial lives of the poor, including greater engagement with the 
reality of poor people’s lives and placing their “voices” as central to research. Issues such as the 
importance of credit for daily cash management, the preference for informal credit and the 
importance of stabilizing income with credit can be better understood. It is for these reasons that 
the thesis has adopted a mixed methodology approach that roots it in the context of the “voices” 
of the poor in regard to their financial lives. 
 
3.5.1 Poverty Alleviation 
Poverty alleviation is not an element of economic development, but its goal. If broadening of 
financial access alleviates poverty then, ipso facto, it contributes to economic development. 
Research into the relationship between poverty alleviation and financial access has not provided 
consistent results. For example, Banerjee et al. (2009) in a study of urban India found no 
statistically significant relationship between household consumption and access to finance 
(Banerjee, 2009). Kaboski and Townsend (2009) in a study in Thailand found no increase in 
investment income and, although they did find increases in short-term consumption, the study 
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was unable to differentiate if this was simply financed by debt. Similarly, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored a research program in Peru, India and 
Zimbabwe, and found net income gains in Peru and India but no impact in Zimbabwe (Snodgrass 
& Sebstad, 2002). Further studies have found no impact on average income, combined with a 
wide dispersion of results around the average with some people being made worse off by 
microfinance (Roodman, 2010).  For example, Banerjee et al. (2009) found evidence that some 
microcredit programs may be harmful, because they psuch the poor into excessive debt.  
In addition, in a different type of study, little correlation has been found between the growth of 
microfinance and economic development. For example, a study by Banerjee and Duflo (2007) of 
MIT’s “Poverty Action Lab” in Bangladesh, where in 2001 approximately one out of four 
households had at least one microloan, showed that microcredit had little impact on the country’s 
relative development performance. In 1991, for example, Bangladesh ranked 136th on the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (a measure of societal well-
being). Fifteen years later it ranked as 137th. Banerjee and Duflo assigned this to microfinance 
growing via increased consumption rather than income generation. It is, however, difficult to 
interpret these results as the studies fail to take into account that many factors other than 
microfinance are related to broad economic development. Nevertheless, they raise the question 
of whether microfinance plays any significant role in economic development and poverty 
alleviation. 
 
3.5.2 Risk Management & Coping Strategies 
The financial lives of the poor are dominated by risk and uncertainty. The risks that are managed 
include the need to manage incomes that are not only low, but also highly volatile, due to their 
reliance on informal employment and subsistence agriculture. In agriculture, there is a high 
vulnerability to shocks from agricultural prices and weather. Such low and volatile income 
therefore creates a need for coping strategies, including consumption smoothing. Non-financial 
strategies include: relying on family and social networks to receive and give assistance; resources 
rationing; asset pawning; usage and sale; and income diversification and migration. However, 
these strategies, while allowing short-term coping, deplete available resources and livelihoods 
over the long term (Cekran, 1993; Bird, 2002; Dercon, 2002). 
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Studies indicate that improved access to both formal and informal financial services can help the 
poor to cope with these risks. Informal services can address the need for borrowing and savings 
over short time periods and for relatively small amounts amongst community groups in order to 
smooth consumption by matching borrowing to erratic and uncertain incomes (Collins et al., 
2009; Dupas & Robinson, 2010; Rosenberg, 2010). Similarly, savings clubs or trade associations 
allow the poor to accumulate or borrow lump sums for important needs, although they are poor 
at facilitating long-term asset accumulation (Collins et al., 2009). As such, informal finance plays 
an important, but incomplete, role in risk mitigation and coping strategies for the poor (Collins et 
al., 2009). Other research suggests that such non-credit services, including savings and insurance, 
may be more valuable than credit in poverty alleviation as they facilitate asset accumulation that 
can act to smooth consumption, finance lump-sum expenditures (such as school fees), or to 
provide “self-insurance” against shocks (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
Recent innovations in microfinance have addressed these needs by providing insurance. This 
includes health insurance and, for agriculturalists, weather and crop price insurance. Studies to 
date indicate the positive effects of insurance. For example, Janze et al. (2013) report that drought 
insurance reduces asset depletion and maintains nutritional intake during droughts in Kenya. 
However, to date, evidence for the effectiveness of insurance products remains under-researched, 
with preliminary analysis suggesting limitations on effectiveness, especially since the poorest 
households may not be able to afford it (Mosley, 2009). 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Limited theoretical and empirical research links the expansion of financial access to broader 
financial and economic development. This is partially due to limitations in methodology and 
research questions. However, it also relates to the fact that existing theories of financial sector 
development lack specific financial transmission channels to link financial sector development to 
structural transformation. 
Five channels by which financial access might contribute to financial development have been 
identified. They include increasing investment, savings mobilization, the development of 
financial architecture, the development of institutional capacity, and the impact on poor 
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households. However, empirical research into each presents, at best, ambiguous results in relation 
to the impact of expansion of financial access on structural transformation through these channels. 
Increases in investment in microbusinesses and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
because of increased financial access may be quite limited and linked most closely to increases 
in short-term working capital and consumption smoothing. Savings mobilization in the formal 
financial system through microfinance-orientated institutions has been limited and appears more 
closely correlated to income than to financial access. Financial architecture and institutional 
capacity have increased as microfinance-orientated institutions have increased scale and 
complexity, but remain challenged by the increasing risks that accompany it. The impact on 
poverty also remains ambiguous, although there does appear to be stronger evidence that financial 
access improves poor households’ ability to cope with risk and allows them to execute coping 
strategies which can bring considerable welfare benefits. These five channels through which 
financial access can contribute to financial development and structural transformation will be 
examined further in the fieldwork. 
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4. FINANCIAL ACCESS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
Financial crises have repeatedly occurred since monetary and financial systems started to emerge 
in early stage capitalist economies and have been consistently accompanied by deep and 
prolonged recessions that have been very damaging to economic prosperity and growth (Rogoff 
& Reinhart, 1999; Kinderberger, 2005; Boissay et al., 2013). These financial crises have been 
associated with many causes and processes. These include macroeconomic policies – such as 
inflation, currency imbalances, large current account deficits and high levels of public debt – and 
excessive credit booms, large capital inflows, and balance sheet fragilities. 
Since 1990 the frequency of financial crises in developing countries has increased in middle-
income countries, causing sharp recessions with prolonged recovery periods. If fact, middle-
income countries have experienced such frequency of financial crises in the post-1990 period that 
it has been colloquially termed the “Great Volatility” (Ocampo et al., 2010). 
However, despite these problems and the increae in the expansion of financial access as policy, 
the role played in financial stability by the expansion of financial access has not been widely 
researched (Khan, 2011; Adasme et al., 2006), despite its importance in ensuring economic 
stability as well as growth. 
This chapter will discuss this issue. It will start with a discussion of the existing scholarship and 
includes a consideration of a possible complementary relationship between financial stability and 
financial access, or of a trade-off between them. The chapter will then prepare the context for the 
fieldwork further by discussing the causes and processes of financial crises relevant to the 
expansion of financial access. 
Three particular aspects have been identified as relevant for the following reasons: 
x Balance sheet soundness: As discussed in Chapter 2, we have adopted the balance sheet 
as the theoretical framework that underpins financial development and stability. 
Understanding how financial instability impacts the balance sheet of financial institutions 
is, therefore, important in examining its relationship with financial access. 
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x Impact of private capital flows: As will be discussed later, private capital flows, and 
especially cross-border flows, have been repeated causal factors in financial crises in 
developing countries. Private capital has also been the key source of financing behind the 
recent expansion of microfinance-orientated institutions. Thereby, we seek to examine 
the relationship between them and financial instability. 
x Contagion between banking institutions: Contagion is the transmission process that 
creates financial instability through the interlocking and interdependent balance sheets of 
economic agents and therefore is the most relevant process in financial crises for our 
discussions. We focus on contagion between banking institutions – as opposed to through 
financial markets – because financial systems in developing countries remain largely 
bank-based and because banking institutions (both formal and informal) form the basis 
of the expansion of financial access. 
These three aspects will be explored by building on frameworks that take institutions’ balance 
sheets as the basis of financial stability or fragility, so that the financial system is presented as a 
system of interdependent balance sheets (Krugman, 1999; Mishkin, 2001; Eichengreen, et al. 
2003, 2005; Kregel, 1998; Arestis & Glickman, 2002; Cozzi & Toporowski, 2006). The approach 
has been used in a number of contexts, including examining the role of corporate leverage and 
currency mismatch in the Asian Crisis of 1997 (Krugman, 1999; Mishkin, 2001; Cozzi & 
Toporowski, 2006; Kregel, 1998; Arestis & Glickman, 2002; Cruz et al., 2005) and currency and 
maturity mismatches in sovereign debt (Hausmann & Panizza, 2003). 
Various definitions are given for a systemic crisis but generally the consensus is of default within 
individual institutions broadening through contagion to cause widespread institutional failures. 
For example, the European Central Bank defines a banking crisis as “An event during which the 
financial sector experiences bank runs… (and) sharp increases in default rates, accompanied by 
large losses of capital” (Boissey et al., 2013). The IMF defines a systemic banking crisis as an 
event when “A country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults 
and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a 
result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system 
capital is exhausted… In some cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in 
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most cases it is a general realization that systemically important financial institutions are in 
distress” (Laeven & Valencia, 2008, p5).  
We will define financial crisis, financial fragility and institutional failure in terms of events, rather 
than by empirical measures (following Rogoff & Reinhart, 1999)15. Institutional failure is defined 
as a financial institution suffering from events that lead to the significant curtailment of its 
deposit-taking or lending, or its closure, forced merger with other institutions or takeover by the 
public sector. Financial crisis is defined as bank deposit or borrower runs (Bond & Ashok, 2009) 
that lead to a significant curtailment of deposit-taking or lending activity or closure, forced merger 
or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions or large-scale government 
assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions), which marks the start of 
a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. Financial fragility is defined as a state 
where the pre-determinants of institutional failure or financial crisis are present, making a 
financial institution or financial system susceptible to failure or crisis. 
 
4.1 FINANCIAL ACCESS AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
The relationship between the expansion of financial access and stability has three possible forms. 
Financial access could: enhance stability; increase financial fragility and instability; or have no 
impact. If increased financial access creates financial instability it is highly likely to damage GDP 
growth and poverty alleviation (Rogoff & Reinhart, 2009). 
Financial instability has already been associated with microfinance (discussed in Chapter 5 in 
more detail), leading to a need to examine whether there is a systematic relationship between 
them. However, despite the rapid expansion of financial access and these episodes, there has been 
little empirical research on their relationship thus far. This is partly because of difficulties in 
measuring both financial access and stability on a consistent basis across different countries and 
                                                             
15 Two approaches can be adopted in research in order to define “crisis”: an empirical approach, such as 
measures of GDP declines, or an event-based approach. I favour the latter for the thesis because it 
encompasses a more complete range of events. The empirical approach, while potentially providing an 
objective definition, does not always capture the full range of events required. It can, however, be useful in 
some instances such as, for example, its utility when defining “crisis” or “shocks” for policy responses 
(Velde et al., 2011). 
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over time (Cull et al., 2012). The balance sheet framework we adopt presents an alternative to 
these methodologies. 
Despite this lack of empirical research, there has been discussion of these possible relationships, 
especially among regulators to whom this is an important concern. Some commentators have 
proposed that the expansion of financial access may enhance financial stability (Adasme et al., 
2006; Thorat, 2010; Khan, 2011; Calice, 2012; Cull et al., 2012). A number of transmission 
mechanisms have been proposed to support this conclusion. These overlap with the arguments 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, suggest that expansion of financial access could simultaneously 
contribute to financial development and financial stability. The specific transmission mechanisms 
proposed by these authors – although not necessarily concurred with by the author – include the 
following: 
x Microfinance assets reduce balance sheet risks among microfinance-orientated 
institutions because the portfolios of small lenders are more diversified and creditworthy 
than a portfolio of larger lenders (Khan, 2011). For example, in a study of Chilean banks 
it was suggested that systemic risk resulting from losses on small loans is low, relative to 
less predictable and infrequent losses on large loans (Adasme et al., 2006). 
x Deposit bases will grow and become a more stable source of financing for financial 
institutions because small savers lead to a diversified and more resilient financial sector, 
especially during crises when other sources of liquidity can be scarce (Khan, 2011). 
x Financial inclusion improves the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission that is an 
instrument for managing economic growth and stability16 (Khan, 2011; Calice, 2012). 
x Financial inclusion promotes the shift from informal institutions to formal ones, which 
are more stable and susceptible to effective regulation (Cull et al., 2012; Khan, 2011; 
Calice, 2012). 
                                                             
16 Khan comments: “Financial inclusion facilitates greater participation by different segments of the 
economy in the formal financial system. The presence of a large informal sector can impair the 
transmission of monetary policy as a significant segment of financially excluded households and small 
businesses make financial decisions independent of, and un-influenced by, the monetary policy actions of 
the central bank. As the share of the formal financial sector increases through greater financial inclusion, 
it yields an important positive externality by making monetary policy transmission more effective” 
(Khan, 2001, p.4).  
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x Financial inclusion increases the efficiency of intermediation by increasing the number 
of transactions and participants, thus allowing economies of scale to develop (Khan, 2011; 
Calice, 2012). 
Commentators have also proposed that the expansion of financial access carries a negative 
relationship to financial stability and suggest a trade-off between stability and access for the 
following reasons: 
x Quality of credit portfolios may be poor because lending to less developed, low income 
markets is subject to greater information asymmetries associated with customers who 
are typically without collateral or a credit history. Parallels have been drawn to the sub-
prime crisis where, in the portfolios of small lenders, correlated risks resulted in material 
losses at a portfolio and capital level (Khan, 2011). 
x Institutions involved in the expansion of access are subject to increased credit risks, 
including concentration risk and liquidity risks (Khan, 2011). 
x Financial innovations involved in the expansion of financial access increase risk. 
Specific issues include outsourcing of financial inclusion services, new technology 
platforms and reputational risks (Khan, 2011). 
There are also dependencies that would allow financial access to be achieved without adverse or 
positive effects, on financial stability. These include the need for sound institutions, regulation, 
and risk management. Khan (2011), for example, comments that “financial inclusion and financial 
stability must coexist… (But) increasing financial inclusion is difficult unless banks and other 
financial service providers are sound, financial markets are functioning normally and financial 
market infrastructure is robust” (Khan, 2011, pp. 6, 17) and that what is required is “a risk-
mitigating framework to exploit the complementarities while minimising the conflicts” (Khan, 
2011, p.18). 
In a more specific prescription of the required mitigants, Thorat, the Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of India, comments that  
financial inclusion can work within the framework of mainstream banking within a sound 
regulatory framework. Regulations have been used to facilitate financial inclusion without 
subventions or compromising on prudential and financial integrity norms. Regulations 
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have been proportional to the risks… (and) have been adopted after careful assessment of 
risks to the banks and to customers. The preference has been to restrict deposit-taking to 
banks and non-bank financial companies are encouraged to focus on innovative approaches 
to lending under a lighter regulatory framework, with additional regulations for 
systemically important non-banking financial institutions. Non-banking non-financial 
institutions are encouraged to be partners and agents of banks rather than principal 
providers of financial services. Fair and transparent code of conduct enforced through an 
effective grievance redress system and facilitated by financial literacy and education are 
the cornerstones for ensuring consumer protection which is an overarching objective of 
financial regulation in the context of financial inclusion (Thorat, 2010, p.30).  
Similarly, Adasme et al. (2006) emphasizes the role that credit risk management can play in 
ensuring that loan portfolios are well managed and that appropriate capital levels are set for 
microfinance-orientated institutions. 
 
4.2 BALANCE SHEET SOUNDNESS 
The structure of financial institutions balance sheets is the basis of their financial soundness or 
fragility. Financial fragility in individual institutions is important because if the institutions 
through which financial access is expanding are fragile, this will contribute to financial fragility. 
Individual institutional financial fragility and failure is also important in microfinance because 
microfinance-orientated institutions serve the poor and so, for financial development to be pro-
poor, sound institutions are important for ensuring that reliable services are provided and that the 
poor’s deposits are safe. 
Africa has experienced repeated and damaging financial instability with, between 1990 and 2009, 
141 systemic crises including 44 banking crises, 71 currency crises, 25 sovereign debt crises, 22 
twin crises (banking and currency) and four triple crises (banking, currency and debt) (Rogoff & 
Reinhart, 2009). Table 4. shows that banking crises – with their roots in institutional failure – 
were most common between 1990 and 2009 when, out of the 47 sub-Saharan African countries, 
27 (or 57%) experienced institutional failures within the domestic financial system. The impact 
of crises is estimated to be an average of 10% of GDP but have been as high as 25% of GDP (in 
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Cote d’Ivoire in 1988) (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2003). In contrast to the sovereign debt crisis of the 
1980s, post-1980s financial fragility was concentrated in smaller, domestic private sector 
institutions. Causes of banking crisis have been identified as macroeconomic weaknesses and 
structural problems. Structural causes in the private sector that have been identified include: 
inadequate regulation and supervision; poor governance; loss of value due to competition from 
new entries; contagion between banks; and illiquidity and insolvency (Mezui et al., 2012). 
Table 4. Post-1990 institutional failures in sub-Saharan Africa 
(NPLs are non-performing loans). 
Country Dates Details 
Angola 1992-1996 2 banks insolvent 
Benin 1988-1990 3 banks insolvent & NPLs reached 80% 
Botswana 1994-1995 Banks merged, liquidated or recapitalized 
Burkina Faso 1988-1994 Banking system NPLs at 34% 
Burundi 1994-1995 Banking system NPLs at 25% 
Cameroon 1987-1998 Banking system NPLs at 60-70% 
Cape Verde 1993 Banking system NPLs at 30% 
Central African 
Republic 
1988-1999 Banking system NPLs at 40% 
DR Congo 1992-1994 Banking system NPLs at 75% 
Rep of Congo 1992 2/3 of countries banks closed 
Cote D-Ivories 1988-1991 Banking system NPLs at 90% 
Gambia 1995 1 bank closed 
Gabon 1992 1 bank closed 
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Ghana 1982-1989 7/11 banks insolvent 
Guinea 1993-1994 8/9 of countries banks insolvent 
Guinea-Bissau 1995 Banking system NPLs at 90% 
Kenya 1992-96 Banking system NPLs at 30% & interventions needed 
in local banks 
Liberia 1991-1995 Banking system NPLs at 60% and 7/11 banks not 
operational 
Mauritius 1997 2/12 banks closed due to fraud 
Nigeria 1992-1997 Banking system NPLs at 20% but 50% of banks in 
financial distress 
Rwanda 1991 One bank failed 
Senegal 1988-91 Banking system NPLs at 50% & 7 banks failed 
Sierra Leone 1990 Banking system NPLs at 50% 
Swaziland 1995 3 banks required bailouts 
Uganda 1992-2002 50% of banks insolvent 
Zambia 1995 1 bank failed 
Zimbabwe 1995 2/5 banks with high NPLs 
Source: Rogoff and Reinhart (2009). 
 
Recent commentators have been positive about the soundness of sub-Saharan African financial 
institutions. For example, Beck et al. (2011) describe African banking institutions as “stable”, 
“well capitalized and liquid” although still with “problems of scale and volatility… (and) limited 
intermediation”. However, financial instability has continued in recent years. For example, in 
Nigeria in 2009, there was a major banking crisis in which a boom in banking, with high levels 
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of consolidation, new equity issues and regional expansion, collapsed and by 2009 nine 
institutions required government guarantees and bailouts, including state injections of capital and 
forced mergers (Sanusi, 2012). Furthermore, post-2009, there has been a region-wide surge in 
non-performing loans in many countries, including Tanzania, Kenya and Gambia (Lunogelo et 
al., 2009; Central Bank of Kenya, 2013; IMF, 2010). 
Banks’ susceptibility to institutional failure is dependent on their balance sheet structures 
(Minsky, 2008; Bock & Demyanets, 2012). Sub-Saharan African banks’ balance sheet structures 
have characteristics that make them less susceptible to institutional failures. They typically have 
traditional balance sheet structures, funding themselves primarily through deposits with a “hold-
to-maturity” lending portfolio and have high levels of low risk assets (such as government 
securities, liquid and foreign assets) and lower levels of lending to the private sector (Beck et al., 
2010). Sector lending is biased towards lower-risk trade, commerce and construction with an 
underrepresentation of higher-risk agricultural lending and infrastructure (Beck et al., 2010). 
However, these aspects of the banks’ balance sheets, whilst protective for individual institutions, 
collectively create “missing markets” in sub-Saharan Africa such as for long-dated or private 
sector lending (Beck et al., 2010). 
Table 4 shows that, despite these protective features, multiple institutional failures have occurred 
following deteriorating asset quality as indicated by the high levels of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). In developing countries asset quality is negatively influenced by lower economic growth, 
exchange rate depreciation, weakening terms of trade and reversal of portfolio inflows (Bock & 
Demyanets, 2012). 
Institutional fragility has been associated consistently with increasing leverage both within 
institutions and the overall banking system, making banks more vulnerable to shocks (Thakor, 
2005; Adrian & Shin, 2009; Toporowski, Tyson & Shabani, 2013). Prior to the 1990s, developing 
country leverage was associated largely with sovereign debt. During the developing country debt 
crisis of the 1980s, there were defaults on public debts following the shocks of sharp falls in 
commodity prices and sharply rising interest rates (Rogoff et al., 2009). 
Since the 1990s developing country crises has become increasingly associated with leverage in 
the private sector, rather than the public sector (McKinley & Tyson, 2014). For example, the 1997 
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Asian financial crisis was characterized by balanced government finances but institutional failures 
resulting from private firms and financial institutions which borrowed excessively in short term 
foreign currency, using funds to invest in long term in domestic assets (Griffith-Jones, 2000). 
Because of this, and as microfinance-orientated institutions are largely private sector institutions 
and have been subjected to increases in leverage, we focus on institutional fragility in the private 
sector, including through leverage. 
Research examining these transmission links and processes in sub-Saharan Africa banking 
failures are limited to the basic data presented in Table 4. There are examples, drawn from Table 
4 and from the database presented in Laeven and Valencia (2008), which illustrate links between 
asset deterioration and macroeconomic factors. For example, in Chad in 1983, banking sector 
insolvency problems were linked to a collapse of world cotton prices which resulted in the quasi-
state monopoly exporter of Chad cotton experiencing a collapse in revenues causing arrears on 
repayments of its debt. In 1992, the Chadian banking system almost collapsed again due to 
macroeconomic contraction after a period of credit expansion. Non-performing loans peaked at 
35% and the output loss was 37% of GDP. In 1998, in the Cote d’Ivoire, a recession and falling 
cocoa and coffee prices (the main exports) substantially increased private sector non-performing 
loans. Non-performing loans peaked at 50% of GDP. In Ghana, during the 1980s, there was a 
rapid increase in domestic bank credit, a fixed exchange rate, high inflation, and a prolonged 
recession followed by deterioration in cocoa exports and a large depreciation of the currency. By 
1983 non-performing loans had reached 35% of GDP. In 1987, in Mali, a surge in credit was 
followed by a collapse in cotton prices, Mali’s major export, which caused a surge in non-
performing loans, including at its largest private bank, caused a systemic liquidity squeeze. Non-
performing loans peaked at 75% and the output loss was 6% of GDP. 
As can be seen from these examples, common causes of asset deterioration in the banking sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa have included recession, excessive leverage, export concentration and price 
volatility and interrelated foreign exchange rate volatility. Many of these issues remain risks to 
sub-Saharan Africa economies including, for example, susceptibility to excessive credit 
expansion, commodity export dependency, banking concentration and macroeconomic 
instability. The IMF (2013) noted downside risks to economic growth in their 2013 Regional 
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Economic Outlook, reporting that sub-Saharan African economies remain vulnerable to risks such 
as global monetary tightening, high domestic inflation and commodity price volatility. 
These issues mean that sub-Saharan African financial institutions remain vulnerable to 
institutional failures due to the deterioration in asset quality and other balance sheet structures.  
Similar financial fragility arising from asset deterioration linked to macroeconomic aggregates 
has also been a feature of microfinance-orientated institutions. This is discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.3 BANKING CONTAGION 
Contagion within financial systems is relevant to the expansion of financial access because it is 
the process whereby individual institutional failures are transmitted to other institutions and is – 
as conceptualised in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 – the transmission channel that links 
the interdependent balance sheets of agents. It is of relevance here because microfinance-
orientated institutions have suffered from contagion, transforming failures at individual 
institutions into systemic crises in the industry. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Contagion can occur in relation to banking institutions or financial markets. In sub-Saharan Africa 
financial markets remain underdeveloped and illiquid. There are stock exchanges in only 12 sub-
Saharan Africa countries17 and only three national commodity or agricultural exchanges. Trading 
is very limited and market capitalization and listings are at very low levels (Beck et al., 2011). 
Derivative markets in sub-Saharan Africa are also very limited, despite some growth in derivative 
markets in other developing countries. In 2010, average daily turnover in emerging market 
derivatives was $1.2 trillion or 6.2 per cent of GDP, compared to $13.8 trillion or 36 per cent of 
GDP in developed economies (Goyal et al., 2011). Turnover is primarily in foreign exchange 
derivatives, as opposed to the dominance of interest-rate derivatives in developed countries 
(Goyal et al., 2011). There have been some policy initiatives, such as by the IMF, to initiate 
derivative markets in sub-Saharan Africa, including in commodities and foreign exchange, 
                                                             
17 These include Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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claiming that that low-income countries would benefit through “self-insurance” against volatile 
commodity prices, foreign exchange and capital flows (Adelegan, 2009). However, the only 
exchange that has been established has been a commodity exchange in Abuja, Nigeria, which is 
inoperative. These factors limit the contagion risk in financial markets in sub-Saharan Africa 
because it requires liquidity for transmission. 
Bank-based contagion is of much greater relevance in sub-Saharan financial systems because they 
remain predominantly bank-based (Beck et al., 2010). The most common mode of contagion in 
banking is a bank run. A bank run is defined as a series of unexpected cash deposit withdrawals 
caused by a sudden decline in depositor confidence or fear that the bank will be closed with many 
depositors withdrawing cash simultaneously. Such a collapse in confidence may be caused by 
common or correlated lending exposures leading to asset deterioration in multiple institutions 
simultaneously, or by herd behaviour amongst depositors. Bank runs are usually driven either by 
a panic situation amongst depositors who lose confidence in the institution, or because of 
deterioration in asset quality due to, for example, collapsing asset prices and increased 
bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector (Rogoff & Reinhart, 2009). In both circumstances 
depositors rush to withdraw monies and the bank cannot meet their demands because of the 
“borrowing short and lending long”18 structure of their balance sheet. This causes an institution 
to become illiquid and leads to its failure. Banking institutions are vulnerable to such runs and 
financial history is rich with numerous instances of them leading to institutional failures, and 
following on from this systemic crises, especially in early-stage financial systems. This includes 
the recent periods whereby between the 1980s and 2000 73% of the IMF’s member countries 
suffered some form of banking crisis (Lindgren et al., 1996) including bank runs (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 2000). 
Banking contagion can be caused by other processes. This includes a contraction in liquidity – or 
more colloquially a “credit crunch” – whereby as confidence in the soundness of institutions 
declines, providers of liquidity become increasingly risk adverse and reduce or stop lending to 
financial institutions, causing them to become insolvent (Aacharya & Naqvi, 2010). There can                                                              
18 This is also known as “maturity mismatch” where short-term deposits can be withdrawn immediately 
or in the short-term, but loans have longer maturities and cannot be liquidated to meet the demands from 
depositors for withdrawal, thus causing the bank to be unable to meet cash demands from depositors.  
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then be a feedback loop between liquidity and insolvency problems in financial institutions that 
further deepen financial crisis. Such events were an important transmission process during the 
Asia financial crisis of 1997 and the financial crisis in advanced economies in 2007 and 2008 
(Independent Commission for Banking, 2011). 
As for individual institutional financial fragility, susceptibility to banking contagion is dependent 
upon banks’ balance sheet structures. Sub-Saharan African banks’ balance sheet structures have 
characteristics that make them less susceptible to contagion. For example, balance sheets display 
relatively short maturities for both deposits and assets, with over 80% of deposits and 60% of 
loans having a maturity of a year or less and only 2% of both loans and deposits having a maturity 
of over 10 years (Beck et al., 2010). Such shorter maturities in the balance sheet structures reduce 
the maturity mismatch within banks and make them less susceptible to bank runs19. 
However, contagion risk is also dependent upon market structure. For example, market 
concentration in banking increases contagion risks because of the presence of more systemically 
important –colloquially termed “too big to fail” – institutions. Unfortunately, in this regard, 
banking concentration in sub-Saharan Africa financial markets is high with a limited number of 
institutions with high market shares in small domestic markets. Indeed, the Herfindahl index (T 
= the sum of the squares of market shares with higher numbers indicating higher market 
concentrations) shows that 50% of sub-Saharan Africa countries have an index value above 2,000, 
compared with 20% with an index above 2,000 in other developing regions (Beck et al., 2011). 
These findings of highly concentrated markets have also been replicated in many country studies 
(e.g., Okeahalam, 2002; Mugume, 2010; Kabango et al., 2010; Aburime, 2008; IMF, 2010). This 
can also be observed in Table 4, where the number of institutions in countries is low. This means 
that there is a heightened susceptibility to contagion because of the presence of systemically 
important institutions. 
This issue – and the issue of private sector capital flows discussed further below – is also 
compounded by the small size of domestic financial markets relative to GDP in many sub-Saharan                                                              
19 Although short-term lending has negative effects on the effectiveness of the financial system by 
reducing their effectiveness in their role in maturity transformation, thus creating reduced long-term 
investment funds. This “missing market” has been observed in a number of developing countries where 
the availability of long-term investment funds is constrained (e.g., Beck et al., 2011). 
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African economies. The average ratio of private sector credit to GDP is 16% for sub-Saharan 
Africa, compared to 49% for non-African developing countries, and intermediation levels are low 
with loan-deposit ratios of only 74% compared to 109% for non-African developing countries 
(Beck et al., 2011). 
As for institutional failures, some commentators have been complacent regardeing the probability 
and impact of systemic banking crisis caused by contagion because they see the recent deepening 
of sub-Saharan African financial systems as protective (Beck et al., 2011). Honohan and Beck 
comment, “Strengthened by an extended wave of reforms over the past decade, financial systems 
in many African countries have begun to diversify their activities, deepen their lending and 
increase their reach…” (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p.2). Similarly, the IMF associate financial 
deepening with greater stability, albeit with more caution, commenting that  
Deepening is widely believed to confer important stability benefits to an economy, albeit 
with caveats. For instance, by increasing transaction volumes, it can enhance the capacity 
to intermediate capital flows without large swings in asset prices and exchange rates. But 
it can also attract volatile capital inflows, complicating macroeconomic management… It 
can lower the reliance on foreign savings and attenuate balance sheet mismatches by 
increasing the scope to raise funds in domestic currencies and at longer maturities… Deeper 
markets can provide alternative sources of funding during times of international stress, 
limiting adverse spill-overs, as evidenced in the global crisis... At the same time though, 
deepening can occur too quickly, leading to credit booms and subsequent busts (Goyal et 
al., 2011, p.4). 
Certainly, it is correct that sub-Saharan African financial systems have “deepened” against 
standard measures. For example, the average ratio of private credit to GDP has risen consistently, 
from 2% in 1990 to 16% in 2012 (although it remains low compared to other regions where the 
average is 49% for non-African developing countries) (Honohan & Beck, 2007). However, in 
other regions, it is the transition period away from an underdeveloped financial system when 
financial systems are most vulnerable to financial crisis, although the reasons for this empirical 
finding has not been fully examined (Velde & Griffith-Jones, 2013). Furthermore, as illustrated 
by the financial crisis of 2007 in developed economies, financial depth does not prevent crisis 
(Independent Commission for Banking, 2011). 
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Overall, it could be concluded that sub-Saharan Africa financial systems remain vulnerable to 
contagion, which can lead to financial crisis through the interdependency of agents’ balance 
sheets. 
 
4.4 THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS 
Private capital flows are an important part of the mobilization of resources for development 
because of their potential contribution to higher investment rates, which can have a positive 
contribution to structural transformation. They have been a particular source of financing for 
microfinance-orientated institutions – as will be discussed in Chapter 5 – and so their role in 
financial fragility and stability are of particular relevance to our discussion. 
Domestic capital flows are important, but primarily so for advanced economies. By contrast, in 
developing countries, and especially in low-income countries, domestic capital is limited. 
Consequently, given the scale of estimated capital requirements for development, cross-border 
private capital flows are seen as a key source of capital. For example, their importance was 
reiterated in the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration (United Nations, 2013a). Cross-
border private capital flows can also facilitate investment mobilization indirectly through 
assisting in capital market deepening and technological transfer (World Bank, 2014). 
Cross border private capital flows are made up of several components. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is one of the major capital flows to developing countries and is considered the most 
desirable for development as it provides a stable and long-term source of investment funds. There 
is empirical evidence that FDI contributes to long-term growth because it is more stable, while it 
complements domestic investment, both in production and through positive spill-over effects, and 
because it may have positive impacts through the transfer of technology and efficiency (Griffith-
Jones, 2000). 
Private capital flows also include portfolio flows, composed of investment in equity and bonds 
by various investor types20 and financial flows, which are primarily net bank lending. They are                                                              
20 Including, for example, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and hedge funds and 
commercial banks (IFF, 2013). 
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considered less desirable than FDI as they can be short-term and volatile. This is because portfolio 
flows are often attracted by short-term opportunities for speculation and investment in equity and 
bond markets. They have been associated with asset bubbles, particularly in real estate and stock 
markets, and with financial crisis in developing countries (Griffith-Jones, 2000). 
In this section we discuss post-1980 trends in cross-border capital flows to developing countries 
and their relationship to financial stability. We also examine recent trends in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This discussion sets the context for the next chapter where the impact of cross-border capital 
flows into microfinance-orientated institutions will be discussed, including their role in creating 
balance sheet financial fragility and crises in microfinance. 
 
4.4.1 TRENDS IN CROSS-BORDER PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
There has been a long-term trend towards increases in cross-border capital flows to developing 
countries (Ocampo, 2005; Lane, 2012; McKinley & Tyson, 2014). This is illustrated in Figure 1 
below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Net capital flows to developing countries by flow type (1980-2013) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014. 
 
Prior to the mid-1990s, all types of flows were limited, with an average of only $53 billion 
annually. FDI and bank lending were 27% and 37% of the total respectively, but low in absolute 
terms. By contrast, portfolio flows were relatively unimportant at 5%. Flows were stable and 
exhibited relatively low volatility. 
These patterns reflected a number of factors. Banks in advanced economies were suffering from 
losses and risk aversion because of developing country debt defaults that suppressed bank lending 
from advanced economies to developing economies in the 1980s and early 1990s. These debts 
had been accumulated during the 1970s because surplus capital accumulated by oil-producers was 
re-circulated by advanced countries’ banking systems into developing economies. However, by 
the early 1980s, following surges in interest rates as advanced economies tightened monetary 
policy in order to tackle inflation and foreign exchange volatility, developing countries were 
unable to repay their debt and there were widespread defaults, especially in Africa and Latin 
America. In Africa, the external debt burden increased significantly between 1970 and the early 
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1980s from just over $11 billion in 1970 to over $120 billion by 1980 and, between 1980 and 
1994, the average debt to GDP ratio of Africa rose from 38 per cent to 70 per cent (United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development, 2004). The IMF and other international financial 
institutions required a comprehensive program of structural adjustment as a condition to extend 
financing and this policy resulted in further increases in debt to a peak of about $340 billion in 
1995, the year immediately preceding the launch of the original Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
Initiative (HIPC) which sought to restructure and forgive debt. Over the period 1970-1999, total 
debt service paid by the continent increased from about $3.5 billion per annum to a peak of $26 
billion per annum, a trend that further added to debt arrears. As advanced economy banks 
contracted credit in the face of such defaults, Latin America and Africa experienced a sharp 
reduction in GDP and a subsequent collapse of living standards, seeing the onset of a “lost decade” 
of economic development. 
There were a number of debt relief and debt-workout initiatives. The Paris Club addressed the 
debt of middle-income countries. In 1996, the IMF and the World Bank created the HIPC 
Initiative to assist low-income countries with unsustainable external public debt burdens. The 
goal of the HIPC Initiative was to reduce the external public debt burden of all “eligible” countries 
to sustainable levels in a reasonably short period of time. Since then, initiatives to reduce external 
debt have continued, although they have continued to be criticised as inadequate by some 
commentators (United Nations Commission on Trade and Development, 2004), and some small 
and fragile states still continue to have excessive debt burdens, such as the Caribbean nations 
(United Nations, 2013). In 2005, in order to help accelerate progress toward the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). As a result, debt relief was agreed for many low-
income countries by 2010. The MDRI allows for 100 per cent relief on eligible debts by three 
institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund (Part of the African 
Development Bank) – for countries completing the HIPC process. In 2007, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) also decided to provide additional (“beyond HIPC”) debt relief to the 
five HIPCs in the Western Hemisphere (United Nations Commission on Trade and Development, 
2009). By the early 2000s, because of these initiatives, public debt levels had been significantly 
reduced for many developing countries and appeared to be more sustainable as a result. For 
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example, in sub-Saharan Africa debt had been reduced, on average, from a peak of 69% of GDP 
in 1994 to 24% by 201221 (Tyson & McKinley, 2014). 
From the mid-1990s to 2007, there was a cyclical upswing in capital flows to developing 
countries. FDI represented 51% of total flows and provided a stable source of capital flow to 
developing economies. FDI was attracted by perceived investment opportunities in developing 
economies. However, FDI was concentrated in rapidly industrialization countries, especially in 
Developing Asia and Latin America which receiving 43% and 27% respectively of all global FDI 
from 1991 to 2013. These were critical factors in their rapidly expanding economies during this 
period with, for example, China achieving GDP growth rates of between 7.8% and 14.2% per 
annum (Ffrench-Davis, 2010). 
Financial flows, composed mainly of bank lending, were also an important component of flows 
in this period, making up 38% of the total. However, it was much more volatile than FDI 
(McKinley & Tyson, 2014) and was to become associated with both the liberalization of financial 
markets, especially capital accounts, and as a causative factor in a series of financial crises in 
developing countries, including in Asia and Latin America (Griffith-Jones, 2000). 
By 2008, the financial crisis in developed countries had spread to developing countries. Private 
capital flows were a key channel for the transmission of the crisis from developed to developing 
countries, along with trade and commodity prices (Ocampo et al., 2010). FDI responded with a 
sharp contraction from a peak of $472 billion in 2008 to $330 billion in 2009, before returning 
and then exceeding pre-crisis levels from 2010 to 2013 (Tyson et al., 2014). 
Financial flows – primarily bank lending – contracted sharply in response to the crisis but, unlike 
FDI, did not recover. Financial flows fell from a peak of $853 billion in 2007 to a mere $9 billion 
in 2008. Subsequently, banking lending has been volatile with peaks and troughs throughout the 
period, including a net outflow in 2012. This pattern reflects the shock of the crisis and subsequent 
risk retraction experienced by international banks in advanced economies, including losses from 
                                                             
21 However, sovereign bond issuances for sub-Saharan Africa surged in 2013 and 2014 (Tyson et al., 
2014). 
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credit shocks in real estate markets and the Euro-crisis, as well as regulatory reforms that curtailed 
leverage (Tyson et al., 2014). 
Portfolio flows were also growing pre-crisis but were minor compared to FDI and financial flows, 
although they experienced a sharp contraction during the crisis. In a structural change from the 
pre-2008 period, they have become much more material – but volatile – component of private 
capital flows. Expansion of portfolio flows was particularly strong in 2010 and 2011, with a sharp 
contraction in 2012, before resuming in 2013. These factors reflected push factors in advanced 
economies as investors – especially investors in the shadow banking systems such as private 
equity funds and hedge funds – sought yield opportunities outside of advanced economies where 
quantitative easing (QE) drove down interest rates, as well as periodic speculation relating to the 
reversal of quantitative easing, especially in early 2013 (Tyson et al., 2014). As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, microfinance, including in sub-Saharan Africa, has been a major recipient of 
such portfolio flows in the post-crisis period. 
Another important impact of the financial crisis for developing countries was that, not only were 
flows impacted, but their costs – reflected in interest rates – also surged (Ocampo et al., 2010). 
This reoccurred in 2013, amid speculation relating to the reversal of quantitative easing and loose 
monetary policy in advanced countries. This drove rapid deterioration in both liquidity and debt 
costs for developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa (Tyson et al., 2014). Such events 
can cause problems for developing countries, as reliance on private capital flows means that the 
cost and availability of financing cannot be ensured and is subject to volatile market sentiment 
(Tyson et al., 2014). 
The opening of capital accounts has been associated in sub-Saharan Africa with acting as a 
negative conduit for capital flight and high levels of pro-cyclicality in capital flows (Weeks, 
2012). Capital flight, as a share of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa between 1980-2008, averaged 6% 
of GDP for petrol exporters, 9.7% for conflict-affected countries and 4.7% for other countries 
(Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011). Such issues indicate that capital account liberalization can also lead 
to capital outflow, draining resources from capital intended for structural transformation. 
Finally, an interesting structural shift was partially driving these trends: the rise of South-South 
financing. This trend has been noted both in relation to inter-governmental lending and in the 
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private sector. For example, the United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 report, “The 
Rise of the South,” comments on these trends, seeing them as important in providing concessional 
finance, infrastructural investment and technology transfer; from 2002-2012, nearly half of 
infrastructure financing in sub-Saharan Africa was financed by interregional governments and 
regional funds (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). China has been particularly 
active in making finance available to sub-Saharan Africa and made investment commitments in 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 and 2007 of more than $7.0 billion and $4.5 billion respectively. 
Their financing was highly concentrated by country (30% in Nigeria and a further 40% in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Sudan combined) and by sector (power, water and telecommunications) (Foster et 
al., 2008). This trend of increasing south-south capital flows continued, with only a brief pause 
during the crisis, and by 2012 outflows from China accounted for 31% of global outward FDI 
(United Nations, 2013a). Similarly, other south-south financing has included increased outflows 
from Brazil and South Africa (United Nations, 2013a). Sovereign wealth funds are also believed 
to be active in such financing, in particular from the Middle East, but there is little transparency 
regarding their investments (Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2008; unpublished Chatham House 
material, 2014). 
 
4.4.2 CROSS-BORDER PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS & FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Despite the positive impact that private capital flows can potentially have in providing a source 
of investment capital, aspects of cross-border capital flows remain problematic, especially for 
financial stability. In particular, there is controversy surrounding the ideal composition of flows 
between FDI, financial and portfolio flows, because of their relative impact on development and 
their differential volatility. As noted previously, FDI is typically considered the most desirable 
because of its relative stability, but financial and portfolio flows are considered less desirable as 
they can be short-term and volatile. However, recent empirical investigation shows that the 
volatility of cross-border capital flows has increased for all types of flows given the growth and 
liberalization of the global financial system and the integration of developing countries into that 
framework (IMF, 2011; McKinley & Tyson, 2014). Such volatility in cross-border private capital 
flows has been associated with macroeconomic disruptions in relation to trade, exchange rates 
and inflation, and boom-bust cycles in financial markets, as well as financial and economic crises 
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(Massa, 2013; Velde & Griffith-Jones, 2013). International institutional investors have been 
perceived as contributing to this volatility due to short-term, speculative motives which have 
added to the volatility of international capital flows (e.g., Basel Committee, 2010; Griffiths-Jones, 
2000; Tyson & McKinley, 2014). 
Causative factors identified in relation to such problems include financial liberalization – 
particularly liberalization of capital accounts that have allowed volatile in- and out-flows of 
private capital. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) found a positive relationship between financial 
liberalization and the financial crisis in relation to Latin America, which was characterized by 
“widespread bankruptcies, massive government interventions or nationalization of private 
institutions” (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985, p.2). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) examined 
crisis determinants for 53 countries between 1980 and 1995 and found that financial liberalization 
had a strong, positive relationship on the probability of a banking crisis, with the probability of a 
crisis increasing five times following liberalization. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examined 
dual currency and banking crises and found them to be associated with financial liberalization, 
including increased access to international capital markets which appeared to act by fuelling the 
boom phase of “boom-bust” financial crisis, especially the asset price bubbles that often precede 
institutional failure and, through contagion, financial crises. Specific causative factors identified 
included capital account liberalization and the boom-bust cycles in cross-border private capital 
markets (e.g., Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Arestis et al., 1999; Ocampo at al., 2010) and asset markets, 
including in stock and real estate markets (Griffith-Jones, 2000; Toporowski et al., 2013; 
McKinley & Tyson, 2014). 
A further causative factor has been that the scale of inflows has often contrasted with the relatively 
small size of recipient domestic markets, causing market instability (Griffith-Jones, 2000). 
Indeed, the relative scale of capital inflows compared to domestic markets may be one reason 
behind the apparent susceptibility of middle-income countries to financial crisis, compared to 
both low-income countries and advanced economies, creating a period of “growing pains” for a 
developing economy as it reaches middle-income country status (Velde & Griffith-Jones, 2013). 
The identification of these issues relating to financial instability can also be deduced from an 
examination of specific historical crises. This includes the Asian crisis of 1997-98 where countries 
experienced rapid and large-scale inflows into speculative asset markets via financial 
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intermediaries, followed by a sharp contraction when investor sentiment reversed. The countries 
hit by the subsequent crisis (South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) 
experienced a reversal of more than 10 per cent of their combined GDP. Such outflows caused 
havoc in national macroeconomics, including foreign exchange and balance of payments crises 
and sharp contractions of GDP (Griffith-Jones, 1998). Similarly, flows to Latin America declined 
sharply, including in the late 1990s (Griffith-Jones, 2000), following the Argentine default in 
2002, and subsequent crises in Mexico, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey that were driven by 
public debt in combination with international capital inflows (e.g., Rogoff et al., 2009; Griffith-
Jones et al., 1995). 
The frequency of crises and the impact of the global financial crisis have been more severe for 
middle-income countries than for low-income countries due to their relative integration into 
international private capital markets and trade (Ocampo et al., 2010; United Nations, 2013). By 
contrast, low-income countries have not been integrated into international financial markets and 
have experienced much lower levels of cross-border private capital flows and less frequent and 
less severe crises. This has raised the issue of whether there is a transition phrase for developing 
financial systems whereby as they emerge and integrate into international financial systems, they 
have a period of increased vulnerability to financial crisis (e.g., Velde & Griffith-Jones, 2013). 
However, to date, no new theory relating structural transformation and financial fragility in 
developing countries has been proposed. 
 
4.4.3 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CROSS-BORDER PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS (2003-2013) 
In common with the experience of low-income countries, sub-Saharan African countries continue 
to have limited links to international financial systems, and receive substantially less private 
capital inflows than other regions (Tyson et al., 2014). Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa countries 
remain on the periphery of the international financial system. 
Nevertheless, there has been increasing trends in cross-border capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa 
in the last decade. Figure 2 illustrates these trends in private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa 
for FDI and portfolio flows. 
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Figure 2. Net cross-border FDI & portfolio flows22 to sub-Saharan Africa (2003-2013) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, October 2013. 
(Note: Bars on the chart represent USD billions and is read on the left hand axis, while the line 
represents GDP percentages and is read on the right hand axis). 
 
FDI grew steadily from 2004, with a lull during the financial crisis, reaching approximately $30 
trillion by 2012 and, as a percentage of GDP, FDI grew from 2.4% in 2004 to 4.7% in 2012 
(Tyson et al., 2014). Trends in FDI included increased participation in FDI sourced from other                                                              
22 Financial flows are not available by country for WDI. However, the World Bank commented that 
increased overall flows were primarily due to portfolio flows, with bank credit remaining subdued while 
improving in 2013 (World Bank, 2014; IMF, 2014b).  
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developing countries, notably China, India and the UAE, as well as growing inter-regional FDI 
from South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria (United Nations, 2013b). There has also been some 
diversification away from previous concentrations in extractive industries towards services, 
including tourism and the financial sector (source: Financial Times). 
Figure 2 indicates that portfolio and financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa were negligible pre-
crisis. However, in 2011 and 2012 these rose, driven by sovereign bond issuances including from 
Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Uganda (Tyson et al., 2014). These flows were 
driven by the search for alternative, high yielding investments by international funds, including a 
number of newly-established “frontier market” funds. Improved macroeconomic fundamentals 
and growth expectations were also important. These private sector issuances had shorter 
maturities and higher costs than previous concessional financing. The 2013 issues had an average 
maturity of 8 years, compared with 28 years for existing debt, and an average interest rate of 8.2% 
compared to 1.6% for existing debt, reflecting their non-concessional terms (Stiglitz & Rashid, 
2013; Hou et al., 2014). They were almost exclusively denominated in US dollars, leaving foreign 
exchange risk with sovereign borrowers (Tyson et al., 2014). However, the period of 
improvement in portfolio flows remains short – only two years – and it remains to be seen if will 
be sustained. 
These trends represent an opportunity for sub-Saharan Africa to mobilize resources for structural 
transformation. In particular, the trends can potentially support pro-development investment in 
the private sector (Velde et al., 2013). However, such portfolio flows carry risks, given their close 
association with financial instability in middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America. 
Indeed, this risk was partially realized in 2008 when the financial crisis in developed countries 
caused African portfolio investment flows to become net negative (Arieff, 2010). 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the current literature linking the expansion of financial access to financial 
stability and fragility. It has found that a number of transmission mechanisms and processes are 
proposed in relation to both, but that the existing research remains limited and it is not possible 
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to conclude if they are complementary or whether there is a trade-off between financial access 
and stability. 
The chapter prepared the context for the fieldwork by discussing three issues that our theoretical 
approach based on balance sheets suggests are relevant to the expansion of financial access and 
its impact on financial stability: soundness of individual institutions; the impact of private sector 
capital flows; and banking contagion between institutions. In Chapter 5, we discuss how these 
factors have played important roles in financial fragility and crisis in microfinance. 
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5. THE APPLIED IMPACT OF THE EXPANSION OF 
FINANCIAL ACCESS 
 
In this chapter we will examine microfinance and the expansion of financial access in practice. 
This will build on the earlier discussion relating to the balance sheets approach and the 
relationship of financial access, development and stability. 
We first set the context for the discussions by presenting a brief overview of the origins of 
microfinance in social and community movements. These movements sought to provide 
opportunities for the poor to help themselves through self-employment. While such aspirations 
were not fully realized, they inspired microfinance to be adopted as policy by development 
agencies. The policy evolved to encompass the twin goals of policy alleviation and financial 
sector development including the expansion of access. 
This drove a significant expansion in the scale of microfinance in many developing countries. 
Development agency pressurised microfinance-orientated institutions to be profitable – the term 
used is “sustainable” – and, combined with commercially attractive returns, microfinance 
attracted large private capital inflows from domestic and international sources. These flows have 
become the predominant source of finance for the expansion of financial access rather than 
through deposit mobilization. 
The impact of these changes – and especially the inflows of private capital and accompanying 
pressures for commercial returns – was increased growth in more commercially attractive 
activities, the rapid expansion of lending, and intensified competition. There were a number of 
consequences of these changes that can be identified: 
x “Mission drift”: A microfinance-orientated institution increases its lending to wealthier 
clients and increases its average loan size for reasons other than progressive lending and 
cross- subsidization (Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2009) and this threatens to undermine its 
social and community mission. 
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x The restructuring of microfinance-orientated institution balance sheets: There has been a 
decline in lending standards and a deterioration in credit portfolio quality at some 
institutions. Inflows of private capital have been predominantly in debt and have 
increased leverage, liquidity and other risks in microfinance-orientated institutions, 
resulting in foreign exchange losses and liquidity pressures. In the worse cases this has 
led to institutional failures and financial crisis in the microfinance sector. 
x Declining “pro-development” lending: Incentives to increase lending in commercially 
attractive sectors has led to increases in consumption lending while self-employment and 
business lending has fallen. 
x Limited impact on financial access: Although there have been increases in levels of 
participation in the formal financial system, absolute levels of participation remain 
stubbornly low in many developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
5.1 THE ORIGINS OF MICROFINANCE 
Community and sector-based banking has a long history in most major developed economies, 
including UK building societies, credit unions and cooperative banks, US savings and loans 
societies, Germany Landschafen and Japan sector credit schemes, all of which were inspired by 
the goal of self-help amongst the aspirational poor. In today’s developing countries, as early as 
the 1950s movements had begun in South East Asia. Often led by well-established local 
organizations, many with religious origins, these organizations sought to incorporate 
microfinance into their broad-based community and self-help organizations. Such organizations 
firmly embedded microfinance in social and community programs as part of education and health 
initiatives, and community development projects such as agricultural land improvements or 
village water and hygiene schemes. They embodied a philosophy of self-help and empowerment 
through community solidarity and cooperation. Examples of such groups include the self-help 
groups (SGH) in India (Wilson, 2002), Sarvodaya of Sri Lanka and Southern India (Ariyaratne, 
1999), and Bangladesh’s “Comilla Model” of village and sector-based cooperatives in poor rural 
communities (Yousaf, 2007). 
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All of these movements had a similar goal: namely, to allow the poor to escape the poverty trap 
created by money lending. The trap results from surplus income from work earned by the poor 
above a subsistence level being skimmed off by the high interest rates charged by moneylenders. 
This traps the poor in a vicious cycle of borrowing and repayment that removes an ability to 
accumulate sufficient capital to start the next income-generating cycle. Such cycles can result in 
land seizure in the event of default, leading to moneylenders often being important local 
landowners (Roth, 1983). 
The contemporary microfinance movement dates to the early 1970s when Mohammad Yunus 
established Grameen Bank, which developed into one of the world’s largest microfinance 
organizations. His original small-scale projects in poor rural villages in Bangladesh focused on 
lending small, uncollateralized sums for income-generating activities at low interest rates. Such 
loan activities enabled the poor to create their own income-generating activities and retain the 
surplus. These projects developed into much larger scale microcredit lending, including the use 
of group lending – where members of a community-based group were held jointly liable for 
repayments – and an exclusive focus on women. The latter was developed as women were 
considered to be better at repayment and in their handling of additional income for more 
developmentally-focused uses, such as family health and education (Yunus, 1999). Equally 
important was the philosophy realized in the policy and practice of the Grameen Bank. Yunus 
comments “Grameen is committed to social objectives – eliminating poverty, providing 
education, health-care, employment opportunities, achieving gender equality by promoting the 
empowerment of women … Grameen dreams about a poverty-free world” (Yunus, 1999, p.218). 
Many of the Grameen Bank’s activities reflect this philosophy, as credit is only one of the 
activities promoted alongside, for example, education and health programs. 
By the 1980s, NGOs adopted microfinance as part of their work and the movement began to 
spread internationally. Many of these organizations copied the Grameen Bank model, providing 
low-interest rates, income-generating uncollateralized loans to the poor, often with a focus on 
women and group lending. Again, these groups embedded microfinance into and as a part of their 
organization’s social and community goals. Quotes from the mission statements of some 
organizations illustrate this. For example, ProMujer, a major Latin American microfinance 
organization, give the following statement of their mission: “ProMujer is an international 
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women’s development and microfinance organization whose mission is to provide Latin 
America’s poor women with the means to build livelihoods for themselves and futures for their 
families through microfinance, business training, and healthcare support. … ProMujer supports 
the health of its clients and their families and helps women build their self-esteem…. (and) links 
women (with) their communities“ (Promujer, 2010). Similarly Freedom from Hunger, another 
NGO with a broad program (including microfinance) comment,  
Freedom from Hunger works with local partners to offer microcredit loans to poor women 
… The key difference between Credit with Education and similar programs is the emphasis 
on providing education to the women … about health, nutrition, family planning and sound 
business practices. In combination with their additional business income, the women act 
on this knowledge and begin to break the cycle of chronic hunger and poverty. Providing 
access to these resources in a single integrated program simultaneously teaches women 
how to help her children and earn the money they need to act on their knowledge. 
 
5.2 MICROFINANCE & FINANCIAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
In parallel with the microfinance movement, from the 1990s onwards the development 
community came to see microfinance as a method to contribute to the development of the formal 
financial sector and the “financial systems approach” to microfinance was widely adopted as 
policy at development agencies. The United Nations declared 2005 “The Year of Microfinance”. 
The policy was supported by the World Bank whish has, through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association (Part of the 
World Bank Group), sponsored microfinance projects including direct funding to microfinance-
orientated institutions, indirect (such as interbank) funding and technical support. In addition, it 
co-sponsored the creation of Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), which has produced 
important research and policy work relating to financial access and microfinance. 
A component in these policy changes was a de-emphasis of the social mission and community 
context of early microfinance initiatives. Instead, microfinance became a stand-alone activity 
within financial sector development and the critical goals of its refashioned image was to 
maximize “outreach” and to be “sustainable”, i.e. commercially profitable, without subsidies from 
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international development agencies and other donors. As part of this transition, scale became an 
important goal in order to both expand access and to achieve economies of scale. As a result, and 
as shown in Figure 3, from 1995 to 2012 microfinance loans and deposits grew from negligible 
levels to more than $1.2 trillion globally. 
Figure 3 Microfinance loans and deposits (1995-2012) 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange elaborated by the author. 
 
Microfinance-orientated institutions offered increasingly comprehensive financial services. This 
included the increasing importance of non-income generating lending (such as for housing, health 
and education), savings and micro insurance. The Microfinance Information Exchange 
(Microfinance Exchange, 2010) reported that by 2008, 92% of microfinance-orientated 
institutions provided saving accounts, up from 41% in 2003. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
US
D 
M
ill
io
ns
 Deposits
 Gross Loan Portfolio
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  97 
This expansion saw a shift of microfinance activities into regulated entities. In the earlier stages, 
microfinance was largely unregulated. Development agencies and regulators sought to ensure 
institutional soundness through the expansion of microprudential regulation to incorporate 
microfinance-orientated institutions. This was particularly promoted because of increased 
deposit-taking where, in the event of institutional failure, the customer is exposed to the risk of 
losing their deposit. This contrasts with lending-only microfinance-orientated institutions where 
the risk of losses is borne only by the institution and not the customer. 
Figures 4 and 5 show that as regulated and non-regulated institutions loans and deposits grew 
strongly, there was an increasing concentration of microfinance-orientated institutions assets in 
large-scale, regulated microfinance-orientated institutions. Loans and deposits at regulated 
microfinance banks and financial institutions – defined as banks, regulated non-banking financial 
institutions, credit unions and cooperatives – have grown rapidly and by 2012 held the majority 
of loans and deposits within these entities holding 62% of loans and 66% of deposits. 
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Figure 4. Loans by institutional type (1995 to 2012). 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange elaborated by the author. 
Figure 5. Deposits by institutional type (1995 to 2012). 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange elaborated by the author. 
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Faced with these structural changes, regulators sought to develop an appropriate regulatory 
regime for microfinance-orientated institutions. This has evolved largely through microprudential 
not macroprudential regulation (Christen, 2003). This has included creating “enabling 
institutions”, building credit information systems and land registration schemes (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Beck & Honohan, 2008; Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2010). Different countries have 
taken different approaches. For example, Bangladesh has created dedicated regulatory 
institutions, whereas India, Peru and Bolivia have incorporated microfinance within the existing 
banking regulatory framework. However, the costs and institutional capacity required of 
regulators are straining the capabilities of many developing countries (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2010). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, these trends have been apparent. By 2009, the number of microfinance-
orientated institutions (as reported to Microfinance Information Exchange) had grown to 153 with 
$5.2 billion in deposits and $4.7 billion in loans. Assets were concentrated in a few, large 
microfinance-orientated institutions (defined by Consultative Group to Assist the Poor as over $8 
million in gross loan23 portfolios), which accounted for 85% of all borrowers and deposits, but 
only 8% of institutions by number (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). These 
dominant institutions were also predominantly private institutions and, in particular, banks with 
private institutions holding over 70% of the total gross loan portfolio and 71% of total deposits, 
of which banking institutions held 53% of loans and 60% of deposits (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2011a). 
Regulatory frameworks have been developed in sub-Saharan Africa in relation to this expansion. 
All but three countries have legislation or regulations in place for microfinance. Regulation 
frameworks have been enacted that are either specialized for microfinance or incorporate 
microfinance into broader banking or non-banking financial institutions legislation. This has                                                              
23 Gross loans are defined as the outstanding principal balance of outstanding loans, including current, 
delinquent, and restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off or interest receivable. Net 
loans are gross loans less provisions for bad and doubtful debts (as defined by portfolio-at-risk) (CGAP, 
2003). 
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included the Central Bank of the West African Monetary Union (BCEAO) that revised the 
microfinance law in 2007 in an effort to strengthen licensing requirements, supervision, and 
reporting standards. The revised law was adopted in 2009 by Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and 
Senegal. Legislation has also been enacted by the Bank of the Republic of Burundi, the National 
Bank of Rwanda and the Banque Centrale du Congo of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and in Uganda and Tanzania. Regulation of branchless banking has also been considered because 
of its high growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, including mobile banking and use of agents, but 
such regulation has not been as widely adopted as that of banking institutions (Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor, 2011a). Eighty-four per cent of sub-Saharan African countries have laws and 
regulations, including addressing customer protection (such as disclosure requirements, customer 
complaints and dispute resolution) and selling practices. However, all the legislative regimes have 
some limitations and remain to be fully implemented (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
2011a). 
 
5.3 THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS 
This large expansion of microfinance required capital to finance it. Deposit mobilization is the 
optimal form of capital for expansion of a financial institution due to its relatively low cost and 
high stability. However, deposit mobilization remains low in many developing countries, 
especially in low-income countries (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & Honohan, 2008) and, as a 
consequence, the expansion of microfinance-orientated institutions required alternative sources 
of financing. 
Development agencies have provided financing to microfinance-orientated institutions as part of 
their policy support for the expansion of financial access. However, the required level of capital 
has not been available from development agencies because of the scale required and due to the 
shift in policy at development agencies from direct financing to leveraging private capital. As a 
consequence, capital has been sought from the private sector. In particular, given the scarcity of 
domestic capital sources, private sector capital has been sought from international investors. The 
development agencies involved have included the UK’s Department for International 
Development, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (El-Zoghbi & Gonzalez, 2013). 
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Private funds have been sourced from “socially responsible investors” (SRI) whose goals are to 
seek both a financial and a “social” return as measured by outreach (i.e. number of customers) or 
percentages of female versus male customers and a “double bottom line” of financial returns and 
social goals (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011). These funds include Responsibility, 
Triodos and Oikocredit and, by 2011, an estimated $6.4 trillion had been sourced from SRIs (El-
Zoghbi & Gonzalez, 2013; Microfinance Information Exchange, 2013). 
However, microfinance has also increasingly attracted purely commercial private investors. This 
is because of the perceived high returns, their attractiveness as “alternative investments” –
uncorrelated to major financial markets – low default levels and high interest rates. Private 
investors have often been sourced through unregulated, private funds run by global investment 
banks, including Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Citibank. In addition, a number of private 
equity funds have sought to invest in microfinance in developing countries directly. The extent 
of these private capital inflows is illustrated in Table 5. Since 2005 there has been a quadrupling 
of capital flows from private financial sector investors with, by 2012, annual flows reaching $8.7 
billion and the number of investing funds reaching 111. Growth was slowed, but not stopped, by 
the global financial crisis. 
 
Table 5. Microfinance investment funds (2005-2012). 
Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor MIV Survey (2005-2012). 
 
The majority of this financing has been in the form of debt, not equity. Debt is typically less 
desirable from the perspective of institutional stability compared to equity. However, as illustrated 
in Table 6, although 90% of private capital flows have been in debt, the debt was primarily lower-
risk. 90% of debt was in lower risk “vanilla” debt and 3% being in low risk “hybrid” subordinated 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number 61 75 93 111 109 102 99 111 
Assets Under 
Management ($bn) 
$2.4 $4.0 $5.4 $6.6 $8.2 $6.9 $7.5 $8.7 
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debt (a hybrid quasi-equity debt). Only 6% of debt was in higher risk forms of debt. These 
included overdrafts, which can create liquidity risk because they can be withdrawn at short notice, 
and publically issued bonds on capital markets that are subject to unstable investor demand. 
 
 
Table 6. Microfinance institutions debt (2009). 
Type of Financing USD millions % of total funding 
Subordinated Debt 610 3% 
Bond Issuance 364 2% 
Vanilla Debt 15,909 90% 
Bank Borrowing (Overdrafts) 759 4% 
Other 1 1% 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange elaborated by the author. 
 
These private capital flows have created additional risks in the balance sheet structures of 
microfinance-orientated institutions. For example, the majority of debt has been in “hard” 
currency24, leaving microfinance-orientated institutions with foreign exchange risk because there 
is a mismatch between their liabilities to pay interest and capital amortisation on foreign currency 
debt and the local currency income flows that must finance those payments. This leaves 
microfinance-orientated institutions exposed to foreign exchange risk and, because of the 
unavailability of liquid hedging instruments, this has led to losses at microfinance-orientated 
institutions (Crabb, 2002; Cavazos, 2004; Barres, 2006; Abrams & Schneider-Moretto, 2007).                                                              
24 “Hard currency” is defined as currencies that are widely traded and liquid in major financial markets in 
both cash and derivative forms. They include the US Dollar, the Euro, the Japanese Yen and the UK 
Pound.  
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Similarly, debt has been predominantly short-term. This has increased liquidity risk at institutions 
because when debt matures it typically needs to be replaced, leaving microfinance-orientated 
institutions exposed to investor sentiment in relation to liquidity and cost on each occasion when 
the debt matures, termed “rollover risk” (Abrams & Schneider-Moretto, 2007). Liquidity risk has 
also been increased in relation to rollover risk because private capital flows have been pro-cyclical 
with, for example, MIVs hording cash during the financial crisis (Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor, 2010). Risks such as these have been important in previous developing country financial 
crises. For example, short-term, “hard” currency debt which was mismatched to income flows 
was an important causative factor in the Asian crisis of 1997 as, when investor sentiment became 
negative, it was rapidly withdrawn. When the crisis developed local currencies collapsed. This 
means that banking institutions were left with both a liquidity crisis and large foreign exchange 
losses that drove them into bankruptcy (Griffiths-Jones, 2000). The risks arising from private 
capital inflows are apparent in the balance sheet structures of microfinance-orientated institutions. 
Capital has also been sought from international private capital markets, including through 
complex transactions to raise both debt and equity financing. Selected examples are given in 
Table 7 below. They include public listings on stock exchanges and securitizations. However, this 
ability to access private capital markets is limited to the largest and most profitable microfinance-
orientated institutions – termed by investors “Tier 1” microfinance-orientated institutions – which 
are estimated at only 150 to 200 microfinance institutions globally. These have included SKS, 
Equity Bank of Kenya and Compartamos (source: Deutsche Bank, 2007). 
 
Table 7. Selected complex capital market transactions. 
Issue Country Type Year Value 
Equity Bank Kenya IPO25 2006 Kes6.5bn 
                                                             
25 IPO is an initial public offering where the equity is listed for the first time on a stock exchange.  
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Banco Compartamos Mexico IPO 2007 $468m 
Financiera Independencia Mexico IPO 2007 $300m 
SKS India IPO 2010 $350 
ICICI -Share Microfin India Securitization 2006 $4.9m 
BRAC Bangladesh Securitization 2006 $180 
ProCredit Bulgaria Securitization 2006 E48m 
ICICI –Spandana India Securitization 2008 $75m 
ICICI –SKS India Securitization 2008 $110m 
ICICI –SKS India Securitization 2009 $55m 
Source: CGAP, Wall Street Advisors Services and the Financial Times.  
Transactions of this type have created risks in the balance sheet structures of microfinance-
orientated institutions. Initial public offerings have not generally raised new equity capital. 
Instead, they have involved the listing on public stock exchanges of previously privately-held 
equity held by the original equity investors in microfinance-orientated institutions. Although this 
does not create a negative impact on microfinance-orientated institutions (and it could be argued 
that it help with future equity raising), it does not provide new or increased equity either. 
Risk has been increased through securitizations. Securitizations offer microfinance-orientated 
institutions the potential benefit of being able to “recycle” capital by selling assets that they have 
originated to third party investors, thus returning capital and financing to the microfinance-
orientated institutions for new lending. However, securitization also creates complex risks that 
may be beyond the institutional capacity of microfinance-orientated institutions to manage. For 
example, securitizations have typically left the “first loss” tranche – that is the liability to absorb 
credit losses before other investors bear any losses – with the microfinance-orientated institutions. 
Such first loss tranches are held on the balance sheet of the microfinance-orientated institutions, 
but are very high-risk instruments because of the high leverage in their structure. When credit 
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deteriorates their value falls rapidly and in the event of defaults the losses are borne by the investor 
until the value of their tranche is nil. Similarly, whilst securitization shifts the ownership of credit 
assets from the microfinance-orientated institutions to the investor, the responsibility to manage 
the borrower remains with the microfinance-orientated institutions. Failures to manage this type 
of risk involved in securitization were important contributing factors to the financial crisis in 
advanced economies in 2007 onwards. Then, financial institutions with relatively high levels of 
institutional capacity – especially compared to even the most capable Tier-I microfinance-
orientated institutions – were unable to manage these risks. This led to institutions needing to 
write-off first tranche assets from securitization, reducing their capital base, and being unable to 
manage securitized assets effectively. Such issues contributed to institutional failures and market 
contagion (Independent Commission for Banking, 2011; Toporowski, Tyson & Shabani, 2013). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the growth in the microfinance sector has been driven by private inflows. 
Although deposit mobilization is higher than in other regions, with an average deposit to loan 
ratio of 55% in 2009, $2.5 billion of investor funds had been committed to sub-Saharan African 
microfinance-orientated institutions and there were 63 microfinance investment funds active in 
the region (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). Of this $2.5 billion, only $82m or 3.2% 
was provided in equity with the remaining £2.4 billion or 96.7% of private capital being in debt. 
As a consequence, the majority of equity has been built from retained earnings and this has proved 
challenging for many institutions because of their continued lack of profitability (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). Investments in sub-Saharan Africa are also concentrated by 
country with, in 2008 and 2009, eight countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Mali, 
Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana) receiving 40 per cent of total cross-border funds committed to sub-
Saharan Africa (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). 
 
5.4 THE APPLIED IMPACT OF EXPANSION OF FINANCIAL ACCESS 
The expansion of financial access by mobilising private capital has introduced new pressures to 
expand scale and to be “sustainable” – that is profitable on a stand-alone basis without grants or 
subsidies – in order to provide commercial returns to investors. As this section will discuss, this 
has, arguably, led to “mission drift”, affected the structure of microfinance-orientated institutions 
balance sheets and lending composition, but provided only limited gains in financial access. These 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  106 
impacts are examined more deeply in the fieldwork that is presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in 
relation to Kenya. 
 
5.4.1 “MISSION DRIFT”: THE EXTENT OF LENDING TO THE POOR 
Mission drift has two dimensions. Firstly, it refers to a tendency for microfinance-orientated 
institutions to reduce lending to the poor and increase it to wealthier clients, contrary to their 
social mission to serve the poor. This definition is the one most commonly used by researchers 
(e.g., Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2001). Secondly, it refers to a tendency towards 
reduced lending for purposes that contributes to long-term poverty alleviation and structural 
transformation, such as lending for microenterprises and increased lending for purposes 
contributing less (or not at all) to these goals, such as consumption. These two aspects of mission 
drift are examined separately, with the impact on lending for purposes relating to structural 
transformation considered in a separate section. 
Most empirical research has focused on whether pressures for profitability cause microfinance-
orientated institutions to move “upmarket” and away from lending to the poor. This is because 
profits can be reduced by high levels of bad debt and arrears and by small loans that incur 
relatively high average management costs. By contrast, lending to wealthier customers presents 
less credit risk and lower average management costs. In relation to this, mission drift can be see 
as when an institution increases its lending to wealthier clients and increases its average loan size 
and this occurs for reasons other than progressive lending and cross- subsidization (Armendáriz 
& Szafarz, 2009). Such shifts in lending then threaten to undermine the institutions social and 
community mission. 
Academic research has consistently found a significant correlation between profitability and 
reduced outreach to the poor, using average loan size as a proxy for the poverty level of customers 
so that smaller loans indicate poorer customers. For example, Cull et al. (2007) completed a 
regression analysis of 124 institutions in 24 countries with disaggregated data in three categories 
of lending (group-based lending, individual-based lending, and village banking) and found that 
there was a negative trade-off between profitability and the proportion of poor clients. These 
results were replicated by Cull et al. (2008) using a different dataset which examined data from 
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346 microfinance-orientated institutions and by Gonzalez and Rosenberg (2006) using a database 
of 2,600 institutions with both studies finding a negative correlation between profitability and 
outreach. 
These correlations have also been supported by profitability differentials by institutional type with 
greater profitability associated with “high end” clients. For example, for the period 2003 to 2008 
the average global annual profit margin of microfinance-orientated institutions for “high end” 
clients – as reported to Microfinance Information Exchange – was +2.3% compared to a net loss 
of 20.4% for “low end” clients (Microfinance Information Exchange, 2010). This negative 
correlation between profitability and the degree of poverty of the client is to be expected, as credit 
risk for wealthier clients is lower due to their higher and more regular income to service debt and 
their ownership of assets that have the potential to provide collateral. In addition wealthier clients 
typically have large loans that are cheaper to manage per dollar of lending. 
However, the interpretation of this correlation in relation to mission drift is difficult. Firstly, from 
a methodological perspective, there is no consensus that loan size is an appropriate proxy for 
lending to poor people, undermining the basis for the regression analysis. Secondly, there are 
alternative interpretations of the correlations found above. For example, it has been proposed that 
this correlation relates to expansion of progressive lending, whereby repeat customers 
progressively increase the size of their loans because they have successfully used funds to grow 
businesses and then borrow further, larger amounts to continue the expansion of their businesses 
(e.g., Gonzalez et al., 2009). “Progressive lending” can thus been seen as an indicator of the 
success of the social mission of microfinance – helping the poor start and grow income-generating 
businesses – rather than of mission drift. 
Secondly, there are alternative explanations of the correlation that provide reasons unrelated to 
mission drift. For example, some studies have proposed that the correlation is due to a deliberate 
business strategy of cross-subsidization where microfinance-orientated institutions achieve 
profitability by serving wealthier and more profitable clients in addition, rather than instead of, 
poorer clients. Similarly, it has been proposed that the correlation is due to the ability of 
microfinance-orientated institutions to achieve economies of scale through managing fewer, 
larger loans more cheaply that more numerous smaller loans, leading to higher total profitability 
for the same total loan portfolio (Cull et al., 2008). 
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Overall, the academic interpretation of these studies in relation to mission drift is difficult 
(Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2009), although practitioners continue to discuss this concern (e.g., 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2001; Women World Banking in Frank, 2008). However, 
we do not examine mission drift in detail. 
 
 
5.4.2 IMPACT ON THE BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE OF MICROFINANCE-ORIENTATED 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
5.4.2.1 Asset Structure 
Assets at microfinance-orientated institutions are primarily composed of loan portfolios. Loan 
portfolio quality is reflected in the levels of arrears and bad debts within portfolios, as measured 
by portfolio-at-risk26 – where loans are experiencing repayment problems such as debt service 
arrears but may ultimately be recoverable – and bad debts, where loans are not expected to be 
recovered. 
As noted, microfinance-orientated institutions have been under pressure to become sustainable 
and many have sought to do this through increasing scale, allowing potential economies of scale 
to be achieved. Expansion in scale has been driven by inflows of private capital that has led to 
pressures to rapidly expand lending and there is evidence that, as lending has expanded, asset 
quality has declined. For example, between 2002 and 2008, 7.3% of all microfinance-orientated 
institutions had experienced a crisis – defined as 30-day portfolio-at-risk plus write offs exceeding 
20% -- and 1% failed outright (Rozas, 2011). The most frequently provided reason for this is that 
in the most commercially attractive markets there has been intensifying and “excessive” 
                                                             
26 Portfolio-at-risk is defined as the value of loans outstanding that have one or more instalments of 
principal past due more than a certain number of days as a percentage of the total loan portfolio. It 
includes the entire unpaid principal balance, including both past-due and future instalments, but not 
accrued interest. Portfolio-at-risk (PAR) is usually divided into categories according to the amount of 
time passed since the first missing principal instalment e.g. 30-day, 90-day (source: CGAP). 
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competition between microfinance-orientated institutions that has led to declining lending 
standards and over-indebtedness amongst clients. These issues can be illustrated by examples 
taken from countries that have experienced declining asset quality as a response to commercial 
pressures and the expansion of microfinance. 
One of the earliest countries to experience these problems was Bolivia. Prior to 1999, Bolivia was 
considered a model of microfinance success with microfinance experiencing rapid growth 
(Robledo, 2008). Microfinance-orientated institutions such as BancoSol, Banco Los Andes 
Procredit, FFP Fie and FFP Prodem were major national financial institutions. This expansion 
took place against a background of macroeconomic instability from 1985 to 1998. It included 
hyperinflation and rising unemployment resulting from a decline in primary sectors, including 
agriculture, mining and state employment. In this environment microfinance expanded rapidly 
and was supported by the government who saw it as a path to creating new employment (Marconi 
& Mosley, 2006). The expansion of microfinance was originally based in NGO-led organizations, 
but increasing profits attracted new private entrants, including consumer finance companies 
(FFPs). Competition amongst institutions was high and, in particular, there was competition for 
the most profitable urban clients. The FFPs also introduced larger loans, including for purchasing 
consumer durables, and lowered lending and repayment capacity assessment standards. Under the 
pressures of competition, more established microfinance-orientated institutions also lowered 
lending standards and increased loan size. These factors led to the microfinance sector suffering 
from over-indebtedness and overlapping debts (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2001). As 
financial crises impacted Latin America in 1998 and 1999, the macroeconomic situation 
deteriorated amid rising political instability. The government instigated deregulation of customs 
tariffs, which undermined many creditors’ businesses, and debt forgiveness and debt-service 
limitation programs, seen by some as having encouraged the default that was growing throughout 
the financial sector, including in microfinance. In this context, a number of debtor cartels sprung 
up to resist debt collection. Such cartels undertook a series of protests and engaged in formal 
discussions with banker groups from 2001 to 2003. Despite this history, by 2009 similar issues 
were again being reported in the Bolivian financial market, including a decline in lending 
standards leading to lax credit practices, oversaturation of markets and resurgence in consumption 
lending. Commentators assigned this to excessive competition (Robeldo, 2008). In addition 
microfinance-orientated institutions were routinely making loans in US dollars, thus passing on 
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foreign exchange risk to borrowers and effectively converting foreign exchange risk to credit risk 
for the institution, and financing high growth with high leverage in microfinance-orientated 
institutions (Robeldo, 2008). 
This pattern of crisis was to repeat itself in a number of countries. Globally, 30-day portfolio-at-
risk increased to 3% by 2008 (source: Microfinance Information Exchange27). Specific countries 
impacted by 2009 included Nicaragua, Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Pakistan. In all these 
countries microfinance sectors experienced very similar patterns of high growth rates of between 
33% and 67% annually from 2004 to 2008, largely funded by debt capital from international 
investors (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 2010), which led to excessive competition in 
and over-saturation of the most profitable (typically urban) markets and multiple debts and the 
over-indebtedness of many borrowers. 
However, the worst crisis that has resulted from these pressures has been in Andhra Pradesh in 
India in 2010 and 2011. Andhra Pradesh has long had a high concentration of microfinance-
orientated institutions in India. By 2006, it was headquarters to four of the largest microfinance-
orientated institutions in the country and more than half of all India’s self-help groups were 
located in the state. By early 2005, borrowers made complaints to the regulators relating to 
exploitative practices. In particular, high interest rates were criticized at a time when 
microfinance-orientated institutions were lobbying for exemption from interest rates caps under 
money lending laws on the grounds that they made their businesses unsustainable. There were 
also complaints relating to debt collection practices (Ghate, 2007). In March 2006, an initial crisis 
occurred when the state regulators moved to close down branches and seize the records of 57 
branches of microfinance-orientated institutions. Repayments rates plummeted to 10-20% as 
rumours that debts were now not repayable circulated amongst borrowers. The Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) and the state government became involved in resolving the problems concerning 
microfinance-orientated institutions. After conceding lower interest rates by microfinance-
orientated institutions and a determination of a code of fair practice by the RBI, the crisis 
dissipated and repayments recovered. However, problems re-emerged in 2010 when SKS, one of 
                                                             
27http://www.themix.org/publications/microbanking-bulletin/2010/09/trend-lines-2006-%E2%80%93-
2008-mfi-benchmark-tables   
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the largest and most profitable microfinance-orientated institutions in India was criticized for 
aggressive debt collection techniques which were alleged to have driven a number of clients to 
suicide. Following political anger and agitation, default rates reached 90% and $2 billion in the 
state28 . New legislation was implemented by the state, which restricted how microfinance-
orientated institutions lend and collect money and putting caps on interest rates that had 
previously been unregulated. 
These events were accompanied by political responses. Vijay Kumar, the State’s Minister for 
Rural Development, commented, “These institutions are using quite coercive methods to collect 
… They aren’t looking at sustainability or ensuring the money is going to income-generating 
activities. They are just making money”29. Reddy Subrahmanyam, a senior official who helped 
write the Andhra Pradesh legislation, accused microfinance companies of making “hyper profits 
off the poor,” and said the industry had become no better than the widely despised village loan 
sharks it was intended to replace. “The money lender lives in the community,” he said. “At least 
you can burn down his house. With these companies, it is loot and scoot”30. Mohammed Yunus, 
a Nobel Prize winner, described the SKS flotation as the “new money lending” and Daley Harris 
of the Microcredit Summit Campaign commented that it was “about how well investors and the 
microfinance institutions are doing and not about ending poverty”31. Vijay Mahajan, Chairman 
of BRAC, even undertook a “yatra” or spiritual journey, relating to “soul searching on the need 
to reinvent microfinance“32. 
Although there has not been so severe a crisis, similar problems have been experienced recently 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Portfolio-at-risk has been steadily rising since 2007, reaching, by 2009, 
30 day portfolio-at-risk of 15% of total loan portfolios, 90-day portfolio-at-risk of 8% of total 
loan portfolios and write-offs of 3.4% of total loan portfolios (Consultative Group to Assist the                                                              
28 New York Times. “India Microcredit Faces Collapse From Defaults”. November 17, 2010.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 New York Times. “Banks Making Big Profits From Tiny Loans”. 5 April 2008. 
32http://cfi-blog.org/2011/03/01/vijay-mahajan-treading-carefully-in-indian-microfinances-troubled-
landscape/ 
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Poor, 2011a). The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor also note that it is likely that portfolio-
at-risk is underreported due to “poor reporting and control systems”. These issues are examined 
further in the fieldwork detailed in Chapter 6. 
Problems in sub-Saharan Africa have also led to multiple institutional failures, although not 
systemic crises, which have required government bailouts, takeovers or closure of institutions. 
For example, in Benin, its largest microfinance-orientated institution, the project for the 
promotion and support of the development of micro-enterprises (PADME) experienced strong 
credit growth, but its portfolio quality declined following an economic slowdown in 2006 and 
2007. In late 2007, the Ministry of Finance ordered an audit of PADME’s operations and found 
evidence of fraudulent lending practices. This led to a government takeover. In Ghana, in 2008, 
Artemis, a microfinance-orientated institution, collapsed due to weak management processes, 
internal fraud and “uncontrolled” growth. It had over 100,000 clients and an 80% delinquency 
rate on collapse. Problems included “improper client evaluation, inappropriate use of staff 
incentives, weak reporting systems, overly large increases in loan amounts between lending 
cycles” as well as management fraud where senior executives made loans to family and friends 
without proper internal controls (Rozas, 2011, p.9). In Nigeria, in 2009 Fuegonord, a deposit-
taking microfinance-orientated institution, collapsed. Problems identified included its 
management having “no experience” and consequently allowing uncontrolled and rapid growth 
in lending. In addition, funds had been misused in speculative real estate and stock market 
investments (Rozas, 2011). The Nigerian regulator was subject to criticism because it had 
imposed low entry requirements and the rapid expansion of the industry was beyond its capacity 
to oversee. By 2001, the Nigerian Central Bank had to withdraw 224 microfinance banking 
licenses in order to control the situation (Rozas, 2011). In 2010, the regional central bank for west 
Africa reported that 13 microfinance providers were in threat of collapse and required to be placed 
under government administration (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). In Cameroon, 
in 2010 multiple microfinance-orientated institutions were placed under government 
administration and required to submit recovery plans to the regulator (Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2011a). Furthermore, according to Consultative Group to Assist the Poor “the 
number of failed, yet officially operational, financial service providers is even greater than the 
number of those formally under government administration” (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2011a, p8). Overall, these on-going problems indicate financial fragility in microfinance-
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orientated institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. They will be examined in more detail in relation to 
Kenya in the following chapters. 
Some researchers have sought to incorporate these events into a conceptual framework of 
financial fragility in microfinance. In particular, they have been conceptualized as “borrower 
runs” (Bond & Ashok, 2009) where, drawing on the conventional depositor runs – where a bank 
collapses due to panic withdrawal by deposits as confidence in a bank’s soundness collapses – 
however, in this instance collapsing confidence in a microfinance institution leads to lenders 
stopping repayments because there is no expectation of effective default penalties being imposed 
or of future lending being made once current loans expire. However, these borrower runs differ 
from a conventional collapse for two reasons. Firstly in a conventional bank default the bank has 
collateral that creates a floor under potential losses. Secondly conventional banking defaults are 
slower to accumulate as there are genuine disincentives for borrowers to default, such as legal or 
reputational penalties including the seizure of collateral. However, in the case of borrower runs 
there is little or no penalty for borrower default as there is no collateral and, if an institution 
collapses, no loss of, for example, future borrowing ability. This means that a borrower run can 
create a very rapid collapse in the loan portfolio quality from a very high to a very low repayment 
rate and means that this can accelerate institutional collapse far more quickly and completely that 
in a conventional banking run. 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Liability Structure 
Chapter 4 argued that the financial stability of a financial institution is dependent upon its balance 
sheet structure, including its liabilities. An ideal liability structure is considered as one that 
includes a high percentage of deposits because they are more stable and cheaper. However, they 
can make a financial institution susceptible to depositor runs, especially where the institution has 
long-dated assets and, hence, maturity mismatches between its asset and liabilities. Equity 
financing is also considered desirable, because equity represents permanently committed funds 
and is an essential part of the capital base of an institution available to absorb losses. 
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Debt is also a funding source. It can be sourced from both public and private sources. Debt’s 
desirability has a number of dimensions dependent upon its type. Debt that contributes to an 
institution’s stability would ideally be long-dated, fixed and low cost. However, debt that is short-
term, although providing liquidity, can be unstable in relation to both availability and cost. For 
example, short-term debt can be obtained from interbank markets, including overnight, but is 
subject to rapid fluctuations in price and availability. 
This is particularly true of debt from private investors and markets because it can be pro-cyclical. 
For international investors, such cycles can be driving factors relating to the fundamental 
creditworthiness of an individual borrower and by market sentiment and contagion. Such cycles 
were important causative factors in the financial crisis in advanced economies in 2007 and 2008 
where interbank and capital markets became illiquid and investor risk appetite suffered a sharp 
contraction. The resultant “credit crunch” forced institutions into bankruptcy including Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns and Northern Rock (Independent Commission for Banking, 2011). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, debt markets for microfinance have been subject to these pro-
cyclical cycles in investor sentiment. For example, there was a contraction in liquidity available 
from microfinance investment funds in 2007 in response to the financial crisis in advanced 
economies followed by a cyclical upswing as international investors have sought alternative 
investments in “frontier markets” (Tyson et al., 2014). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, in 2009 microfinance-orientated institutions had high levels of deposits 
with a ratio to loans of 55% and high equity levels with a capital to asset ratio of 24%. However, 
equity was largely sourced from retained earnings with only six investments between 2007 and 
2009 being equity investments. Debt to equity ratios averaged 2.41 and, although equity and 
deposits were strong, microfinance-orientated institutions remain dependent upon debt 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2011a). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, debt has been predominantly sourced from private capital investors and 
markets. This is illustrated in Figure 6 below, where 55% of debt in sub-Saharan African 
microfinance-orientated institutions is sourced from private investors, a level similar to global 
rates. It is also notable that sub-Saharan Africa microfinance-orientated institutions have a higher 
percentage of their debt from banks and funds – that is to say from commercially orientated 
investors – compared to socially-responsible investors (SRIs). 
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Figure 6. Debt structures of microfinance-orientated institutions (2009). 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange. 
These higher levels of debt in the liability structures of microfinance-orientated institutions in the 
region indicate potentially greater susceptibility to financial fragility than if there were greater 
levels of equity and deposits. However, a firmer conclusion cannot be drawn without examining 
the composition of debt – such as maturity, foreign currency, mismatch, and so forth – and its 
relative stability compared to deposits. This issue is examined in more detail in the fieldwork 
presented in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4.3 IMPACT ON COMPOSITION AND PURPOSE OF LENDING 
Commercialization through private capital inflows has – arguably – created shifts in lending 
composition that have reduced or removed the contribution that microfinance might make to long-
term poverty alleviation and structural transformation. This is because profit-seeking incentives 
lead to increased lending concentration in the most attractive commercial business sectors and 
markets. 
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In particular, there are concerns that commercialization has led to a shift towards consumption 
lending. According to one academic, many heads of microfinance programs now privately 
acknowledge what John Hatch, the founder of FINCA International (one of the largest 
microfinance institutions), has said publicly – that 90% of microloans are used to finance current 
consumption rather than to fuel enterprise (Ogden, 2007). Consumption lending can help the poor 
by facilitating consumption smoothing (Collins et al., 2009). However, some commentators 
criticize such lending as providing short-term assistance, but not a long-term path out of poverty 
or a contribution to structural transformation through investment. 
Empirical work examining the relationship between expansion of financial access through private 
capital and shifts in sector composition of asset portfolios is limited. In one example, in sub-
Saharan Africa Consultative Group to Assist the Poor highlight that the concentration of assets in 
banks has been associated with high levels of consumption lending (Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor, 2011a). However, there is little empirical research to quantify consumption lending and 
one of the key contributions of this thesis is a quantified analysis of consumption lending in 
Kenyan microfinance-orientated institutions. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4.4 LEVELS OF FINANCIAL ACCESS 
Given the growth in the microfinance sector and policy support, it might be expected that there 
has been a significant increase in financial access in recent years. However, access has remained 
stubbornly low in many developing countries. Table 8 shows access levels as measured by 
accounts per thousand people at regulated banks. In lower middle-income countries and low-
income countries the average number of accounts per thousand people is 570 and 148 respectively 
compared to 2,004 in high income countries. In sub-Saharan Africa there are only 261 bank 
accounts per thousand adults, the lowest of any region. 
 
 
Table 8. Accounts per thousand adults at regulated banks (2008-2010). 
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World Bank country classification Average 2008 to 2010 
By income level 
High income 2,004.3 
Upper middle income 921.1 
Lower middle income 570.1 
Low income 147.9 
By region Sub-Saharan Africa 261.0 
Source: World Bank global financial development database elaborated by the author. 
 
Using other measures of financial access that include post office and cooperative bank accounts 
in addition to regulated banks, in sub-Saharan Africa fewer than 20% of people had access to 
formal financial services in 2006 (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & Honohan, 2008). There was little 
improvement three years later when the 2009 “Financial Access” reported that access levels in 
many poor countries for deposits and loans remained around 20% (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & 
Honohan, 2008). 
There are also significant intra-country differences in financial access levels, differentiated by 
income. “Banking sectors target mainly the richest inhabitants, leaving the more numerous poor 
with few options. Worldwide, an ‘access gap’ excludes the world’s poorest from the formal 
financial sector, leaving the majority of accounts owned by the rich” (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & 
Honohan, 2008, p.13). 
There has been research into what blocks improvement in access. Some research assigns 
exclusion as due to “voluntary self-exclusion”, defined as having services available but choosing 
not to use them. A variety of reasons are proposed as to why customers would choose to exclude 
themselves, but many appear insubstantial or poorly defined. For example, they include “no need” 
and “cultural or religious” reasons (such as haram under Islamic law; Collard et al., 2001; Whyley 
et al., 1998). “Psychological” barriers are also proposed, such as “many people on low incomes 
feel quite disengaged from banking” (Kempson et al., 2004). 
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However, the majority of research attributes barriers to involuntary exclusion. Involuntary 
exclusion focuses on those who have demand for services but are either refused them or are unable 
to access them. For example, financial institutions may impose barriers that create exclusion. 
These include requirements to open and maintain an account. This may include requirements for 
formal identification, minimum balances, fees and collateral requirements. All of these are 
common features of formal banking services. Such features help banks manage risks such as 
taking collateral and seeking identification that help manage credit and reputation risk. Others 
practices, such as fees, seek to maximize returns, or are actively designed to include only 
commercially-attractive, affluent customers, such as minimum balances. Banking institutions also 
consider costs in making business decisions resulting in them limiting branch networks to areas 
with affluent and concentrated populations, such as richer, urban areas and not having a presence 
in poor or rural areas with disbursed populations. 
Many of these requirements and conditions cannot be met by the poor, excluding them from 
financial access. In many developing countries there is a lack of formal documentation such as 
identity documents or land registration. Costs and minimum balances can be prohibitively 
expensive for the poor. For example, in the sub-Saharan countries, the average minimum balance 
for opening and maintaining a deposit account is 49% of per capita GDP and average annual fees 
are 10% of per capita GDP. For loans, the minimum average loan made is 140% of per capita 
GDP for consumer loans and 996% of per capita GDP for small and medium-sized enterprises 
loans (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & Honohan, 2008). 
Practitioners and micro-finance orientated institutions have sought to address these barriers in 
their business practices, including moderating interest rates and other fees. This has meant 
institutions trying to build a “high-volume, low-cost” business model. The most successful 
innovation to help achieve this has been mobile banking that reduces costs and removes physical 
barriers to financial access (such as the distance to a bank) and so has allowed economies of scale 
to be achieved by microfinance-orientated institutions. However, cost structures for many 
microfinance-orientated institutions remains high due to high staffing levels, inefficient 
processing and poor or little-used technology platforms (CGAP, 2012a). 
Policy has tried to address these issues via an “enabling environment” with better-defined and 
enforced creditor and property rights (including reform of property registration and bankruptcy 
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and collateral seizure procedures) or to build information infrastructure such as credit bureaus 
and identity cards. However, often such “best practices” from developed countries have proved 
difficult to transplant. For example, land ownership is shared or communal in many developing 
countries, making collateral based on individualized property rights ineffective. 
Finally, it has also been suggested that an important barrier for the poor is a lack of “financial 
literacy”, defined as knowledge and understanding of financial products and services. The World 
Bank describes financial literacy as “empowering the poor” and their policy has included financial 
literacy training for potential customers in response to these issues. 
The issue of what are the barriers to the expansion of access remain open to discussion and these 
will be discussed in relation to Kenya. In particular, Chapter 8 will examine the issue of what are 
the barriers to financial access from the perspective of the poor themselves and consider whether 
the barriers are voluntary or involuntary and how this has interacted with the expansion of 
financial access. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have examined how the theoretical frameworks relating to the expansion of 
financial access to financial development and stability can be applied in practice. We discussed 
how, following expansion based on the original social mission of microfinance-orientated 
institutions and its absorption into financial sector development policy, pressures for 
commercialization has attracted inflows of private capital, particularly in the form of debt which 
has led to a rapid expansion of lending and intensified competition. 
The consequences of these pressures include a tendency for “mission drift” with a decreasing 
proportion of lending to the poor and increasing levels of consumption lending compared to 
income-generating lending. However, research in relation to mission drift can be difficult to 
interpret due to the issues of progressive lending and cross-substitution strategies at microfinance-
orientated institutions. Also problematic is that levels of financial access remain low, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Debate continues regarding the nature of the barriers to access. 
From the perspective of financial sector development and stability, these pressures have created 
restructuring in the balance sheets of microfinance-orientated institutions that are affecting 
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institutional soundness. Assets have declined in quality with rising portfolio-at-risk levels 
globally and, in some countries, institutional failures and crisis. In sub-Saharan Africa these trends 
have been repeated with rising portfolio-at-risk and multiple instances of institutional failures, 
although there have been no systemic crises in the region to date. 
In relation to liability structures, the inflows of private capital have been predominately in “hard” 
currency debt. This increases foreign exchange and liquidity risk at institutions. However, a fuller 
analysis of the structure of debt is required in order to conclude on the impact of changes in the 
debt structures of microfinance-orientated institutions. 
In the next three chapters, the thesis will discuss the fieldwork in order to develop these themes. 
In Chapter 6, it will examine the institutional impact of the expansion of finance using private 
capital in microfinance-orientated institutions in Kenya, including examining changes to their 
balance sheet structures. In Chapter 7, the thesis will discuss the implications of these changes 
for systemic stability. In Chapter 8, the thesis will examine the role of financial access in the 
“financial lives of the poor”, including whether barriers are voluntary or involuntary. 
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6. THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT OF THE EXPANSION OF 
FINANCIAL ACCESS IN KENYA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELDWORK 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will present the fieldwork conducted in Kenya. It has been divided into three 
sections: Chapter 6 discusses institutions, Chapter 7 the financial system and Chapter 8 
individuals. 
In this chapter, we start with an overview of the Kenyan financial system in order to provide a 
context for the subsequent discussion. We then examine the impact of the expansion of financial 
access on microfinance-orientated institutions. The expansion of financial access has driven rapid 
expansion in the scale and number of microfinance-orientated institutions. It has been 
accompanied by declining quality in assets, particularly in credit portfolios. Liabilities have been 
restructured because of limited success in funding growth through equity and deposit 
mobilization, leading to increased private sector debt. We discuss the changes on institutional 
capacity and financial architecture. We conclude that, whilst institutional capacity has 
strengthened in some institutions, there is an overall increase in institutional risk because of 
weaknesses in regulation and because some institutions are struggling to build capacity. 
 
6.1.1 THESIS METHODOLOGY FOR CHAPTERS 6 AND 7 
Chapters 6 and 7 present a balance sheet analysis of microfinance-orientated institutions with 
interpretative material. The analysis draws on two sources, namely data from financial statements 
and fieldwork interviews in order to generate a sample of institutions. 
The section of the sample included three types of institutions. These were: 
1. Microfinance-orientated banking institutions (MFOBs). These are regulated 
banks designated as being microfinance-orientated by the Central Bank of 
Kenya based on the predominant customer base. All microfinance-orientated 
banking institutions were included in the sample. 
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2. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions (DTMs). These are a defined 
regulatory category of non-banking financial institutions designated by the 
Central Bank of Kenya as microfinance-orientated and licensed to take deposits. 
All deposit-taking microfinance institutions were included in the sample.  
3. All other non-regulated microfinance institutions that were members of the 
Association of Microfinance Institutions in Kenya (AMFI)33  
Details are given in Table 9 below of the individual institutions in the sample. Financial 
statements and interviews were sought from the full sample. The table shows for which 
institutions financial statements were obtained (column marked “Financials obtained?”) and those 
that were interviewed (column marked “Interviewed (if yes, with date)”).  
Table 9 Sample institutions with details of interviewees & financial statements. 
Category Institution Financials 
obtained? 
Interviewed  
(If yes, with 
date)? 
Interviewee name and 
other comment 
Microfinance-
orientated 
banking 
institutions 
Cooperative 
Bank 
Yes No Refused / No response 
Family Bank Yes No Refused / No response 
K-Rep Bank 
Ltd 
Yes Aug. 11 Albert Ruturi, Managing 
Director 
Equity Bank Yes Aug. 11 Sam Makome, Risk 
Manager 
Deposit-taking 
microfinance 
institutions 
Faulu Kenya Yes Aug. 11 Anne Kimari, Chief 
Financial Officer; 
Raphael Lelolool, Head 
of Audit 
                                                             
33 Some members are not microfinance institutions.  
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KWFT Yes Oct. 11 Rose Muyanga, Risk & 
Audit 
SMEP Yes Aug. 11 Symon Mwangi, Chief 
Financial Officer; Simon 
Gathecah, Head of Audit 
Rafiki No No Start-up & not yet 
operational 
Remu No No Start-up & not yet 
operational  
Uwezo No No Start-up & not yet 
operational  
MFIs BIMAS Yes No Refused / No response  
Opportunity 
International 
Yes No Refused / No response  
ECLOF Kenya Yes No Refused / No response 
Jamii Bora Yes No Refused / No response 
Juhudi Kilimo Yes Aug. 11 Nat Robinson, Chief 
Financial Officer 
KADET Yes Oct. 11 Joseph Keverenge, Chief 
Financial Officer 
Micro Africa 
Limited 
Yes Oct. 11 Tim Carson, Managing 
Director 
Pamoja 
Women 
Development 
Programme 
(PAWDEP) 
Yes Aug. 11 Jackson Wangombe 
General Manager; 
Stephen Mungai, Chief 
Financial Officer 
Taifa Option 
MFIs 
No No Refused / No response  
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ADOK TIMO No No Refused / No response  
Yehu MFIs 
Trust 
No No Refused / No response  
Molyn Credit No No Refused / No response  
Blue Limited No No Refused / No response  
U & I MFIs No No Refused / No response  
Musoni No No Mobile MFI located in 
Netherlands 
SISDO No No Only pre-2006 FS 
available; Refused / No 
response 
Sumac Credit No No Refused / No response 
Canyon Rural 
Credit 
No Oct. 11 Trizah Kiarie, Head of 
Finance 
Source: Author. 
 
The financial statements were obtained from websites or through requests for hard or soft copies 
of all 28 sample institutions. Of these, 15 institutions financial statements were obtained and 
included in the data analysis presented in Chapter 6 and 7. These were comprised of four (100%) 
microfinance-orientated banking institutions, three (50%) deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions and eight (47%) microfinance institutions. The remaining 13 institutions were 
excluded either because they were not yet operational or because no published financial 
statements were available. This included three deposit-taking microfinance institutions which 
were new start-ups in 2012 and not yet operational and 10 microfinance institutions which had 
no websites, had websites but without financial statements, and who either refused or did not 
respond to requests to provide them. These were largely small private or NGO-based institutions 
and because their balance sheets are relatively small, it is not likely that their exclusion has 
materially distorted the analysis in these chapters. 
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Once the financial statements had been obtained, data and narrative information was taken from 
the balance sheet, the profit and loss statements and the notes to the accounts. The latter included 
details of portfolio-at-risk, debt financing and sector analysis of loan portfolios. Details that map 
the specific analysis that will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7 regarding their specific sources in 
the financial statements is given in Table 10 below. 
Table 10. Financial statements sources used. 
Analysis Source – detail  Source – detail 
Loans Balance sheet Net and gross loans 
Notes to accounts Sector analysis of the loan portfolio 
Deposits Balance sheet Gross deposits 
Equity Capital Balance sheet Composition of equity capital including tier I 
and II capital 
Debt financing Notes to accounts Individual loans with names, principal and 
interest rate details 
Portfolio-at-risk Notes to accounts Portfolio-at-risk, classification of loans by 
risk, balance sheet reserves, profit and loss 
charges for reserves and write-offs of loans in 
the period.  
Source: Author. 
 
The use of such financial statements presented a number of advantages. Firstly, as noted in the 
introduction, there is a lack of data relating to financial development beyond measures such as 
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credit to GDP – which only captures credit growth. In particular, there is a lack of information 
that provides any insight into the transmission mechanisms from such credit growth to structural 
transformation. The use of financial statements potentially provides a much greater level of 
granularity in terms of transmission mechanisms. 
Secondly, such financial statements provide a source of data that is reliable. The financial 
statements were audited. This includes by international auditors – such as Price Waterhouse and 
Ernst and Young – and local Kenyan audit firms. The financial statements were prepared under 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) that are set by the International Accounting Standards 
Board and are widely-used globally. Some countries have national accounting standards as well 
– such as the United States or the United Kingdom. However, Kenya does not, and IAS is widely 
used in Kenya. The use of financial statements that are both audited and prepared under IAS 
means that a reasonable level of reliance can be assumed. 
In completing the analysis it was also noted that other sources of data that are based on financial 
statements were found to be unreliable. In particular, CGAP provide an online database that is 
also based on financial statements of microfinance institutions. The author initially sought to use 
this database rather than compiling a new database from original financial statements. However, 
the data in the CGAP database was found to be inaccurate. This was discovered because the author 
started to reconcile the financial statements of individual organizations to the CGAP database and 
found a significant number of errors. For example, data was simply misstated or missing either in 
whole or in part, such as for particular times series or data sets. In addition there was reporting in 
multiple currencies with some entitles reporting in local currency (Kenyan shillings) and some in 
dollars. Where the reporting was in dollars, inconsistent exchange rates had been applied which 
was considered material because of the volatility in the Kenyan shilling exchange rate. These 
errors in the CGAP database appear to have resulted from a number of problems. Firstly, it was 
voluntarily self-reported by institutions but their reporting was incomplete or inaccurate. 
Secondly, CGAP does not seem to have performed any review or established standards for the 
self-reported data. For example, there were no guidelines for the basis of reporting – such as a 
standard for reporting of foreign currency values – resulting in inconsistencies between reporting 
institutions. The lack of work to verify or reconcile the data reported – such as by reconciling 
back to the financial statements as the author did – meant that errors had not been detected and 
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corrected. The author eventually concluded that the level of errors in the database was such as to 
render the database results to be materially misstated and the decision was made to create a new 
database specifically for the thesis. The database is included in the Appendix.  
However, although using the financial statements presented significant advantages, there were 
also some disadvantages. This included in relation to the definition and consistency of categories 
for the sector analysis of loan portfolios.  
For this analysis, information was taken from the detailed notes to the accounts in the financial 
statements that include a sector analysis of the loan portfolio. This is a compulsory disclosure 
under IAS and was available for all institutions from which financial statements were obtained.  
However, IAS does not define the sectors that the disclosure needs to adopt. Instead it 
allows each institution to determine the sectors that it considers relevant to its business. This 
resulted in inconsistencies in the definition of sectors between institutions. In particular, the 
category of “businesses” presented difficulties This was because the majority of institutions did 
not provide a definition of “business” in their financial statements. Thus consistency could not be 
checked between them. Further, some entities included multiple categories that could be 
considered general business categories such as “microenterprises”, “retail”, “wholesale”, “trading” 
and so forth. The approach adopted by the thesis was to include these as “business” and there is 
further comment in Chapter 7.   
This was discussed with a number of interviewees to confirm the reasonableness of this 
approach. It was also raised with the Central Bank supervisors. They confirmed that there 
is confusion about the classification and, in addition, some overlap between “business” 
and “consumer” loans. This was due to the sector analysis being based on the declared 
intention of the borrower about the purpose of their loan and so some may declare it to 
be a personal loan but use it in their business, while others may apply for a business loan 
but use it for personal consumption. However, overall they believed this overlap netted 
out and was not material. Nevertheless, in examining the analysis in the thesis, these 
inadequacies, which could not be fully resolved, should be noted. 
In relation to the interview material, interviews were conducted with regulators, practitioners and 
investors. Invitations were sent in various ways. Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya 
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assisted with introductions to a number of institutions. (In return a working paper was written for 
them relating to the issues faced by microfinance institutions in transforming their institutions 
into regulated entities). The African Economic Research Council introduced me to the Governor 
of the Central Bank who then asked his various staff members to be interviewed and to make 
introductions for me to some financial institutions including at K-Rep, KWFT and Equity Bank. 
Invitations were also send by “cold calling,” including via internet sites, email, phone and in 
person at offices by the author. The IFC, Oikocredit and some microfinance instituions accepted 
such invitations. The acceptance rate was 100% for invitations via FSD and the Central Bank but 
was lower for cold-calling. As detailed in Table 11, 10 institutions accepted invitations. This 
included two microfinance-orientated banking institutions (Equity Bank and K-Rep Bank), three 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions (Faulu Kenya, Kenya Women’s Finance Trust and the 
Small and Medium Enterprises Program) and five non-regulated microfinance-orientated 
institutions. Other interviewees included officials at the Central Bank of Kenya – including those 
responsible for DTM licencing, DTM supervision, the supervisor for Equity Bank and the senior 
manager of the Supervisory Department – and the investors International Finance Corporation 
and Oikocredit. 
The interviews were structured around the questionnaire detailed in Table 11 below. It was written 
in advance based on the literature review presented earlier (particularly in Chapters 3 and 5). 
Interviewees were provided with the questionnaire in advance with a request for a face-to-face 
interview. One interview provided only written answers (Oikocredit) and declined to be 
interviewed in person. All others agreed to meet in person and interviews were typically about 
one hour long, although some lasted for two hours. A pilot questionnaire was not prepared. 
However, in general the pre-prepared questionnaire proved satisfactory and was largely adhered 
to, although interviewees could add topics and comments of relevance as they chose. Detailed 
transcripts of the interviews are included in the Appendix.  
 
Table 11. Institutional interview questionnaire. 
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Topic 
Questions 
Credit Risk What is the history of portfolio-at-risk defaults? Can data including 
time series be provided? Examples of possible responses: Business 
failures, general or sector recessions, agricultural problems, over 
indebtedness, consumption lending, export conditions, natural disasters, 
political events. 
 
Question: What action and procedures are followed to prevent and 
manage non-payment? Examples of possible responses: At 
origination, customer profiling, relationship & methodology, credit 
scoring; On default, officer visits to clients, escalation to senior 
managers, legal action; portfolio-at-risk reserving and loan loss 
recognition policies. 
 
Question: Are there portfolio concentrations that can potentially 
drive high portfolio-at-risk? What are the factors that deterioration 
in these concentrations might relate to? Examples of possible 
responses: Sector or regional concentrations, urban or rural 
concentrations, large individual borrowers. 
Question: What management procedures are followed to assess the 
overall portfolio? Examples of possible responses: Static pool analysis 
(delinquency, prepayments and rate of return); Measuring and 
monitoring sector and geographical concentrations; risk management 
committee reviews; stress testing or identification of tail events; 
correlation analysis. 
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Liquidity risk 
 
Question: To what extend does liquidity risk exist in the balance 
sheet of the bank? What are the key sources of financing? Examples 
of possible responses: Extent of liquidity risk within the portfolio; 
Comment on availability and sources of liquidity (e.g. Development or 
NGO financing, local banks or capital markets, microfinance investors, 
deposit base). 
Question: How do you quantify FX risk levels? If available, can data 
or reports be provided that quantifies liquidity risk? Examples of 
possible responses:  Maturity and interest rate mismatch; VaR; stress 
testing. 
 
Question: To what extend is liquidity risk actively managed & what 
techniques are used? Examples of possible responses: Internal 
treasury; Risk management committees; Risk management approach & 
funding polices; Funding and hedging instruments. 
 
Question: What are the barriers to actively managing liquidity risk? 
Examples of possible responses: Lack of flexibility in funding sources, 
lack of money market hedging instruments; low levels of perceived risk; 
technical expertise; Deposit base building. 
 
Question: How did the Global Financial Crisis affect liquidity and 
financing? Examples of possible responses: Contraction of commercial 
funding; Stability or commitment of financiers including investors. 
Question: Where a deposit base has been established, what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of it as a liquidity source and how 
was it established? Examples of possible responses: Stability and scale 
of deposits; Issues and their resolution in building the deposit base; 
Approaches in technology & management. 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  131 
 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  132 
Foreign exchange 
risk 
Question: What are the sources of FX risk? Is there any history of 
significant gains or losses on FX positions? Examples of possible 
responses: FX funding and other financing; FX lending to borrowers; 
FX denominated assignments or securitizations; data on historical FX 
gains and losses including realised and unrealised gains and losses. 
 
Question: How do you quantify FX risk levels? If available, can data 
or reports be provided that quantifies FX risk? Examples of possible 
responses: Notional values of FX liabilities, notional values of 
mismatched currency positions, value-at-risk, stress testing. 
 
Question: How do you manage and hedge FX risk? What are issues 
in executing hedging? Examples of possible responses: Use of FX 
limits (including national limits, balance sheet limits, VaR-based limits); 
FX futures or options; risk management committee and approval 
structures; Issues: cost, liquidity, availability of appropriate instruments, 
expertise, collateral. 
 
Question: Where FX risk rises from financing sources in “hard” 
currency, what are the barriers to local currency financing? 
Examples of possible responses: Unwillingness of financiers to lend in 
local currency; lack of commercial bank financing or local deposit base. 
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Risk management 
capacity 
Question: Where do building risk management capabilities rank 
versus other challenges and priorities facing your MFI today? 
Examples of possible responses: More critical or difficult issues than 
need to be addressed before risk management capabilities. 
Question: What are the formal channels for risk management at the 
MFI? Examples of possible responses: Formal risk management limits, 
approval or committees, internal processes and procedures, VaR or 
stress testing limits. 
Question: What are the “lessons learnt” by the MFI relating to 
building risk management capabilities? What are the critical 
barriers to this? Examples of possible responses: Successful 
approaches and projects; Issues of building staff expertise, management 
information systems platforms, technology platforms; Usefulness of 
technical advice or training. 
Question: Are staff provided with performance related 
compensation relating to risk management? What are the pros and 
cons of this in assisting appropriate risk management? Examples of 
possible responses: Performance bonuses for lending, portfolio-at-risk 
or deposit taking targets. 
 
Source: Author 
 
6.1.2 THE KENYAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
At independence the Kenyan financial system was an offspring of its colonial past. It had an 
oligopolistic market structure, dominated by former colonial banks (Engberg, 1965), and the East 
African Currency Board (EACB) who, in the absence of an established central bank, had a limited 
function of maintaining a strict parity between the East African shilling and the British Pound. 
The financial system had been developed to finance trade and settler agriculture and had very 
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limited monetary and financial independence and little engagement with the Kenyan indigenous 
population (Upadhyaya, 2011). 
Immediately upon independence in 1963 the new government reformed the financial system. This 
included establishing the Central Bank of Kenya, which was given supervisory powers and 
control of monetary policy and the newly created Kenyan shilling. The financial sector was 
heavily dominated by government or quasi-government institutions, whose primary mandate was 
development. The government actively managed the financial system through direct policy and 
regulation. Controls included ceilings on domestic interest rates, control of the foreign exchange 
markets, and restrictions on bank borrowings (Ngugi, 2000). Government-owned banks were 
established, including specialist institutions for development and agricultural financing. These 
included the National Bank and Grindlays Bank, which were nationalized to create the Kenya 
Commercial Bank and two new state banks, the Cooperative Bank and the National Bank of 
Kenya. Specialized development financial institutions established by the government included 
the Industrial & Commercial Bank for Cooperation, the Industrial Development Bank, the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya (Grosh, 
1991). Foreign banks, including Barclays and Standard Chartered, were generally allowed to 
continue to operate as part of the Kenyan government’s approach to retaining and attracting 
foreign capital and preventing capital flight. 
From 1963 to 1970, real GDP growth was strong and averaged 8.4% with low inflation at 2.3% 
(source: World Bank). This is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 below. The growth was driven by 
agricultural exports and helped by “relatively market friendly, growth-promoting” economic 
policies under the Kenyatta administration (Mwenga & Ngung’u, 2008, p.329). 
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Figure 7. Kenya GDP growth and inflation (1963-2011). 
Source: World Bank 
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Figure 8 Kenyan inflation with index 35 (2006-2011) 
Source: 
World Bank 
 
During this period of strong macroeconomic performance, the financial system showed consistent 
growth. Domestic credit relative to GDP grew from 13% to 30% between 1963 and 1979, as 
illustrated in Figure 9 below. However, the loan to deposit ratio remained low (Upadhyaya, 2011) 
and the market structure remained oligopolistic (Ndung’u & Ngugi, 1999). 
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0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
140%
150%
160%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Pe
rc
en
t c
ha
ng
e
In
de
x
Index
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  137 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Kenya private credit as a percentage of GDP (1963-2011). 
Source: World Bank 
 
However from 1973, following the global oil shocks, economic performance deteriorated with 
high inflation and declining GDP growth, which from 1978 to 1991 averaged only 3.8% (source: 
World Bank). This poorer performance has been assigned to a number of factors, including the 
Moi administration policies that, from 1978 until 2002, “pursued redistribution and political 
power at the expense of private investment... (that) was paralys(ed) by a combination of increased 
corruption, policy uncertainty ... and deteriorating relationship with donors” (Mwenga & 
Ndung’u, 2008, p.329). The advent of multi-party politics in 1991 introduced a period of 
generally-stalled political and economic reforms (Mwenga & Ngung’u, 2008). Financial sector 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
%
 o
f G
NP
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  138 
growth stagnated with private credit remaining broadly static at about 30% of GDP and 
investment levels “almost stagnating” (Ngugi, 2000). 
In the financial sector, this period was characterized by weak credit fundamentals and political 
interference and abuse (Ndung’u & Ngugi, 1999). This includes the “Goldenberg Scandal” when 
over 10% of GDP was lost though corruption at high levels of government (Wrong, 2010) and a 
series of banking scandals and failures where, between 1985 and 1989, 15% of the financial 
system liabilities were insolvent and a number of institutions failed or required interventions 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Given the broader weakening macroeconomic fundamentals, reforms were made under pressure 
from the World Bank. This included making stabilization and structural adjustment programs in 
the financial, agricultural and industrial sectors aimed at introducing market-orientated reforms. 
Such reforms were a condition for the World Bank extending the 1989 Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credit (FSAC) and the accompanying IMF standby facility. 
In the financial sector, the exchange rate was gradually floated and interest rates were deregulated. 
The Banking Act was upgraded in 1985, 1988 and 1989. In 1986, the Deposit Insurance Fund 
was established. From 1988 onwards, government-dominated banks were privatized. This 
included non-specialist banks such as Kenya Commercial Bank (Bowbridge, 1998), and specialist 
financial institutions, such as the Development Finance Corporation. Some institutions remained 
under government control. The World Bank imposed strengthening of the legislative mandates 
and capacity of the regulatory department of the Central Bank of Kenya. There was restructuring 
of nine insolvent institutions out of an identified 28 institutions with severe problems (although 
there was a planned restructuring of a further ten institutions which was never implemented) 
(World Bank, 1992; Ndung’u & Ngugi, 1999). 
The results of the financial reforms and privatizations were generally considered to be 
disappointing with little impact on savings mobilization and resource allocation within the 
economy (World Bank, 1992; Ndung’u & Ngugi, 1999). In 1992 Kenya suffered a banking crisis 
(Honohan & Laeven, 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The 1992 World Bank report on the reform 
program in the financial sector concluded that it was “Overall ... unsatisfactory” and – as 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  139 
discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to “augmented” liberalization – assigned these failures to 
shortcomings in implementation, including sequencing and political infeasibility. 
However, there was an alternative explanation that focuses on structural issues including 
“failure(s) to achieve macro-stability and strengthen the capital base” (Ngugi, 2000, p.70). 
Ndung’u et al. (1999) found that these disappointing results were due to  
inherent structural weakness in the economy ... (that) has limited the transmission channels 
and mechanisms and dynamism in the economy (and that) the reform program replicated 
to a large extent the suggested sequencing ... however, financial liberalization was 
implemented before attaining macroeconomic stability. As such, the reform process was 
characterized by macro-instability (p.489).  
This included excessive fiscal and monetary expansion that fuelled inflation and excessive 
liquidity within the financial system. 
Today (2014) the financial system remains limited in its depth and functioning with the financial 
system is fragmented, with many small banks servicing niche markets and limited the outreach 
(Beck et al., 2011) . 
In 2007, the Government of Kenya published “Kenya Vision 2030” (Government of the Republic 
of Kenya, 2007) which sought to set out a long-term national planning strategy for Kenya’s 
economic, political and social development. President Mwai Kibaki proclaimed a plan for 
“accelerating the transformation of our country into a rapidly industrializing middle-income 
country by the year 2030”. (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2007) Economically, it aims 
to develop sectors where Kenya has competitive advantages, including high-value agriculture, 
manufactured goods and tourism, supported by a program of public investments and a sound and 
accountable political system. Important inthe goals set out in the “Kenya Vision 2030” is the 
expansion of financial access to mobilize domestic savings (Collier & Ndung’u, 2010) to improve 
stability, enhance efficiency and expand access to Kenyan households (Beck et al., 2010). In 
reality, however, this vision was impeded by the post-election violence between different ethnic 
groups in late 2007 and 2008. It was compounded by drought and poor agricultural production, 
threat of famine in Kenya’s remote eastern regions, and security tensions on its eastern borders. 
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6.1.3 INSTITUTIONS SERVING THE POOR 
Prior to the mid-1980s, financial access in Kenya was very limited and the majority of the 
population used informal financial services. Informal financial services and institutions have a 
deep-rooted history in Kenya and their presence was noted in the colonial period (Colony and 
Protectorate of Kenya, 1950). The International Labour Organization (ILO) study of informal 
employment in 1972 noted that it was well-established at that time (ILO, 1972). Informal finance 
is often linked to agriculture, such as part of marketing or distribution cooperatives or cooperative 
groups in trading, transport (matatus) and teaching (Johnston, 2004). 
Today, such informal and small scale self-help groups remain very important, with current 
estimates of between 3,000 to 5,000 unregulated saving and credit cooperative societies 
(SACCOs) (Central Bank of Kenya, 2010) and they remain the dominant provider of financial 
services to poor households (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009). 
However, there were important exceptions to this. Firstly, there was the presence of cooperative 
banks that from the colonial period onwards were important institutions for the poor, particularly 
for agricultural finance, and were incorporated and sponsored by government policy. Indeed, from 
the colonial period on, the issue of moneylending and agricultural credit constraints to 
productivity were apparent (Atieno, 1994), and policy formulation focused on problems that are 
the same as those addressed by the present-day expansion of financial access. For example, policy 
papers in the 1950s discuss the need for “granting and recovery of loans on reasonable terms to 
replace the widespread and pernicious effect of the general employment by the community of the 
private moneylender” whilst seeking to ensure “all possible safeguards against establishing 
conditions of general and hopeless indebtedness… which result in … living permanently in 
advance of their income and under the continual fear of foreclosure” (Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya, 1950, pp.1-2). Subsequently, cooperative credit schemes were included in economic plans 
for 1954, 1965, 1966-74 and 1970. Plans included establishing organizations to execute 
government-led credit policy through cooperatives, such as the African Land Development 
Board, the Agricultural Corporation and the Cooperative Bank of Kenya. In 1975, the Central 
Bank of Kenya established minimum lending percentages to agriculture for regulated banks 
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(Atieno, 1994). Important aspects of policy included both government bureaucracy and the 
establishment of special credit organizations. 
However, the expansion of credit was disappointing (Atieno, 1994). In 1973, the World Bank 
offered policy support to such credit schemes, assigning the cause for “missing markets” in 
agricultural credit as the requirements for land collateral and non-farm sources of income that 
could not be met (World Bank, 1992). However, these institutions also suffered from many 
problems, including inefficient and corrupt administration, poor lending practises and lending for 
non-policy purposes. There were institutional failures and widespread bad debts (Atieno, 1994). 
In addition, there was also the case of the Post Office Savings Bank, which was established in 
1910. It continued after independence under the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Act that limited 
it to being a savings-only institution with no lending provision. It has been highly successful in 
mobilizing deposits as it uses its extensive national network of post offices as agents for deposit-
taking. In 1990 the Post Office Savings Bank established an affiliate, Post Bank Credit, but this 
was closed down in 1993 after a large overdraft to a politically-connected borrower was not 
serviced. It appears that the affiliate was used fraudulently as a conduit for channelling funds from 
the National Social Security Fund into campaigning for the 1992 elections in the Goldenberg 
Scandal (Bowbridge, 1998). Nevertheless, it remained the “single most important institution” for 
low-income clients until the mid-2000s, as it provided a nationwide network and low cost 
transactions (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009). However, it has not been competitive 
in mobile banking and has not grown as quickly as microfinance-orientated banks and 
consequently has declined in relative importance with a fall in its share of household deposits 
from 2006 to 2009 ranging from 5.6% to 2.5% per annum (Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, 
2009).  
In the private sector, non-banking financial institutions have also been important in serving the 
poor, especially from the 1980s onwards. Non-banking financial institutions engage in a variety 
of activities including hire purchase, leasing, mortgages and trade financing. They are not allowed 
to offer checking accounts, but offer interest-bearing deposit accounts which are also their 
primary source of funding. In the 1980s regulatory changes were enacted, including low capital 
requirements and limited interest rate controls which stimulated a move of deposits from banks 
to non-banking financial institutions (Ngugi, 2000). The non-banking financial institutions 
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expanded rapidly with assets tripling between 1980 and 1985 (World Bank 1992) with expansion 
concentrated in unsecured and longer term (relative to banks) lending to the small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
However, these institutions were weak and poorly managed and a significant number of non-
banking financial institutions suffered from insolvency problems. Twenty-one institutions failed 
between 1984 and 1996, including 11 in 1993 alone (Upanishida, 2011). Problems resulted from 
weak asset quality in lending portfolios and inadequate capital bases. The inadequate capital bases 
related directly to the lower regulatory requirements for these types of institutions that had been 
established to encourage their establishment and growth. The poor asset quality was caused by a 
number of factors, including inadequate credit analysis, excessive risk concentration and weak 
and ineffectively enforced regulation. The latter allowed unsecured and excessive insider lending 
and other persistent violations of regulations. Insiders included senior politicians such as 
government ministers and also featured outright fraud relating to the 1992 elections where pre-
shipment export finance and export compensation facilities at the Central Bank of Kenya were 
used to fraudulently extract funds from the institutions. The most notorious of these fraudulent 
schemes was the previously mentioned Goldenberg Scandal. 
Other asset quality issues arose from poor lending practises such as inadequate evaluation, 
documentation and collateral. Given the low regulatory requirements for capital and low levels 
of enforcement, relatively small levels of asset impairment created insolvency. The World Bank 
comments that “interest liberalization ... created over-competition ...and encouraged many weak 
financial institutions to invest in riskier assets, thereby adding to their already severe financial 
difficulties” (World Bank, 1992, pp. v-vi). For example, Rural Urban Credit Finance had extended 
largely unsecured loans to slum dwellers to purchase matatu (minibuses), plots of land and real 
estate. Other institutions suffered from asset concentrations or multiple pledging of collateral 
(Bowbridge, 1998). Such institutions were amongst those that failed. 
Liquidity was also mismanaged, with issues such as investment in illiquid assets (mainly real 
estate and fixed assets), excessive depositor concentration and maturity mismatches. 
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Loopholes in accounting contributed to institutions obscuring their real financial situation such 
as bolstering revenues through the continued accrual of interest on non-performing loans or 
inappropriate revaluation of assets (Upadhyaya, 2011). 
The failures exposed the poor standard of regulation and supervision. The World Bank comments 
that the proliferation of institutions outstripped the capacity of the Central Bank of Kenya and 
resulted in falling supervisory standards (World Bank, 1992). In addition, the influence of senior 
politicians in ensuring regulations were circumnavigated was extensive (Wrong, 2010). 
Following these institutional failures in the non-banking financial institutions, their regulations 
were gradually brought into line with regulated banks, including capital and cash ratios and 
interest rate restrictions. In 1994 all non-banking financial institutions were required by the 
Central Bank of Kenya to convert into regulated banks or to revert to their “true status” as non-
banking financial institutions (Central Bank of Kenya, 1996). Changes included outlawing 
unsecured insider lending, restricting investment in real estate, equity and speculative assets and 
giving powers to the Central Bank of Kenya to remove and appoint managers when the institution 
was not being run appropriately. Overall, the debacle of the non-banking financial institutions 
created deep distrust in the formal banking system that, as will be discussed later, remains 
prevalent today. 
Unregulated microfinance-orientated institutions started to be formed from the 1980s onwards, 
but proliferated in the 1990s and 2000s in response to the non-banking financial institutions 
failures. They became more widely trusted institutions due to their stronger integrity and social 
mission. The majority of microfinance-orientated institutions started as charitable or social self-
help organizations, typically organized by community groups, NGOs or church organizations and 
were usually small and with localized operations. 
This is the case for the three main deposit-taking microfinance institutions (DTMs) who have 
origins as charitable or church-based organizations For example, Kenya Women’ Finance Trust 
(KWFT) started its operation in 1981 with a group of women professionals who sought to set up 
services for women entrepreneurs. The Small and Medium Enterprise Projects (SMEP) was 
started in 1999 by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) to assist slum dwellers 
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who needed financial aid to buy food and then later developed into helping in business enterprises 
for employment (source: interview material & websites). 
Prior to 2006, microfinance-orientated institutions were unregulated. In 2006 the Microfinance 
Act initiated regulation of deposit-taking microfinance-orientated institutions (DTMs), including 
licensing and supervision by the Central Bank of Kenya. The Act became operational in 2008. As 
at the close of 2012, there were three microfinance-orientated institutions that have transformed 
into deposit-taking microfinance institutions and five new deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions. Institutions which transformed to deposit-taking microfinance institutions (DTMs) 
from unregulated microfinance-orientated institutions since the 2008 legislation are the Kenya 
Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT), Faulu (Swahili for “success”) and SMEP. These are all 
participated in the fieldwork interviews. The five new start-ups provide relatively little public 
information relating to their ownership and funding structures but are wholly commercial 
organizations (source: interview). 
Regulated banks have also been involved in low-income markets. Prior to 2005, their loan 
portfolios were heavily concentrated in low-risk lending such as wealthy private customers and 
in secured, short-term lending. In the 1980s, foreign banks, such as Barclays, expanded into rural 
areas with the goal of mobilizing rural deposits as a source of low-cost funding for high yielding 
loans and investments in urban areas. The operations did not appear to be profitable and there was 
retrenchment back into urban and richer client bases. 
Subsequently, from the mid-2000s onwards regulated banks started to “downscale” into 
microfinance markets and are now dominant in the microfinance sector. This was achieved by 
two types of entrants. Firstly, there were new entrants, notably Equity Bank. Equity Bank’s 
operations date from 1993, but the bank expanded hugely in the 2000s to become the dominant 
institution in the microfinance sector. K-Rep Bank was established in 1999 but, following strong 
growth up to 2005, is now a second-tier player whose growth was impacted following senior 
management fraud in the mid-2000s. Secondly, entrants into the market emerged because 
established banks who saw the success of new entrants like Equity Bank, took a strategic decision 
to downscale into the microfinance sector. This included the Cooperative Bank and Family Bank, 
who are both well-established banks with national operations and have origins as cooperative 
banks or building societies, dating back to 1965 and 1984 respectively. 
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In 2009, the Central Bank of Kenya established a defined category of microfinance-orientated 
banks (MFOB). This currently includes Equity Bank, Cooperative Bank, Family Bank and K-
Rep. Microfinance-orientated banks are defined as large, regulated banks whose business is 
concentrated in microfinance and are regulated as banks under the Banking Acts. Microfinance-
orientated banks have, as will be discussed, accounted for over 80% of growth in the sector 
between 2006 and 2011 (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009, 2013). 
 
6.1.4 CURRENT ACCESS TO FINANCE 
There are now a wide variety of institutions active in Kenyan microfinance. They include 
microfinance-orientated banks, deposit-taking microfinance institutions, unregulated 
microfinance-orientated institutions, the Post Office and informal savings and credit cooperative 
societies. In addition, mobile banking has become very widely used for money transfer services. 
Nevertheless, access levels remain limited. The Financial Sector Deepening Program 2009 and 
2013 household surveys provide data summarised in Table 12. Although the total percentage of 
the population using formal finance has increased, usage is concentrated in mobile banking and 
regulated banks. Mobile banking is very widely used in Kenya, mainly for transactions, but not 
for savings (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2013). Microfinance-orientated institutions 
had increased market share from 2006 to 2009, but stagnated thereafter. Most importantly, 
informal finance, in both registered saving and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs) and 
informal arrangements, predominate. 
Table 12. Use of financial services (2006-2013). 
Stated as percentage of the adult population. 
Type of service 2006 2009 2013 
Regulated banks 13.5 17.1 29.2 
Unregulated MFIs 1.7 3.1 3.5 
M-PESA 0.0 28.4 61.6 
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Post Office 5.6 2.2 n/a 
SACCOs 13.1 8.3 9.1 
Informal Groups 39.1 29.5 27.7 
Source: Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009; Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2013. 
 
The Financial Sector Deepening Program household surveys of 2009 and 2013 report that access 
remains concentrated in certain groups. There is an urban and rural divide. In 2009, 17.8% of the 
rural population had access to formal services, compared to 40.3% of the urban population. By 
2013, 25.2% of the rural population had access to formal services compared to 46.6% of the urban 
population. There is differential access between provinces with high levels of access in Nairobi 
and Central, but much lower usage in poorer and rural areas, such as the Eastern provinces and 
the Rift Valley. Higher proportions of those with higher incomes and levels of education had 
access to formal financial services as opposed to those who were poorer and without education. 
For example, 60% of those with primary education have no access to financial services, compared 
to 13% of people educated at secondary school (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2013). 
As discussed above, an important aspect of the expansion of financial access in Kenya has been 
the role of mobile banking , most notably M-PESA and its similar but less dominant competitor 
services. M-PESA was started in 2007 as a money transfer system by Kenya’s leading mobile 
telephone company, Safari.com, in partnership with Vodafone and the Government. 
It allows money to be transferred within social networks and to MFIs via mobile phones. As well 
as personal ownership of phones, it can also be accessed through agents – typically based in 
“kiosks” or small shops – who own the phone and use it to collect or distribute cash and then 
record the transaction via the mobile device. Because of its reliance on access to - but not 
necessarily ownership of - a mobile phone it is easy and convenient to use relative to accessing 
financial services at banks’ physical premises. This is particularly the case in remote areas or 
urban areas – such as slums – that lack proximity to banks’ physical premises. Costs are also low 
relative to regulated banking services. Because of these advantages to customers, mobile banking 
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has proved very popular in Kenya and usage – as reflected in the financial access surveys – is 
widespread. 
However, although originally a money transfer system, M-PESA was increasingly used for other 
services including loans and deposits because the clients have a “electronic wallet” at M-PESA. 
This effectively acts as a bank account because debit and credit balances are permitted. Further 
innovations have also been made – for example, M-PESA transactions can be linked directly to 
bank accounts in regulated banking institutions and the use of automated teller machines in 
partnership with Equity Bank (CGAP, 2014). These uses of M-PESA have raised concerns 
because M-PESA and it agents were unregulated but are conducting effectively regulated 
businesses such as holding client monies and payment systems.  
The Central Bank of Kenya established stronger regulations for the control and management of 
agents and mobile banking through new legislation in 2008 and 2009 through an amendment to 
the Banking Act 2003. The legislation introduced licensing for both regulated institutions acting 
through agents and for individual agents. Regulated institutions remain liable for any negligence 
or fraud by agents. Technical standards were set for systems specifications. Mobile banking was 
also brought within the scope of the National Payments System Bill in 2012 (CGAP, 2010b; CBK, 
2012). 
However, the issue of the holding of client monies and the use of related interest remains 
unresolved. Client monies are now held in trust accounts at commercial banks. However, they are 
pooled across all clients and interest on monies is not allocated to clients. Such arrangements are 
below “best practice” standards and are likely to need further improvements in the future. (CGAP, 
2010b, 2014). There is further discussion of M-PESA in Chapter 7. 
 
. 
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6.2 THE IMPACT ON THE BALANCE SHEET OF MICROFINANCE-
ORIENTATED INSTITUTIONS: ASSETS37 
 
The financial fragility or stability of an institution is dependent upon its balance sheet structure. 
This and the next section discusses the fieldwork findings in relation to the changes that have 
occurred in the asset and liability structures of microfinance-orientated institutions as financial 
access has expanded. This section examines assets. The following section discusses liabilities. 
6.2.1 The Growth in Scale and Concentration of Lending 
One of the most fundamental changes that have occurred within microfinance-orientated 
institutions as financial access has expanded has been increased scale. In Kenya, there has been 
strong growth in microfinance assets – as represented by gross loans – since 2006. Outstanding 
loans in the sector have expanded from from Khs 37 trillion in 2006 to Khs 121 trillion by 2011 
in real (inflation-adjusted) terms – a more than threefold increase. This is illustrated in Figures 10 
and 11 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
37 All figures in Chapters 6 and 7 are in real terms (i.e. inflation-adjusted) unless otherwise stated. 
Figures have been rebased using the index data from Figure 9. 2006 has been taken as the base index after 
which figures have been restated using cumulative inflation up to 2011.  
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Figure 10. Gross loans (2006 to 2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
Figure 11 Growth rates in gross loans (2006-2011; 2006 Baseline) 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
As illustrated in Table 13, growth has been concentrated in microfinance-orientated banks. They 
account for Khs 77.5 billion of the growth in real terms, or 92.4% of the growth and experienced 
growth rates in real terms of 343% between 2006 and 2011. By 2011, the market share of the 
microfinance-orientated banks was 90.2%. 
By contrast, the growth of deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated microfinance 
institutions has been relatively muted.  
Deposit-taking microfinance institutions experienced strong growth until 2009, but then growth 
slowed significantly. Between 2006 and 2011 deposit-taking microfinance institutions added Khs 
5.8 billion in real terms in loans but market share shrank from 11.4% in 2006 to 8.3% in 2011.  
Unregulated microfinance institutions grew by a small Khs 0.5 billion in real terms between 2006 
and 2008 and market share for unregulated microfinance institutions had fallen from 3.3% in 2006 
to a mere 1.5% by 2011. Unregulated microfinance institutions have been unable to compete with 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions and microfinance-orientated banks. 
Table 13 shows the pattern of growth by individual institution. Two institutions – Cooperative 
Bank and Equity Bank – account for 78.2% of the 2011 balances and 83.1% of the growth of the 
total sector. Equity Bank in particular has experienced huge growth rates in loans (and, as will be 
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discussed further, in deposits and funding) with a growth rate of 725% from 2006 to 2011 and, 
by 2011, a 44.3% market share. 
Similarly, within the deposit-taking microfinance institution sector, the dominant institution is 
KWFT, which expanded loans from Khs 2.2 trillion to Khs 7.1 billion from 2006 to 2011 with a 
5.9% market share, thus becoming the fourth largest institution in the market.  
Unregulated microfinance institutions loan balances are all individually trivial at the institutional 
level with, in 2011, none exceeding a 0.3% market share and none having a loan portfolio that 
exceeds half a billion shillings. 
 
 
Table 13 Gross loans (2006-2011) by individual institutions with market share and growth rates. 
KHs millions  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2011 
Market 
Share 
2006-
2011 
Growth 
MF 
Orientated 
Banks 
Cooperative Bank 18,190 23,589 28,216 31,705 42,672 41,092 33.9% 226% 
Equity Bank 7,410 15,374 31,989 42,859 47,496 53,720 44.3% 725% 
Family Bank 2,573 3,934 4,908 5,785 7,376 10,350 8.5% 402% 
K-Rep 3,768 4,977 5,160 4,066 3,898 4,280 3.5% 114% 
Sub Total 
MFOB 
Total 31,940 47,875 70,272 84,416 101,443 109,443 90.2% 343% 
DTMs KWFT 2,281 3,674 5,578 7,675 8,402 7,098 5.9% 311% 
Faulu 1,521 1,674 2,449 2,266 1,842 2,052 1.7% 135% 
SMEP 458 585 734 708 854 916 0.8% 200% 
Sub Total 
DTMs 
Total 4,260 5,933 8,762 10,649 11,098 10,065 8.3% 236% 
Non 
Regulated 
MFIs 
PAWDEP 488 687 365 469 454 402 0.3% 82% 
Jamii Bora - 371 557 547 - - 0.0% n/a 
KADET 267 396 313 353 344 228 0.2% 85% 
ECLOF Kenya 225 323 206 231 245 259 0.2% 115% 
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Opportunity Kenya 79 113 170 193 226 259 0.2% 329% 
BIMAS 117 165 178 150 187 254 0.2% 217% 
MicroKenya 78 93 132 123 179 280 0.2% 359% 
Juhudi Kilimo - - - 56 73 102 0.1% n/a 
Sub Total 
MFIs 
Total 1,254 2,148 1,921 2,123 1,707 1,783 1.5% 142% 
All Total 37,454 55,956 80,955 97,189 114,248 121,291 100.0% 324% 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author. Inflation-adjusted basis. 
 
 
 
6.2.2 The Impact on Credit Quality 
Critical to the impact on asset structures of lending is credit quality. Credit quality is indicated by 
portfolio-at-risk. 
Portfolio-at-risk, as reported by institutions in their financial statements from 2006 to 2011, is 
detailed in Figure 13 and Table 14 respectively. Portfolio-at-risk was at a high level from 2006 to 
2009 with a sector average of 14.4%. From 2010 onwards portfolio-at-risk declined – indicating 
improving asset quality – with a sector average of 6.4% in 2011. The reasons for these changes 
in portfolio-at-risk include macroeconomic issues (notably inflation), agricultural events and 
political events. They are discussed in more detail below. 
Portfolio-at-risk varies between institution types with microfinance-orientated banks consistently 
reporting the highest portfolio-at-risk, followed by deposit-taking microfinance institutions, and 
then unregulated microfinance institutions. This can relate to higher credit risk and related 
provision and losses but many interviewees commented that credit quality was better at 
microfinance-orientated banks because of their capacity to attract better quality customers, 
including wealthier customers, and because of their greater institutional capacity in relation to 
credit risk management.  
Instead, it was commented that this higher portfolio-at-risk was due to the underreporting of 
portfolio-at-risk by institutions relative to regulatory provisioning requirements, especially in 
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unregulated institutions such as unregulated microfinance institutions. This is discussed further 
in relation to institutional capacity and regulation below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Portfolio-at-risk (2006-2011). 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  154 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange and financial statements elaborated by the author. 
 
Portfolio-at-risk also varies between individual institutions as illustrated in Table 14. Within 
microfinance-orientated banks, different institutions reported very different levels of portfolio-at-
risk within the same year. Equity Bank and Cooperative Bank reported 30 day portfolio-at-risk in 
2007 of 8.1% and 22.7% and, in 2011, 4.4% and 6.3% respectively. 
Within unregulated microfinance institutions, some bodies – such as Jami Bora, PAWDEP or 
ECLOF – reported zero portfolio-at-risk in some years whilst other unregulated microfinance 
institutions – such as BIMAS or Opportunity Kenya – consistently reported high portfolio-at-risk 
levels of up to 23.4%. 
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Table 14. Portfolio-at-risk (2006-2011) by individual institutions and with weighted average for 
types and all institutions. 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange and financial statements elaborated by the author. 
 
The reasons for variations in portfolio-at-risk were explored in interviews with senior managers 
at microfinance-orientated institutions and regulators. Most significantly for microfinance-
orientated institutions, interviewees reported that credit risk relates to general poverty, as in the 
microfinance sector the typical customer is poor. This is unsurprising as it reflects the 
fundamental risk in microfinance lending – that its lending is to those whose credit risk is poor 
because they have low and volatile incomes and because they have no substantial assets to offer 
as collateral. 
Interviewees reported that credit quality was related to macroeconomic conditions, again a 
fundamental credit risk. This exposure needs to be considered in the context of the exposure of 
the poor to macroeconomic events. Some macroeconomic events do not impact on the poor and 
so were not considered relevant by interviewees. For example, some interviewees commented 
that the poor were sheltered from macroeconomic cycles because they are excluded from formal 
labour markets and so are not affected when unemployment rises in the formal sector. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cooperative Bank (Adjusted 2006))14.00% 22.70% 17.83% 10.53% 6.44% 6.30%
Equity Bank 12.19% 8.11% 8.57% 18.19% 6.20% 4.44%
Family Bank 14.00% 13.16% 7.93% 6.42% 17.77% 17.16%
K-Rep 5.46% 12.57% 22.33% 26.74% 23.72% 6.27%
Sub Total MFOB Total 11.41% 14.14% 14.16% 15.47% 13.53% 8.54%
KWFT 3.62% 1.23% 2.38% 1.31% 15.53% 6.25%
Faulu 3.20% 2.00% 3.43% 8.60% 10.82% 5.14%
SMEP 12.34% 24.02% 16.40% 21.30% 13.89% 8.88%
Sub Total DTMs Total 6.39% 9.08% 7.40% 10.40% 13.41% 6.76%
PAWDEP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.43% 5.00% 5.00%
Jamii Bora 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.62% 0.00% 0.00%
KADET 7.64% 17.17% 5.87% 9.49% 6.65% 4.27%
ECLOF Kenya 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.06% 14.03% 9.53%
Opportunity Kenya 8.00% 7.82% 23.47% 2.11% 1.53% 1.33%
BIMAS 16.57% 7.89% 9.14% 12.01% 8.84% 6.90%
MicroKenya 9.99% 10.50% 9.85% 9.82% 4.45% 4.54%
Juhudi Kilimo n/a n/a n/a 12.09% 3.90% 0.99%
Sub Total MFIs Total 6.03% 6.20% 6.90% 8.58% 5.55% 4.07%
All Total 11.37% 14.41% 12.03% 13.59% 8.44% 6.38%
MF Orientated Banks
DTMs
Non Regulated MFIs
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However other macroeconomic risks have differential impacts on the poor and consequently are 
causes of credit losses at microfinance-orientated institutions. In particular, inflation was 
considered a key risk by the practitioners interviewed 38 . Kenyan consumer price inflation 
accelerated to a peak of 16% in 2008 and 2009, and then fell back before rising again to a new 
peak of 19% in 2011 (source: KNBS). Inflation was concentrated in basic goods, including food 
and fuel that had inflation rates of 25% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Since these goods make 
up a large proportion of spending for the poor this created an inflation rate for the poor of 20%, 
compared to only 10% for the middle classes (Fengler, 2011). 
In addition, the Central Bank of Kenya raised interest rates in order to use monetary policy to 
control inflation and this increased loan interest rates as microfinance loans are benchmarked 
against Central Bank of Kenya base rates. In 2011 the average rate charged to customers in 
microfinance was 32%39. 
Given the necessity of buying food and fuel regardless of income and the increases in interest 
rates, it is unsurprising that financial institutions reported inflation and interest rate rises as causes 
of increasing bad debts as their customers had reduced residual income for debt servicing 
combined with increased debt servicing levels. 
Credit quality was linked by interviewees to business cycles and risks in specific sectors. The 
agricultural sector was identified as a sector where such events and cycles were important risk 
factors in credit quality. Between 2006 and 2011 there were significant problems in agricultural 
conditions with adverse conditions, including flooding and drought, in different parts of the 
country. Credit loses resulted and were concentrated in institutions with high proportions of 
agricultural lending or whose positions were concentrated in rural areas in Kenya where 
agriculture is the main economic activity. Agricultural risk also created high correlation risk 
across lenders within a given portfolio – that is to say, if one farmer is impacted by adverse                                                              
38 For inflation to impact on the repayment ability of households, it has to rise faster than wage inflation – 
that is there is a decline in real wages. Data for this period that would provide an analysis of the real wages 
of poor households in this period is not available. However, given that the inflation was in fuel and foods 
and was very rapid and at a time of economic contraction, it was unlikely to have been accompanied by 
wage inflation that matched or exceeded it. Overall, it is reasonable to assume that real wages did indeed 
fall, as per the perceptions of practitioners. 
39 Source: Equity Bank Financial Statements 2011, Chairman’s Statement. 
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weather conditions, the majority are likely to be impacted. In addition, agricultural prices and 
supplies can be volatile and impacted not only by weather, but also by business and political 
events. For example, one MFI, Juhudi Kilimo, specializes in agricultural finance, including value-
chain financing. They have a large portfolio in the dairy business, including both primary dairy 
cow production and processing plants. However, in 2009 and 2010, the business expansion, 
combined with competitors who were replicating their successes, resulted in a glut of milk and 
prices fell. Portfolio-at-risk rose as a result. Subsequent improvements and diversification of 
marketing has improved these problems. 
Some microfinance-orientated institutions have sought to diversify regionally or through greater 
diversify of agricultural products in order to manage this risk. However – and as will be discussed 
below – many have also withdrawn from agricultural financing into lower risk, higher return 
sectors. 
Interviewees identified political risk as an important factor in credit quality. In Kenya, there has 
been social unrest during elections. All institutions reported significant credit losses and 
heightened portfolio risk during the political violence following contested elections in 2007 and 
2008. The sector saw heightened portfolio-at-risk in 2007 to 2009, which peaked at 13.6%. 
Customers were affected by the destruction of their businesses and farms and by forced relocation, 
and were often unable to be contacted by the institutions from which they had borrowed, making 
management of bad debts impossible. In addition, some institutions reported that they believed 
some customers took advantage of the problems to cease payment. Violence and intimidation was 
focused in geographical areas including the Nairobi slums and the Rift Valley, and institutions 
with portfolio concentrations in these areas were differentially impacted. Improving political 
stability also saw a significantly improved portfolio-at-risk for the majority of institutions in 2010 
and 2011 because political stability was re-established. 
Finally, it should be noted that factors such as inflation as well as political or agricultural risk are 
common to institutions and create a further potential risk from a systemic perspective: namely, 
correlation risk. Correlation risk across portfolios of institutions exists where the latter have 
similar portfolios that are subject to similar risks. For example, institutions may all be exposed to 
risk from macroeconomic problems as well as to specific risks such as political or agricultural 
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threats. Such similar portfolios mean that bad debts across the industry rise together and are a 
source of coordinated financial fragility. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3 THE IMPACT ON THE BALANCE SHEET OF MICROFINANCE-
ORIENTATED INSTITUTIONS: LIABILITIES 
 
As a financial institution expands its lending portfolio, it needs to expand its funding sources or 
liabilities in parallel. Funding can be sourced in many forms, including deposits, equity and debt. 
Deposits are raised from customers. They are considered the best form of funding because they 
are cheap and stable. 
Equity and debt can be sourced from different types of investors. In Kenya, this has included 
public and private investors. Private profit-seeking investors have provided both debt and equity 
financing (although debt has predominated). Other investors have been important, including SRIs, 
NGOs, national governments and international finance institutions. In Kenya there are also a 
number of dedicated government funds that channel monies via microfinance institutions for 
poverty alleviation programs to targeted groups such as poor women, children or young people. 
From the perspective of the institution, funding sources can carry liquidity and foreign exchange 
(FX) risk. Debt can be procyclical or subject to cycles in investor sentiment. This can create 
liquidity risk when new or replacement (rollover risk) sources of financing are needed. Debt can 
be denominated in foreign currency giving rise to foreign exchange risk. 
These risks must be quantified and managed as part of the internal control and management 
processes of institutions. This includes “hedging” risk, whereby risk is mitigated by offsetting 
instruments. In developed countries such hedging would be completed largely through the use of 
derivative markets such as in foreign exchange or interest rate futures, options and swaps. 
However, in developing countries the immature financial markets heighten risks and make risk 
management difficult. Liquidity risk is heightened compared to developed markets because of 
shallower capital and interbank markets and limited maturity of instruments. Capital flows – 
especially from foreign investors – can be highly pro-cyclical. Foreign exchange markets can be 
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illiquid and volatile. Hedging instruments – such as interest rates futures, options and swaps – are 
not widely available. These challenges are discussed further below. 
 
6.3.1 Equity Financing 
Along with deposits, equity40 is a preferred source41 of financing for a financial institution. It 
has a number of advantages, including stability due to its perpetual nature and its flexible “cost” 
in the form of dividends that are entirely variable in relation to profits and corporate goals. In 
addition, and very importantly, it contributes to the capital base of an institution. 
In Kenya microfinance equity has been sought from international and domestic sources but 
investor appetite has been very limited. Where equity financing has been available, it is highly 
concentrated by institutional type and individual institution. 
As illustrated in Figure 14, equity capital is almost entirely held by microfinance-orientated banks 
with minimal capital in deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated microfinance 
institutions. In 2011, 95% of equity was in microfinance-orientated banks, 4% in deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions and less than 1% in unregulated microfinance institutions. 
Furthermore, since 2006 only microfinance-orientated banks have experienced any material 
growth in their capital with a 416% growth rate compared to only a 150% increase in deposit-
taking microfinance institutions, and a decline of 75% in unregulated microfinance institutions. 
                                                             
40 Equity is composed of share capital and retained earnings. Share capital is sourced when shares are 
issued and cash is paid into the institution. The buyer receives the shares. This can occur privately – a 
private placement – or through markets such as via stock exchanges. An initial public offering is the first 
time that a stock is listed on a stock exchange. It can raise share capital for an institution and this is 
known as a primary issue. It can also be a sale of previously privately-held shares and the proceeds go to 
the seller of the shares, not the institution. Retained earnings are the accumulated profits or losses of the 
institution. Retained earnings are issued after dividend payments to shareholders. If net profits are made 
and retained (that is not distributed as dividends), earnings increase. If net losses are made, they decline.  
41 There is also considered to be an optimal level, as excessive capital can then lower returns on capital. 
However, this is more typical in large international financial institutions where return on equity is an 
important measure of performance from a shareholder’s perspective. In fact most banks in developing 
economies hold much higher levels of capital than their developed country counterparts. For example, the 
total capital to total RWA for Kenyan banks is 22.9% (Central Bank of Kenya, September 2013). In Kenya 
such high ratios have been encouraged by the Central Bank of Kenya according to Central Bank of Kenya 
interviews. 
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As will be discussed later, this is due to microfinance-orientated banks sourcing new capital from 
private investors. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated microfinance 
institutions have sourced capital from retained earnings. For unregulated microfinance institutions 
the decline in capital is due to the losses being made. 
 
Figure 13. Equity capital (2006-2011). 
Source: Financial statements as elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
For microfinance-orientated banks, equity capital had increased between 2006 and 2011 by more 
than four times in real terms, from Khs 11.9 billion to Khs 39.6 billion (59.4 billion in nominal 
terms). Of this, Khs 12.4 billion in real terms (or Khs 19.7 billion in nominal terms) or 41% had 
been raised through primary issuances, with the remaining capital accumulating through retained 
earnings. Capital ratios for all microfinance-orientated banks in 2011 were well above the Bank 
for International Settlements thresholds. 
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Equity Bank was the dominant recipient of equity capital with Khs 8.2 billion in real terms (or 
13.1 billion in nominal terms) or 66% of the primary issues raised by Equity Bank. Equity Bank 
held 53% of the sector’s total capital in 2011. This is because Equity Bank has been active in 
seeking equity investment and investors have included international names such as George Soros, 
various private equity groups and the International Finance Corporation. In 2006 Equity Bank 
was listed on the Nairobi stock exchange via an initial public offering and is (as at 2013) the third 
biggest company on the exchange. Its reputation amongst investors, especially internationally, is 
high. Cooperative Bank also completed an IPO in 2008, raising Khs 3.0 billion (or 4.9 billion in 
real terms), or 25% of the total raised in the period, in terms of share capital. In 2011 it held 40% 
of the sector’s equity capital. 
Other microfinance-orientated banks have been less successful in raising equity. They conducted 
some minor private placements between 2006 and 2011 that accounted for 9% of the new 
issuances. This was largely from international investors. There were also some one-off 
placements with private domestic investors whose motivation was mainly philanthropic rather 
than commercial. In 2011 these institutions held 7% of total equity capital. 
For deposit-taking microfinance institutions the scarcity of equity capital has been a particular 
problem. Prior to transformation, deposit-taking microfinance institutions had low capital bases. 
They largely consisted of paid-in capital from initial owners – which were often related charitable 
organizations – plus retained earnings. For some deposit-taking microfinance institutions, 
retained earnings were negative due to on-going losses. However, upon transformation, the 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions became subject to a regulatory requirement to limit 
ownership of any one party to a maximum of 25% and needed new capital to meet capital ratio 
standards. This was reported as difficult to meet by deposit-taking microfinance institutions, 
despite the Central Bank of Kenya granting lengthy grace periods to allow compliance. KWFT, 
for example, raised capital in 2010, but from its parent company and remains exclusively owned 
by it with a four year grace period granted by the Central Bank of Kenya. Interviewees at KWFT 
reported that they were seeking investors but that it was “tricky” due to the need to ensure that 
investors were compatible with their social mission as well as commercially suitable and, because 
of these difficulties, they were considering divesting through grants of equity to staff and 
customers instead. Faulu also reported searching for investors in order to both meet the capital 
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requirements and to build their capital base. Interviewees reported “strong discussions” for a 
private placement in 2010 but it appeared not to have been successful by 2011. SMEP was also 
in the process of diversifying its ownership, having applied for and been denied an exemption 
from the Central Bank of Kenya in 2010. SMEP interviewees also reported that they had wished 
to avoid diversification because of concerns that new investors would not be compatible with 
their religious and social goals. Overall, the deposit-taking microfinance institutions seemed 
optimistic about raising new equity. However, their motivation was primarily to meet the 
regulatory requirements for ownership diversification and they were cautious about partners that 
might deflect them from their social mission. 
Less optimistically, there seems little concrete investor interest beyond some minor domestic and 
related parties and the alternate source for equity financing – retained earnings – remained weak 
due to their low profitability. 
Overall the equity base, from both a financing and capital ratio perspective, is weak for deposit-
taking microfinance institutions due to a lack of appetite or compatibility of international 
investors that prefer investments in microfinance-orientated banks. 
Unregulated microfinance institutions were the least unattractive to potential equity investors. 
Many had negative retained earnings and, in the weakest institutions, negative net equity due to 
on-going net losses. In interviews, many unregulated microfinance institutions reported seeking 
equity because it was needed for “transformation” to a regulated deposit-taking microfinance 
institution. However they reported little realistic opportunity of finding it. 
Financial needs for transformation are high because of the need to upgrade technology platforms, 
investing in order to meet regulatory standards (such as for premises), and meeting capital 
requirements. This included needing to increase bad and doubtful debt provisions to meet 
regulatory standards. As a consequence of being unable to finance these requirements through 
new capital unregulated microfinance, institutions that were seeking to transform were spending 
large amounts of self-funded costs to prepare for transformation. This was resulting in further 
deepening of capital deficits. 
All interviewees at unregulated microfinance institutions reported concerns about creating 
conflicts of interest with investors between commercial returns and their social mission. 
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PAWDEP, for example, reported seeking Khs 60 million or more in investments to both fund 
transformation and meet the ownership diversification requirements. They reported long-standing 
relationships with a number of financiers, including socially responsible investors such as 
Oikocredit, the Grameen Foundation and the Netherlands Development Agency – all of whom 
have previously or currently provided them with debt finance. However, there was a reluctance 
to commit to equity investments. Barriers included requests for Central Bank of Kenya progress 
reports, intensive due diligence on internal environments and expectations of a more commercial 
approach to business. Some investors had also created a “chicken and egg” situation where they 
did not wish to be the first investor to commit. In another example, Juhudi Kilimo – a start-up 
MFI in 2009 for value-chain agricultural financing – reported a difficult environment for sourcing 
equity. They had received start-up funds from the Grameen and Acumen Foundations. They were 
using internal funds to finance expansion and planned to sell the whole operation once it is more 
mature to an investor such as a commercial bank. 
Overall, only the microfinance-orientated banks have been able to successfully access equity 
capital. Its main source has been international investors. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions 
and unregulated microfinance institutions have struggled to attract such investment. 
 
6.3.2 Deposit Mobilization 
An attractive source of financing for microfinance-orientated institutions is deposit mobilization 
because they are cheap and stable. Many interviewees commented on the desirability of attracting 
deposits as a cheap and stable source of funding for their institutions and almost all interviewees 
cited this as a key strategic goal. A secondary goal in deposit mobilization was to provide a safe 
and effective savings vehicle to the client and to promote a savings culture. 
Deposits in microfinance institutions have grown rapidly between 2006 and 2011 as illustrated in 
Figures 14 and 15 below. For the sector, deposits have grown from Khs 34.8billion to Khs 119.8 
billion (in real terms) in the period, a three and a half fold increase. 
However, following a very similar pattern to equity, deposits are concentrated in microfinance-
orientated banks with limited deposits in deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated 
microfinance institutions. Microfinance-orientated banks raised 94.0% of all new deposits. 
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Deposit-taking microfinance institution raised 5.2% of new deposits. Unregulated microfinance 
institutions raised a very minor 0.8% of new deposits. 
 
Figure 14. Deposits (2006- to 2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
 
Figure 15. Growth rates in deposits (2006-2011, from 2006 baseline). 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
Deposit growth is highly concentrated by individual institutions, as illustrated in Table 15 below. 
By 2011, Equity Bank and Cooperative Bank had a market share of deposits of 59.1% and 20.0% 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Deposits (2006-2011) by individual institutions with market share and growth rates.    
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KHs billions  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Market Share Growth 
MF 
Orientated 
Banks 
Cooperative Bank 12,046 13,134 13,718 17,625 21,784 23,965 20.00% 199% 
Equity Bank 12,205 20,984 28,747 33,499 50,202 70,911 59.18% 581% 
Family Bank 4,160 5,777 6,170 7,907 11,367 13,590 11.34% 327% 
K-Rep 3,308 4,301 3,751 3,343 3,941 4,085 3.41% 124% 
Sub Total Total 31,718 44,196 52,386 62,374 87,295 112,551 93.92% 355% 
DTMs KWFT 1,276 1,583 2,216 3,228 4,453 4,485 3.74% 352% 
Faulu 779 1,031 1,229 1,504 1,340 1,245 1.04% 160% 
SMEP 247 323 351 397 444 516 0.43% 209% 
Sub Total Total 2,301 2,937 3,797 5,129 6,237 6,246 5.21% 271% 
Unregulated 
MFIs 
PAWDEP 120 215 243 258 352 342 0.29% 286% 
Jamii Bora 252 371 557 547 - - 0.00% 0% 
KADET 151 214 187 224 245 182 0.15% 120% 
ECLOF Kenya 102 150 121 141 158 175 0.15% 172% 
Opportunity Kenya 18 26 88 89 108 131 0.11% 745% 
BIMAS 104 125 130 130 116 128 0.11% 123% 
MicroKenya - - - - 35 76 0.06% n/a 
Juhudi Kilimo - - - 26 - - 0.00% n/a 
Sub Total  746 1,101 1,327 1,414 1,014 1,034 0.86% 139% 
ALL Total 34,766 48,234 57,509 68,918 94,546 119,831 100.00% 345% 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
Because of the advantages of deposits as a source of financing, interviewees considered that there 
is considerable competition for deposits between institutions. They also saw deposit-taking as an 
area where the competition was between all banks, rather than only microfinance-orientated 
banks. For example, banks such as Barclays, Kenya Commercial Bank and Standard Chartered 
were quoted as competitors. Interviewees at a deposit-taking microfinance institution described 
the competition as “fierce” and driven by microfinance-orientated banks downscaling into the 
microfinance sector and directly competing with them. 
This was especially the case for the most attractive business clients with significant deposits to 
be make. Interviewees commented that the most attractive customers from a depositor perspective 
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were often already sophisticated enough to have established bank accounts, typically at non-
microfinance-orientated banks. They preferred non-microfinance-orientated banks because they 
offer more attractive services, such as cheque clearing – which are restricted for deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions under the separate DTM regulations – as well as the number of ATMs 
and branches. This applied especially to business customers who are identified by many 
institutions as attractive clients from a commercial perspective as well as individuals with large 
deposits. Very few saw poor households as commercially attractive clients for deposit raising 
because of their typically small level of deposits. 
Interviewees emphasised the importance of reputation in relation to deposit-taking. Given the 
history in Kenya of bank bankruptcies and the lack of deposit insurance, they commented that the 
institution’s reputation for stability and soundness was a major factor in gaining the trust of 
depositors. 
Deposit-taking institutions commented that success in deposit-taking was elusive. Their 
reputations – whilst well-established as lenders – was very limited in deposit-taking and they felt 
that their reputation was weak compared to both microfinance-oriented banks and general banks. 
For example the chief financial officer at a DTM commented that its reputation was a major 
barrier to deposit-taking as in their customers’ view the institution was “not really a bank”. 
Overall, the chief financial officer commented that deposit-taking microfinance institutions were 
“struggling” to raise deposits in the face of competition from banks. Another DTM interviewee 
commented on the problem of reputation and clients seeing them as being a reputable microcredit 
provider, but not a deposit-taking institution. The DTM interviewee commented on the strategic 
issue of how to pace expansion, as it required large investments in order to establish the required 
regulatory branch environment in terms of security and premises. However, this was offset by the 
need for critical mass in order to serve clients, especially the attractive business clients who 
expected a nationwide service. These comments reflect the lower success rate of deposit-taking 
at deposit-taking microfinance institutions compared to microfinance-orientated banks. 
By contrast, unregulated microfinance institutions have only a very tiny share of the deposit 
market with very small levels of absolute deposits and new deposits, and comparatively slow 
growth rates. However, they are not regulated to take deposits. Nevertheless, the majority reported 
doing so. Many took deposits as part of lending practices, whereby clients were expected to 
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establish savings habits prior to being given credit and to demonstrate this through regular 
deposits into dedicated accounts. Many unregulated microfinance institutions also require cash 
collateral from lenders and count these as deposits. However, some were also openly flouting the 
regulatory prohibition on deposit-taking, although the level of such unregulated deposit-taking 
was small. 
6.3.3 The Funding Gap 
Because of these difficulties in equity raising and deposit mobilization, non-debt sources of 
funding have not grown sufficiently to fully fund the growth of loans. Figure 16 illustrates the 
extent of the “funding gap,” defined as total deposits less total loans in the microfinance sector. 
A nil or positive value indicates that deposit growth has been matched or exceeded by loan 
growth, meaning that an institution does not need other sources of funding apart from deposits. A 
negative value indicates that loan growth has exceeded deposit growth and that other sources of 
funding – such as debt – are required. 
As can be seen here, the funding gap has become increasingly negative since 2006 for all 
institutions except for Equity Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The funding gap (2006-2011) 
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Source: Financial statements as elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
For microfinance-orientated banks, the funding gap became increasingly negative, peaking at Khs 
-22.0 billion in 2009 before returned to being slightly positive at Khs 3.1billion in 2011. However 
this was exclusively due to Equity Bank because its deposit base has grown faster than its loan 
portfolio since 2009 and, between 2009 and 2011, its funding gap moved from being Khs -9.4 
billion to Khs 17.1 billion. 
The three remaining residual microfinance-orientated banks have seen an increasingly negative 
funding gap that increased to a maximum of Khs -22.1 billion by 2010 before declining slightly 
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period and appeared to rely on non-microfinance deposits, including government deposits, in 
order to finance microfinance loan growth42. 
For deposit-taking microfinance institutions (DTMs) the funding gap grew to Khs -5.5 billion by 
2009, before declining to -3.8 billion by 2011 as deposit-taking microfinance institutions began 
to seek deposits under their new licenses. Again, the funding gap was differentiated by institution 
with the gap concentrated in KWFT. These figures are representative of the difficulty of deposit-
taking microfinance institutions in raising deposits. 
Finally, for unregulated microfinance institutions the funding gap has been stable and small. This 
reflects their low growth rates overall in both loans and deposit-taking. 
 
6.3.3 The Leverage Ratios 
The funding gap implies that institutions need to increase non-deposit forms of funding for loan 
growth. This could be achieved through increasing equity or via increasing debt. Which of these 
has occurred can be examined through the leverage ratio. 
The leverage ratio – defined as loans divided by equity (with equity defined as share capital, share 
premium, and retained earning but excluding revaluation reserves and proposed dividends)43 – is 
shown in Figure 17 below (on a logarithmic scale). 
                                                             
42 Disclosure of deposits broken down for microfinance customers is not given in cooperatives’ financial 
statements. However, in 2011 it was disclosed that 33% of deposits are from “Private Enterprises” and 35% 
as “Other”, including 20% from “governments”. Of these 33% is term or foreign currency deposits. It is 
unlikely that such deposits are from microfinance customers (Cooperative Financial Statements, 2011).  
43 The ratio is based on a simplified form of the BIS definition. It has also been inverted to allow greater 
clarity. This allows for two advantages, which are: (i) the ratio has been calculated using the data that is 
used throughout the thesis. This ensures consistency. It also avoids the problem that the BIS definition 
includes calculated elements that are not publically available – such as risk-weighted assets - , but that are 
unlikely to be material for the institutions under consideration based on the thesis findings. For example, 
BIS capital is defined to include instruments where assessment of subordinated creditor status or 
capability and the “exposure” includes adjusted derivative values, collateral and risk-weighted values for 
off-balance sheet instruments. No banks reported such activities either in interview or in their financial 
statements; and (ii), it allows the same methodology across all institutions in the sample. This is necessary 
because only regulated entitles provide disclosure of full BIS-based capital (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010a, 2014).  
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The leverage ratio has increased modestly across the sector (defined as “all institutions”) from a 
low of 2.4 in 2007 – which was the year in which Equity Bank raised new capital through an IPO 
– to 3.1 by 2011. Microfinance-orientated banks, with the exception of Equity Bank, followed 
these sector trends closely. 
However, deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated microfinance institutions 
showed rapidly increasing leverage. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions leverage increased 
from a low of 2.1 in 2006 to 6.4 by 2011. Unregulated microfinance institutions leverage ratios 
increased from 1.64 in 2006 to 4.64 by 2011. This reflects earlier discussions in this chapter 
detailing the expansion of their loan portfolios despite weak growth in deposits and lack of net 
profits that would help build the equity base in proportion to the loan portfolio.  
As will be discussed in the next section, this gap has been filled by debt. Such balance sheet 
structures – with these high leverage ratios – can be a source of financial fragility. 
Figure 17. Leverage ratios (2006-2011) 
 
Source: Financial statements as elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
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6.3.4 Debt Financing 
The implication of this widening funding gap for institutions is that there is a need for institutions 
to seek to fund growth through debt, including through private capital inflows and debt financing 
has become the dominant source of financing for microfinance-orientated institutions in Kenya. 
Figures 18 and 19 below show that total debt financing has grown nearly four-fold, from Khs 4.5 
trillion in 2006 to Khs 17.1 trillion by 2011 (in real terms),. 
 
Figure 18. Debt financing by source (2006-2011). 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (figures are inflation-adjusted). 
 
 
Figure 19. Debt financing by source (2006-2011). 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author. 
National and international development institutions have been an important source of debt 
financing. They were particularly important in providing anti-cyclical funding in 2011. National 
and international development institutions who have provided financing to microfinance 
institutions in Kenya include the European Investment Bank, the Netherlands Development 
agency (FMO), the German Development Agency (KfW), the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and, since 2009, the China Development Bank. However, such financing has (as for lending 
and deposits) been concentrated in a small number of institutions with, respectively, 81% (in 2011) 
and 60% (in 2010), of all such financing being received by Equity Bank. 
However, the majority of debt been sourced from private investors. Debt financing from private 
investors grew annually from 2006 peaking at Khs 13.5 trillion in 2010 (in real terms), accounting 
for 78% of all debt financing, before declining in 2011 to 57% due to reduced flows following 
the global financial crisis. 
Furthermore, and as illustrated in Figures 20 and 21, the majority of private financing from 2006 
to 2009 came from international private investors that grew from negligible levels in 2006 to peak 
at Khs 6.5 billion (in real terms) in 2010. However, such flows are pro-cyclical and declined to 
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Khs 5.4 billion by 2011 and in the wake of financial crisis, when debt financing from international 
private capital declined. 
 
Figure 20. Lending by international and domestic private investors (2006-2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
 
 
 
 
 -
 2,000
 4,000
 6,000
 8,000
 10,000
 12,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Kh
s M
ill
io
ns
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  175 
Figure 21. Lending by international and domestic private investors (2006-2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author. 
 
Increasing leverage, especially using private capital from international sources, can have a 
number of advantages. For example, it offers a much greater pool of potential liquidity and, as 
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examined have prudent liquidity risk management practices in relation to both leverage and 
maturity risk. KWFT, for example, had 75% of their 2011 borrowing (i.e. debt liabilities) in 
maturities over one year and had a liquidity ratio of 66% versus a regulatory requirement of 20%. 
Similarly, Equity Bank had 61% of their 2011 borrowing in maturities over one year and a 
liquidity ratio of 33%. 
Nevertheless, the reliance on pro-cyclical and short-term private capital remains a key risk even 
for the most stable institutions. This is particularly the case where there is a reliance on 
international investors flows because these can be pro-cyclical. In fact, as discussed above, this 
has materialized in Kenya, where, as a percentage of private investment, international investment 
has declined continually since 2007 from 72% in 2007 to 42% in 2011, reflecting investor 
responses to the financial crisis in advanced economies. This creates significant liquidity risk for 
institutions that are reliant on international funding and increases the financial fragility of 
institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4, such pro-cyclical capital flows have been an important 
cause of numerous developing country financial crises. 
Furthermore, international private capital is highly concentrated in a very few, highly rated 
institutions. Equity Bank is the primary recipient. Citibank and Deutsche Bank – both of whom 
have global investment operations for private investment in microfinance – invest exclusively in 
Equity Bank. Two major funds, Growth Management and the Global MFIs Facility44 have made 
investments in Kenya, again exclusively in Equity Bank. This is because Equity Bank is able to 
provide an attractive profile to private investors. For example, as at 2010, Equity Bank had an 
AA credit rating and attracted publicity in international investment circles. In 2008 the Financial 
Times45 commented, “Mr Mwangi46, a former Ernst & Young accountant, is a numbers-and-
systems man. He boasts of the bank’s rigorous credit analysis… (that) Equity’s proportion of non-
performing loans, at 2.8 per cent, is the lowest in the sector… (and) has built a state-of-the-art 
information technology system that the chief executive says can handle ever higher volumes of 
customers without an appreciable increase in costs”. When an institution has such a reputation,                                                              
44 The owner is not disclosed publically. 
45 Financial Times, “Equity Bank: Runaway profits from banking the poor”, 22 October 2008. 
46 Equity Bank’s Chairman. 
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international finance is often easily available. In fact, in an interview the Head of Risk 
Management at Equity Bank described it as being able to select from investor and financiers as 
they have more willing liquidity providers than they require. This enables it to manage liquidity 
and maturity risk well and assists with institutional soundness, despite very high growth rates. Its 
ability to lock into longer maturities also ensures that it is less susceptible to short term changes 
in investor sentiment and liquidity. For example, during the global financial crisis it has been 
relatively unaffected by changes in investment sentiment and liquidity and, in fact, Equity saw 
themselves promoted as an “alternative” investment. 
However, second tier institutions report only moderate success in attracting international 
financing and – if available – increased institutional risks in relation to it. For example, 
interviewees at deposit-taking microfinance institutions reported that there was international debt 
finance available, but it was predominantly offered either in “hard” currency or with costly 
foreign exchange hedging and limited maturity. Interviewees commented regarding foreign 
exchange hedging that liquidity was reasonable as Symbiotic – a new socially responsible 
provider of foreign exchange hedging in developing country currencies – had been established, 
but that it was expensive.47 
However, the majority of institutions reported much less favourable positions. This included 
difficulty in sourcing basic liquidity from international investors. They were being reported by 
interviewees as conservative in their investment appetite for smaller and less well-known 
microfinance institutions. In particular, small and unregulated microfinance institutions without 
track records in profitability and growth reported that attracting private international financing 
was almost impossible. Overall, they again experienced a “chicken and egg” situation – as for 
equity finance – where institutions were only able to attract funds for growth once they have 
already demonstrated growth and profitability and an ability to attract other investors. 
Oikocredit provided interesting comments which capture this dynamic in the investment 
environment, stating, “More recently, competition has been high, especially with more and more 
                                                             
47 Analysis of foreign exchange risks data is not available.  
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social investors and private funds taking an interest in the region ... at the wholesale level, only a 
number of MFI’s have the capacity to borrow and it seems like we are all chasing the same fish”. 
However, these issues with basic liquidity provisions and pro-cyclical flows from private sources 
were also dependent upon the type of investors. For example, SRIs and NGOs – with their twin 
goals of investment and social returns – were reported as being more stable sources of financing 
with a long-term view of investment and, consequently, less focus on pro-cyclical flows. Active 
in Kenya are Oikocredit, Blue Orchard and Dexia. Again, Equity Bank has been a major recipient. 
However the recipients have been more diverse than other sources of finance and have included 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions including KWFT and SMEP. Both attract investors due 
to their engagement with banking for women. Small amounts have also been provided to 
unregulated microfinance institutions such as ECLOF Kenya, a church-affiliated MFI. 
In interview, Oikocredit commented that they actively sought out less well-established 
organizations and provide both financing and technical support to assist in their growth. 
Oikocredit comments, “We want to support organizations to grow and have high developmental 
impact and will often work with younger organizations needing both financial and technical 
support to grow. Young organizations with high social impact and a positive financial outlook 
usually would be candidates”.  
Nevertheless, SRIs are subject to the same investment appetite and pro-cyclicality of private 
investors. Oikocredit, for example, commented that, “Speaking for Oikocredit, we did experience 
a slowdown in inflows from investors in 2008 and also now in 2011 ... By the end of 2009, our 
inflows had improved once again”. However, they have been a consistent source of funding for 
smaller organizations and, because of their commitment to providing longer-term liquidity, are a 
source of financial stability rather than fragility for institutions. 
Finally, domestic financing has also increased. The major recipients have been the second tier 
institutions, especially deposit-taking microfinance institutions, particularly KWFT with smaller 
amounts going to SMEP and Faulu. The major lenders have been Kenya Commercial Bank and 
Cooperative Bank, both of whom have exposure to several deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions. Many interviewees saw domestic financing as preferable in some respects compared 
to international funding. Interviewees at Faulu, for example, commented that the long maturities 
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available domestically had protected the institution from liquidity problems during the financial 
crisis and also helped to avoid foreign exchange risk as domestic institutions were able to provide 
loans in Kenyan shillings. 
 
 
6.4 BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION 
 
The analysis in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 examined the assets and liabilities of institutions in detail. 
These findings can be summarized by examining the overall structure of the balance sheet over 
the period of the study and the changes in its relative composition in terms of percentage of 
different assets and liabilities. 
This is shown for all institutions in Figure 22 below (with its legend in Figure 23). In the figure, 
100% represents the total of gross assets or liabilities, that is the gross value of each side of the 
balance sheet. 
For all institutions, the composition of assets shows moderate fluctuations during the period. 
Loans reduced as a percentage of the balance sheet from 73% in 2006 to 65% in 2011. This was 
offset by increases in non-loans – primarily cash and investment assets – which increased as a 
percentage of the balance sheet from 27% in 2006 to 35% in 2011. This indicates improving 
liquidity in institutions despite increasing loan levels. However, as will be discussed, this was 
largely due to changes at Equity Bank. 
In relation to liabilities, the level of funding through deposits has declined moderately as a 
percentage of the balance sheet from 68% in 2006 to 64% in 2011. Equity has also declined as a 
percentage of the balance sheet from 23% in 2006 to 21% in 2011. Theses changes in liabilities 
have been offset by increases in debt that rose as a percentage of the balance sheet from 9% in 
2006 to 15% in 2011 – reflecting the increasing debt levels discussed in earlier sections. 
 
Figure 22. Balance sheet composition: all institutions. 
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Legend is given below figure. 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
Figure 23. Legend for figures 6.x to 6.x 
Balance sheet category Colour 
Loans Blue  
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As shown in Figure 24 below, these changes to the sectors’ overall balance sheet composition 
was driven by that of microfinance-orientated banks. Their assets saw a declining share in loans 
that dropped from 73% in 2006 to 65% in 2011. This was offset by increases in cash, investments, 
and other assets from 25% to 35% in the same period – indicating improved liquidity. On the 
liability side of the balance sheet, microfinance-orientated banks saw equity increase as a 
percentage of the balance sheet from 21% in 2006 to 23% in 2011, reflecting their success in both 
raising capital and generation of retained profits. The share of deposits fell from 74% to 68% in 
the same period and the funding gap was filled with debt, which increased from 4% to 9% of 
liabilities. These trends were driven by Equity Bank, which by 2011 held 92% of microfinance-
orientated banks’ cash and investments, 53% of equity and 95% of debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Balance sheet composition: microfinance-orientated banks. 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
As shown in Figure 25 below, this contrasts with deposit-taking microfinance institutions, where 
their increased debt levels are apparent. On the asset side of the balance sheet, loans declined in 
value from 62% in 2006 to 56% in 2011, with greater levels of liquid assets in the form of cash 
and other investments, which increased from 38% in 2006 to 44% in 2011. On the liability side 
of the balance sheet – reflecting deposit-taking microfinance institutions’ lower ability to raise 
equity and deposits as loans have grown – deposits declined from 44% of assets in 2006 to 37% 
in 2011, and for equity from 45% to 14% in the same period. By contrast, debt grew from 11% 
in 2006 to 49% in 2011. 
 
Figure 25. Balance sheet composition: deposit-taking microfinance institutions. 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
As shown in Figure 26 below, for unregulated microfinance institutions, assets followed similar 
patterns to other institutions. Loans declining relative to cash and other investments with a decline 
in loans from 74% to 64% from 2006 to 2011 and increases in cash and other investments from 
26% to 36% from 2006 to 2011. Liabilities saw similar changes to deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions, with declining deposits and equity – from 44% to 37% and from 45% to 14% from 
2006 to 2011 – offset by increasing debt that grew from 11% in 2006 to 49% in 2011. However, 
as noted earlier, the overall balance sheets of unregulated microfinance institutions remained 
small relative to microfinance-orientated banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions. 
Figure 26. Balance sheet composition: unregulated microfinance institutions 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
Overall, these balance sheet compositions reflect the trends discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, for 
increasing overall scale in the balance sheet, financed by debt and – for a limited number of 
successful organizations – equity. 
 
 
 
6.4 THE EMERGENCE OF DOMINANT INSTITUTIONS 
The trends discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter have led to the development of a market 
structure of a few, dominant institutions attracting a disproportionately large share of loans, 
deposits, equity and debt financing. 
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This is illustrated in Figures 27 and 28 below showing loans and deposits and the related market 
shares for each by individual institutions. Cooperative Bank and Equity Bank jointly account for 
77% of the 2011 balances and 80% of the growth of the total sector. The market then has a number 
of medium-sized institutions (Family Bank, KWFT and K-Rep). Then there are “also ran” 
institutions with very small market shares, made up of all unregulated microfinance institutions, 
plus the deposit-taking microfinance institutions, Faulu and SMEP. 
Figure 27. Loans and deposits (2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted figures). 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Loan and deposits market share (2011). 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author. 
 
Focusing on Equity Bank, as illustrated in Figure 29, its market shares show its 
dominance, not only in loans and deposits, but also in private, government and 
international development agencies financing. Equity Bank’s dominance has increased 
continuously as it accelerated away from rivals for all measures since 2006. By 2011, 
Equity Bank held 55% of deposits, 44% of loans, 27% of private financing and 94% of 
international development agencies and government financing in the Kenyan 
microfinance sector. 
 
 
Figure 29. Equity Bank market share (2006-2011). 
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Source: Financial statements elaborated by the author. 
 
This is due to Equity Bank’s success in a “winner takes all” market structure where, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, through achieving growth and a good reputation, 
including high credit ratings and an international brand, it is able to fuel further growth 
through attracting the majority of financing including equity, debt and deposits. 
Equity Bank also has a differentiated strategy. It has built only a modest physical presence 
in banking, with branches increasing from 28 in 2008 to 135 by 2012 and ATMs from 
377 in 2008 to 611 by 2011. Instead, it has used the mobile banking platform, M-PESA, 
for agency and point of sale (POS) business to rapidly acquire new customers. Equity 
Bank has, from negligible levels in 2006, increased its number of agents to over 3,200 
and POS to over 6,000 by the end of 2011. This has resulted in Equity Bank increasing 
its customer base from 1.8 million in 2007 to 7.5 million by 2012. Other institutions have 
also adopted mobile banking platforms, but without as much success as Equity Bank. 
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Equity Bank has been subject to political influences as its chairman, Mwangi Kibaki, 
campaigned for president in 2007. Equity Bank became a target for opposition 
campaigning as a result. Equity Bank has been subject to some negative press in relation 
to this. For example, the Financial Times reported, “Some sceptics, meanwhile, voice 
doubts about the solidity of a business that has expanded so fast. ‘I have a feeling all is 
not well. It is not solid. What are its structures?’ says one retired banker. ‘The question is 
whether it’s a house of cards,’ says a Nairobi businessman. The evangelism with which 
Equity Bank talks about its social mission has heightened such suspicions”48 
However, despite this strong market concentration, the perception by market participants 
is of intense competition for business as a result of expanding finance access. The 
majority of interviewees saw the marketplace as very competitive, driven by the entry of 
microfinance-orientated banks. Competition was from new entrants, like Equity Bank, or 
from existing banks downscaling their business into microfinance. The outcome of this 
is that microfinance-orientated banks hold a dominant position in both loans and deposits 
based on their rapid expansion of business and competitive advantages, such as the range 
of services they can offer and their reputations. 
Deposit-taking microfinance institutions are evolving and changing quickly in order to 
catch up with microfinance-orientated banks. However, they are hindered by their social 
mission and restrictions on their services under DTM regulations. Overall, deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions continue to compete, but remain as a second tier below 
microfinance-orientated banks. By contrast, unregulated microfinance institutions are 
seeking to compete but are generally failing and being left behind. 
In terms of lending, as discussed previously interviewees reported that competition has 
been very fierce. However, this competition was also reported as being mainly based in 
Nairobi and a limited number of regional centres such as Kisumu and Mombasa. In 
addition, competition has focused on the most desirable clients, namely the wealthier, 
                                                             
48 The Financial Times. 22 October 2008. “Equity bank: Runaway profits from banking the 
poor”. www.ft.com 
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urban middle classes. Competition for business in rural areas and for poor customers is 
limited. 
Some interviewees commented that this has resulted in urban markets becoming 
overbanked with cases of multiple and over-indebtedness. 49 As discussed in Chapter 5, 
“excessive” competition has been a driver of microfinance crises in other countries due 
to declines in lending standards and aggressive business practices. Interviewees 
considered that this was also the situation in Kenya, especially in the absence of credit 
bureaus. Certainly, as discussed earlier in this chapter, many saw it as a key contributory 
factor given the perceived high levels of over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness, 
especially where the competition is so concentrated in seeking commercially-attractive 
clients among the urban, middle class. 
Equally important, is that the “winner takes all” structure that has developed amongst 
institutions has led to the rise of systemically important institutions. The implications of 
this are discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
6.5 MITIGATING MICROPRUDENTIAL RISKS: BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITY 
 
Any institution – even the most capable and well-resourced – would be challenged to 
retain operational integrity in a period of very rapid change relating to the fundamental 
aspects of its business. 
Kenyan microfinance institutions have experienced the pressures that arise from such 
changes as they have grown in scale and face new risks. This raises the issue of whether 
institutional capacity is adequate.                                                              
49 These factors can also be seen in financial access figures where increases in, and levels of, financial 
access are far higher in populations that have higher levels of income, education and urbanization (Financial 
Sector Deepening Program, 2009; Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2013). 
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As credit portfolios grow in scale and complexity, risk increases. However, risk can be 
mitigated through development of institutional capacity and the financial architecture 
required to manage it. For example, in relation to credit risk, individual institutions can 
have extensive internal processes to manage bad and doubtful debts, including procedures 
to assess changes in the credit worthiness of lenders, valuation of collateral, management 
information system and practices relating to late payments and arrears. 
In microfinance-orientated banks there was a variety of reported levels of institutional challenge. 
Equity Bank, for example, reported relative ease of supporting its very rapid growth operationally 
as it had access to the best staff because of its reputation and market position and it considered 
that it operated “best practices”. In addition, its profitability has supported high levels of 
investment in risk management, including technology platforms. Interviewees reported its 
strategy of using Infosys platforms which, while expensive, were well-tested platforms and highly 
adaptable to expansion, such as “plug and play” platforms for new branches and the ability to 
operate 35 million accounts. Equity Bank has also invested in a major Nairobi-based data centre 
with IBM and Sun Systems servers, a back-up recovery site and information technology 
engineers. Staff have been recruited from international competitors in order to import expertise 
in a number of areas, including risk management, operations and information technology. Equity 
Bank is able to match international compensation in order to do this. Interviewees reported that 
overall operational problems, including losses, have been low. However, the interviewees at the 
Central Bank of Kenya – who are responsible for onsite inspections and offsite risk assessments 
at Equity Bank – were less complacent, describing the institution as having “high” operational 
risk under the Central Bank of Kenya rating system. They commented that this was partially due 
to the innate risk of the high growth rates, including both within Kenya and in relation to Equity 
Bank’s regional expansion, and that the Central Bank of Kenya considered the bank’s technology 
platforms to be “robust” and having “no challenges” in relation to both centralized processing and 
network operations. However, the Central Bank of Kenya also commented that there were some 
weakness, including audit functions, that were understaffed and weak, and risk management 
practices that were “not that advanced”, such as a lack of stress testing and “value-at-risk” 
processes despite quite complex trading and foreign exchange risks. It was the Central Bank of 
Kenya’s opinion that Equity Bank was “on top of it,” but that the high risk had caused the Central 
Bank of Kenya to put Equity Bank on a rapid inspection cycle. Overall, Equity Bank is an example 
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of an institution that has increased risk due to the growth and complexity of its operations, while 
also (apparently) building matching good institutional capacity to manage them. However, an 
independent assessment of Equity Bank’s institutional capacity cannot be determined by the 
fieldwork. 
Equity Bank also illustrates another issue in operational environments – that of fraud and 
corruption. There have been rumours relating to Equity Bank’s political connections through its 
Chairman. Additionally, another bank’s chief executive officer, in interview, reported that staff 
found committing fraud and corruption at his institution had been recruited into senior 
management by Equity Bank. The chief executive officer reported that his institution suffered 
significant problems with fraud and incompetence when they expanded their business from their 
traditional base in individual lending into small and medium-sized enterprises and corporate 
lending as part of their growth strategy and “fraud and corruption were widespread”. After a 
clean-up by international investors, the previous chief executive officer and other senior staff 
were dismissed. Other institutions, including unregulated microfinance institutions, also reported 
that staff that were “the baggage” from other institutions circulated to other institutions. In Kenya, 
there is no regulatory register of finance employees and there is a lack of a referencing process in 
the industry. Such reports cannot be verified, but highlight the general risks of fraud and 
corruption. 
In 2009, the DTM licensing legislation became active and three institutions transformed from 
unregulated microfinance institutions to regulated deposit-taking microfinance institutions. These 
were KWFT, SMEP and Faulu. All were interviewed. Because of this transformation deposit-
taking microfinance institutions have faced challenges, not only from increases in scale and risk, 
but also from changes relating to organizational transformation from an unregulated to a regulated 
institution. This requires both a significant upgrade in internal operations to meet new regulatory 
reporting and operational standards and fundamental changes in their organization from being a 
predominantly charitable organization to a commercial one. 
Often this involved the establishment of new technology platforms, including replacing low level 
technology or manual record-keeping systems. All three deposit-taking microfinance institutions 
introduced the T-24 platform, a well-established core-banking platform that includes customer 
account functions. Two reported that during this process of data migration, multiple reconciliation 
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errors and fraud were revealed. These included non-existent assets, such as fraudulent loans, 
which resulted in the need for large provisions. In addition, the upgrade to real-time accounting 
requires excellent connectivity between mainframe systems and ATMs and branches. This has 
proved challenging, given the weak telecommunications infrastructure in Kenya. Infrastructure 
security has also been difficult and there have been breaches via the internet. Unregulated 
microfinance institutions preparing for transformation to deposit-taking microfinance institutions 
or introducing new technology platforms reported similar issues. 
All deposit-taking microfinance institutions reported staffing challenges in terms of retraining 
existing staff and recruiting experienced staff. Retraining current staff was difficult, as there has 
to be a shift in culture. For example, one chief financial officer reported moving from “A more 
relaxed NGO culture to a more aggressive commercial culture” and that the staff was often 
resistant and turnover increased. Some deposit-taking microfinance institutions tried to increase 
and upgrade staff though recruiting from the banking sector, but reported that qualified staff are 
scarce and often prefer to work for microfinance-orientated banks where compensation is higher. 
If higher compensation was offered to new recruits this created staffing problems with existing 
staff. Again, unregulated microfinance institutions preparing for transformation to deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions reported very similar issues with staff retraining and recruitment. 
All institutions reported significant issues with the management of bad debts during 
transformation from an unregulated to a regulated entity. Two major issues were noted. Firstly, 
as part of the transformation to a regulated entity, there was a regulatory requirement to increase 
the recognition and extent of loan provisioning as, prior to becoming regulated, internal process 
and provision requirements were below regulatory standards. This resulted in some new deposit-
taking microfinance institutions making large one-off provisions on transformation in order to 
raise provisioning to the required regulatory levels. The required increase averaged 10% of gross 
loans and can be attributed to lower internal standards of provisioning prior to becoming 
regulates. This suggests that unregulated microfinance institutions have significant under-
recognition of bad debts in their loan portfolios. 
Secondly, these institutions suffered bad debt problems relating to the transformation process 
itself that required additional reserve provisions. For example, as noted institutions introduced 
new internal technology platforms in order to upgrade their technology to meet both new 
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regulatory standards and to facilitate expansion of their businesses. When loan accounts were 
reconciled and transferred to these new systems a number of problems became apparent. This 
included inaccurate and incomplete records of current balances and arrears. These required write-
offs and new provisions. Also institutions often faced internal stresses, such as recruiting new 
staff with banking skills, retraining of existing staff and internal political infighting. These issues 
distracted staff from on-going credit management, which then allowed credit control to deteriorate 
and resulted in a surge in bad debts. Again, these new bad and doubtful debts required additional 
provisions to be made. 
Unregulated microfinance institutions typically have a much simpler operating environment than 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions, but are of a much lower standard. For example, one 
unregulated microfinance institution reported being assessed by “Planet Ratings”, a MFI-rating 
agency, who commented on their respective lack of systems, formality, segregation of duties and 
risk monitoring. Other unregulated microfinance institutions reported that the staff are typically 
NGO-style social or charity workers, rather than professional bankers. Some has suffered 
problems with staff fraud. Operating environments were reported as having major weaknesses, 
such as using manual or spreadsheet systems for managing loans and deposits or lacking good 
quality arrears tracking and management. A number of unregulated microfinance institutions 
reported difficulties in upgrading as they lacked the expertise and funds for establishing more 
robust technology platforms. For example, one reported weak arrears management that was 
improved on the introduction of T24 in 2010 after more than six years of problems in trying to 
establish the platform. Other unregulated microfinance institutions reported trying to buy in 
packaged systems, but then struggling to manage related service contracts that varied in quality 
and were often costly. 
Unsurprisingly, given these very substantial challenges, many unregulated microfinance 
institutions reported poor internal control environments and expected timeframes for deposit-
taking microfinance institutions’ transformation of up to five years. Some of these institutions are 
subject to risk of failure, especially if significant shocks to the sector are again experienced. 
However, such institutions are also limited in terms of connectivity to the financial system as they 
are largely self-funded because they have not been able to access private funding markets or build 
deposit bases. Hence, they pose a relatively low systemic risk. 
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Overall the fieldwork indicated that there is a range of institutional capacity. Some institutions 
are developing “best practice” internal control environments. For example, a number of the 
microfinance-orientated banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions had reasonably strong 
management practices and internal controls. Others, however, appeared to be struggling and a 
number reported problems with errors, frauds and mismanagement. Unregulated microfinance 
institutions seemed to lack basic capacity and were weak institutions. 
However, institutional capacity was broadly related to the size of the institution, with greater 
capacity for larger, regulated institutions as they are more able to invest in staff, technology 
platforms and internal control, thus creating a feedback loop of scale and capacity, providing a 
generally more robust institutional capacity. There were some exceptions – for example, K-Rep 
– but this relationship was broadly true. Conversely, smaller institutions, especially unregulated 
microfinance institutions, had weak capacity but were less likely to be systemically important. 
 
6.6 MITIGATING MICROPRUDENTIAL RISKS: DEVELOPMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
As with institutional capacity, the development of financial architecture can act as an important 
mitigant to risk within financial institutions. In this section, we highlight two important issues 
identified in the fieldwork relating to financial architecture. Both relate to weaknesses in ensuring 
the sound capital bases of regulated institutions and are weaknesses in managing over-
indebtedness and multiple indebtedness amongst microfinance clients and weaknesses in the 
regulatory environment relating to monitoring of the capital base of institutions. These are 
important because banking regulations, typically based on Bank for International Settlements 
standards, set minimum standards for banks’ capital ratios in order to provide for absorption of 
losses without institutional failures. If losses cannot be absorbed by an institution without 
breaching these thresholds, then it becomes technically bankrupt. Less extreme losses can indicate 
financial fragility which can affect other aspects of institutional soundness – for example, its 
ability to access liquidity as potential lenders become less willing to lend funds – and be a factor 
than can initiate depositor runs. 
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6.6.1 Over-Indebtedness and Multiple Indebtedness 
As discussed in Chapter 5, over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness have been critical factors 
in microfinance crises in a number of countries. Their prevention is important to financial 
stability. 
The most frequent way to control over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness is through the use 
of credit bureaus. Credit bureaus collect and share information relating to borrowers across 
lending institutions within the financial system. This includes, for example, disclosure of 
borrowers’ credit histories, including any previous defaults or arrears, and disclosure of 
outstanding loans with other institutions. This information can then be used by institutions in 
assessing the creditworthiness of a borrower in relation to the granting of further credit to them. 
In order to be effective, a credit bureau needs to have cooperation and information from a critical 
mass of lending institutions to ensure that the information provided is timely, comprehensive and 
correct. This usually involves institutions agreeing the processes and procedures for reporting 
customer information to the credit bureaus and the terms and conditions under which it is shared. 
In Kenya, there is a limited credit bureau infrastructure and many of the interviewees commented 
on the need to establish a more comprehensive system. The Central Bank of Kenya is aware of 
the issue and has been active in seeking solutions. In 2008, the Banking (Credit Reference Bureau) 
Regulations were enacted and became operational in 2009. The Central Bank of Kenya, which is 
responsible for regulating credit bureaus under the Act, has since licensed several credit bureaus. 
However, information sharing via credit bureaus is limited to microfinance-orientated banks, 
although there are plans to include deposit-taking microfinance institutions and unregulated 
microfinance institutions in the future (source: Central Bank of Kenya interviews). As the Central 
Bank of Kenya comments,  
The Kenyan banking sector was in the 80’s and 90’s saddled with momentous non-
performing loans. This invariably led to the collapse of some banks. One of the catalysts in 
this scenario was ‘serial defaulters’, who borrowed from various banks with no intention 
of repaying the loans. Undoubtedly these defaulters thrived in the ‘information asymmetry’ 
environment that prevailed due to lack of a credit information sharing mechanism... The 
development of a sustainable information sharing industry is therefore recognized as a key 
component of financial sector reforms (Central Bank of Kenya, 2011). 
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Over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness are difficult to quantify but almost all interviewees 
believe that it is a material issue in Kenya. When asked for a subjective risk assessment, 
interviewees ranked it from medium to high risk. Interviewees who rated it as high commented 
that they thought over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness were common and had been 
deepened by excessive competition in the microfinance sector and an absence of credit bureaus. 
For example, the interviewees at KADET commented that it was “urgent” and that there was also 
adverse selection taking place as microfinance-orientated banks improved credit assessments 
(including through bureaus), whereupon poorer quality clients move to institutions with more 
limited information on their credit history (i.e. adverse selection was taking place). Some of the 
best clients had also been actively poached by microfinance-orientated banks from smaller 
institutions, leaving them with poorer-quality residual clients. In fact, such had been the 
competitive pressures and problems with over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness, that some 
stated that they had taken a strategic decision to withdraw from lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises to focus exclusively on “children welfare lending”. Interviewees also 
commented that there was a lowering of credit standards taking place under increased competitive 
pressures. 
Others interviewees were less concerned about the issue however. For example, at a small, 
unregulated microfinance institution, interviewees considered that it was a risk, but a manageable 
one if you manage clients and credit officers by being the institution that is tightest in “putting 
those (clients) under pressure”. While not entirely comforting in relation to their debt collection 
techniques, it does indicate active management of defaults. 
Overall, it seem likely that until there is comprehensive credit bureau monitoring, there will be a 
high level of multiple and over-indebtedness in the Kenyan microfinance sector and – in common 
with other countries who have experienced microfinance crisis – it is being intensified by 
competitive forces. Whilst it does not appear to have reached unmanageable levels in Kenya at 
the current time, nevertheless it can add to financial fragility. 
6.6.2 Institutional Capacity and Regulatory Compliance 
Reporting and accounting for credit losses is a critical part of bank regulation as it ensures that 
capital ratios – a critical element of an institutions’ soundness – are correctly reported. Capital 
ratios are determined by central banks but are usually based on internationally-accepted Bank for 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  197 
International Settlements standards. Regulatory requirements for determining and providing in 
bank reserves for portfolio-at-risk are also set by central banks or other regulators, but are less 
universally applied. 
In Kenya, the Central Bank of Kenya set standards for regulated institutions for credit losses and 
capital. Central Bank of Kenya requirements for microfinance-orientated banks are detailed in the 
“Guideline on Risk Classification of Assets and Provisioning” whose purpose is to ensure that 
assets are correctly evaluated, standards of provisioning are set (such as time limits and 
classification of assets) and work out processes are followed and effective. Similar requirements 
are set out for deposit-taking microfinance institutions in “The MFIs (Deposit-Taking MFIs 
Institutions) Regulations, 2008”. Selected details of these standards from the legislation are set 
out in Table 16. Auditing of these internal controls and processes are part of the Central Bank of 
Kenya inspections. As can be seen, the regulations are prescriptive and seek to ensure adequate 
and comprehensive recognition of bad and doubtful debts. Regulatory requirements for deposit-
taking microfinance institutions provision are also higher than for microfinance-orientated banks. 
 
 
 
Table 16 Central Bank of Kenya loan classification and provisioning requirements. 
CBK 
category 
MFOB 
Provision 
DTM 
Provision 
Timeframe 
for arrears 
Summary definitions 
Normal 1% 1% N/a Well-documented facilities to financially 
sound customers and all loans performing 
Watch 3% 5% 30-90 days Potential weaknesses including deteriorating 
collateral or economic conditions; adverse 
trends in the borrower’s financial position 
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Sub-
standard 
20% 25% 90-180 days Not protected by net worth and paying 
capacity of the borrower & collateral relied 
upon for repayment. 
Doubtful 20% 75% Over 180 
days 
All the weaknesses of a substandard loan plus 
not well secured or collectable 
Loss 100% 100% As  
identified 
Uncollectible or of no or little value 
Source: “Guideline on Risk Classification of Assets and Provisioning”, Prudential Guidelines for 
Institutions Licensed under the Banking (pp. 62-88); the MFIs (Deposit-Taking MFIs Institutions) 
Regulations, 2008 (Part viii – Risk Classification and Provisioning of Loans); 
www.centralbank.gov.ke 
 
Interview material and the secondary data analysis presented earlier in this chapter indicate that 
these standards are not being fully adhered to and this signals that the capital base of these 
institutions is materially overstated. 
In fieldwork interviewees reported difficulty in compliance with regulatory standards of reporting 
and internal control and non-compliance with reserving requirements. Across all institutions, 
interviewees reported difficulties in complying with regulations relating to portfolio-at-risk 
management and reporting. Internal control and management problems were identified as key 
causative factors, indicating weaknesses in institutional capacity in compliance with regulatory 
requirements relating to credit risk. Commonly reported failures were in management information 
systems and management processes – such as arrears tracking and follow-up – that made effective 
management of deteriorating credit difficult. 
These challenges were particularly acute amongst deposit-taking microfinance institutions as they 
transformed from unregulated to regulated entities. This was due to both the expansion of lending 
portfolios – thus increasing the capital required to be held under regulatory standards – and due 
to the more stringent standards for regulated institutions. In addition, pressures on these 
institutions arose from the need to be “sustainable” and present strong capital ratios to potential 
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investors and depositors that can be a disincentive for honest financial reporting. For example, a 
chief financial officer of a microfinance institution commented that provisions in 2008 and 2009 
covered less than 10% of its portfolio in its financial accounts but, in fact, they had had bad debts 
of up to 70% based on its internal management information systems and informal credit officer 
reports. He stated they had not fully provided for them because of the negative impact it would 
have had on their capital base. 
Deposit-taking microfinance institutions and those MFIs hoping to transform to deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions reported significant issues with the transformation process, including 
management of bad debts. Two major issues were noted. As discussed earlier, part of the 
transformation to a regulated entity meant that there was a regulatory requirement to switch to the 
recognition and provisioning requirements detailed in Table 16 above. Prior to becoming 
regulated, for many institutions internal process and provision requirements were below 
regulatory standards. Consequently, a large increase in provisions is required as a one-off loss on 
transformation by these institutions. Practitioners, when interviewed, openly raised this issue. For 
example, a General Manager of a large unregulated microfinance institution hoping to transform 
commented that the reduction in their capital base that would be required to bring provisioning 
up to regulatory standards was large and a “barrier” to transformation as the organization could 
not afford the write-offs required. 
The level of these problems can be estimated from the figures for portfolio-at-risk reported earlier 
in this chapter. Deposit-taking institutions, prior to transformation, had reported portfolio-at-risk 
that was lower than average prior to 2009 and then increased from 4% to 14% in 2009 to 2010, 
before declining in 2011 to converge with levels of provision at the microfinance-orientated 
banks. This 10% increase between 2009 and 2010 was assigned by the deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions interviewed as due to the need to increase provision to bring them in 
line with regulatory standards. It is not possible to estimate the extent of the under-provisioning 
for unregulated institutions exactly, but if this estimated 10% increase is applied to the current 
portfolio of unregulated microfinance institutions, it would imply under-provisioning within the 
sector of approximately Khs 0.3 to Khs 0.5 billion in 2010. 
These issues of non-compliance in relation to regulatory standards was confirmed by the Central 
Bank of Kenya officials responsible for deposit-taking microfinance institutions licensing. They 
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described regulatory requirements as “more stringent and prescriptive”. They confirmed that they 
thought that unregulated microfinance institutions were materially underprovided and that the 
write-downs required to comply with regulated standards were a major barrier to them becoming 
regulated institutions. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
Institutional stability and capacity are essential building blocks of a stable financial system. 
Institutional failures in sub-Saharan Africa remain common with some extending into systemic 
crisis. 
This chapter discussed the pressures that institutions in Kenya are experiencing in balancing 
institutional stability and the expansion of financial access. The challenges are great. These 
include the impact on risks within institutions as the expansion of financial access has driven the 
restructuring of their balance sheets. These pressures include increasing credit risk that reflects 
the creditworthiness of the poor, macroeconomic cycles (notably in relation to inflation and 
agricultural cycles) and political risks. 
At the same time, the lack of equity capital from investors and the difficulty of building deposit 
bases have led to a high reliance on debt to fund expansion, which, in turn, has led to increases in 
foreign exchange and liquidity risks. The stability of such flows is differentiated by the type of 
investor that varies according to the investment criteria they apply and their commitment to social, 
as well as commercial, goals. Socially responsible investors often have a commitment to the social 
missions of institutions that lead them to make riskier investments – for example, in weaker 
institutions – that purely profit-seeking investors avoid and are less pro-cyclical in their 
investment appetite. Nevertheless, the funds they deploy remain susceptible to pro-cyclical flows 
that limit their ability to invest on a non-cyclical or counter-cyclical basis. Profit-seeking investors 
favour only select Tier 1 microfinance-orientated banks, are more pro-cyclical in investments and 
more concerned with profitability compared to social mission. In addition, private capital was 
highly concentrated by institution with a “winner takes all” structure in relation to equity and, to 
a lesser extent, debt. 
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These risks can be mitigated to a degree through increases in institutional capacity. The fieldwork 
found that growth in institutional capacity was broadly correlated to increases in the scale and 
complexity of institutions. This implies that increasing institutional capacity involves adequately 
managing increasing risk within institutions as financial access expands. However, there were 
some notable exceptions. Deposit-taking microfinance institutions faced challenges because of 
their rapidly increasing risks with lower ability to attract private capital and resources (such as 
staff) to build institutional capacity. Broadly, the results indicate that some institutions are making 
good progress in building institutional capacity but others are struggling to do so. 
Financial architecture can also an important mitigant to inherent risk as financial access expands 
and it also becomes an important enabler of institutional soundness. However, the fieldwork 
reported significant weaknesses in the areas of credit risk management. In particular, the financial 
architecture in relation to the management of credit risk was weak, including over indebtedness 
and multiple indebtedness, and a lack of compliance with regulatory frameworks. This includes 
the absence of a comprehensive coverage of client and institutions in the current limited number 
of credit bureaus and non-compliance with regulatory requirements for recognition of portfolio-
at-risk, thus overstating their capital base. These issues increase the probability that crises that 
have occurred elsewhere in microfinance due to over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness – 
including institutional failures – are at risk of recurring in Kenya. 
However, more important for building a stable financial system is how these institutional risks 
accumulate and interact at a systemic level. It is this issue that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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7. THE IMPACT OF THE EXPANSION OF FINANCIAL ACCESS 
ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEMIC STABILITY 
 
Institutional stability and capacity are essential building blocks of a stable financial system and 
are dependent upon the balance sheet structures of financial institutions. As discussed in Chapter 
6, Kenyan microfinance-orientated institutions are experiencing challenges because of the 
restructuring of their balance sheets as they expand financial access. This restructuring is 
increasing credit, liquidity and foreign exchange risks. These can, in theory, be mitigated through 
matching their growth with increases in institutional capacity. However, in practice, institutions 
are having mixed success in building required institutional capacity. By contrast, financial 
architecture is lagging behind this growth, especially building architecture to manage over-
indebtedness and multiple indebtedness and in order to ensure compliance with microprudential 
regulation. However, all these concerns relate only to the development of individual institutions, 
not the whole financial system. 
In this chapter, we build on the findings from Chapter 6 to examine how the expansion of access 
is interacting with financial stability and with economic growth using the frameworks developed 
in Chapters 2 and 3. 
When exploring financial stability, we examine the finding that a few institutions have emerged 
in a “winner takes all” ability to attract equity, deposits and debt financing, in order to show that 
this has driven the emergence of an oligopoly market structure of systemically important 
institutions. Second, we discuss how the finding that the funding gap left by the failure of deposit 
mobilization to match expansion of lending has led to increased interdependence on international 
private capital flows and domestic interbank markets. Third, we examine more deeply the 
emergence of mobile payments systems in Kenya and its possible impact on financial stability. 
We conclude that, while these changes have brought positive benefits – including the expansion 
of financial services through the most capable institutions to households and liquidity provision 
to financial institutions – they have also increased financial fragility. This includes through 
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increasing liquidity risk via greater susceptibility to pro-cyclical international private capital 
flows and by increasing contagion and coordinated failure risks. 
The chapter will then discuss the relationship of the expansion of financial and economic 
development. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, this can potentially include increasing 
intermediation of savings to productive investment. This chapter will present further fieldwork 
findings in relation to these issues. As will be discussed, the research suggests that the expansion 
of financial access is contributing moderately to deposit mobilization, but it is impaired by a lack 
of confidence in institutions and by non-incremental deposit-raising. In addition, much of the 
expansion of lending is going toward purposes that make a neutral or negative contribution to 
structural transformation. 
 
7.1 FINANCIAL SECTOR STABILITY 
 
7.1.1 THE GROWTH OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS 
As discussed in Chapter 6, there has been an emergence of a “winner takes all” market structure 
with a few dominant institutions attracting a disproportionately large share of deposits, equity, 
debt and lending. As a consequence, there has been an evolution of the market towards an 
oligopoly. This is illustrated by the CR3 concentrations measure (market share of the three largest 
banks), that in Kenya for loans is 86% and for deposits is 90%, versus an African financial market 
average of 68% (Beck et al., 2010). 
The evolving market power of the top tier banks (especially Equity Bank) creates systemic issues 
because they are, arguably, systemically important institutions. The latter can be defined as an 
institution whose failure would cause widespread distress, either directly or as a trigger for 
contagion. It is assessed through several measures, including size and inter-connectedness relative 
to the whole financial system (IMF, 2009). By these measures, Equity Bank has become 
systemically important and a “too big to fail” institution. This issue was explicitly recognized in 
interviews with the Central Bank of Kenya who are consequentially directing additional resources 
to its supervision. 
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Currently, it is not possible to conclude whether the evolving market structure of excessive 
competition against an increasingly dominant institution will result in institutional failure or 
financial sector instability. However, it is possible to comment that the market structure that has 
evolved in microfinance in Kenya places high reliance for overall financial system stability on 
the soundness of a very few institutions. 
 
7.1.2 DEEPENING OF LINKAGES IN DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Linkages within the financial system play a key role in intermediation. Interbank markets 
facilitate liquidity management and the transmission of monetary policy. Payments systems 
facilitate efficient intermediation between financial institutions and firms and households. 
However, such linkages can act as mechanisms to transmit contagion leading to financial 
instability. This may include sources of liquidity, such as participants in interbank markets, losing 
confidence, becoming increasingly risk adverse and reducing or stopping lending to other 
financial institutions, causing them to become insolvent (Acharya & Naqvi, 2010). There may 
also be a feedback loop between liquidity and insolvency problems in financial institutions that 
further deepens financial crisis. 
Financial access is deepening financial linkages, including those in domestic interbank markets 
and through payments systems. This can bring significant economic and social benefits but also 
increases the risk of financial fragility by providing channels for transmitting financial instability. 
These two channels are now discussed in more detail. 
 
7.1.2.1 The Deepening of Domestic Interbank Markets 
As discussed in Chapter 6, private sector financing of institutions involved in the expansion of 
financial access has grown with the majority of debt financing now coming from private sources. 
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This has increased linkages to the international financial system. Such exposure increases 
liquidity risk within institutions where such inflows are pro-cyclical50. 
In addition there has been significant growth in domestic interbank financing markets. Since 
2006, the domestic interbank market has become a greater liquidity provider to microfinance 
institutions than international markets and as illustrated earlier, with domestic investors providing 
27% of financing in 2007, but 60% by 2011. 
The major recipients of increased domestic financing have been the second tier institutions, 
especially deposit-taking microfinance bodies, particularly KFWT. Smaller amounts have gone 
to SMEP and Faulu. These institutions have found it difficult to access international equity and 
debt markets. The major lenders have been Kenya Commercial Bank and Cooperative Bank, both 
of whom have exposure to several deposit-taking microfinance institutions. Many interviewees 
saw domestic financing as preferable, in some respects, to international funding. Interviewees at 
one deposit-taking microfinance institution, for example, commented that the long maturities 
available domestically had protected the institution from liquidity problems during the financial 
crisis and also helped it to avoid foreign exchange risk as domestic institutions were able to 
provide loans in Kenyan shillings. 
However, whilst these domestic sources of financing can create a more stable source of financing, 
they also increase linkages within the financial sector and, consequently, can potentially pose 
greater systemic risk through contagion. For example, in Kenya, one bank is the creditor of 
another and, in the case of institutional collapse, one institution’s failure could cause the failure 
of another through credit losses leading to bankruptcy. Such contagion can spread in the instance 
of market rumours or reputational problems and then become self-fulfilling through withdrawal 
by liquidity providers or depositor bank runs. This is especially the case where financing is 
                                                             
50 During the financial crisis this has caused the failure of a number of institutions in developed economies 
was due to the failure to match loans and deposit growth and instead relying on interbank funding. For 
example Northern Rock in the UK, which collapsed after the first bank run in the UK since 1866, ran into 
problems because its funding was reliant on wholesale funding markets which became highly illiquid 
during the crisis, especially for small, regionally-based institutions such as Northern Rock.  
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uncollateralized, as is the case for the microfinance institutions. In that case, the speed of collapse 
of confidence is increased. 
The deepening of domestic interbank markets also generates greater systemic risk by creating 
secondary exposure to microfinance credit risk. Cooperative Bank, for example, lends to KWFT, 
as well as directly in the microfinance market. Thus, it has a “double” exposure to microfinance, 
directly through its own credit portfolio and via its interbank lending to deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions. 
In common, with other central banks, the Central Bank of Kenya acts as lender of last resort to 
institutions and in theory would be able to mitigate these risks. However, in practice, it is not 
known if there were to be multiple institutional collapses whether the Central Bank of Kenya 
would have the capacity to support all institutions. In fact, in past crises in Kenya, the Central 
Bank of Kenya has only been able to attempt orderly closure rather than rescues of various 
institutions. 
 
7.1.2.2 Development of Payments Systems 
In Kenya, there has been a strong growth in mobile banking. Mobile banking usage is high, with 
61.6% of Kenyans using it by 2012. It has been the main reason why reported financial access in 
Kenya has increased so substantially (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2013). 
The most notable amongst these platforms has been M-PESA, a mobile phone-based money 
transfer system operated by agencies throughout Kenya and jointly owned by Safari.com (whose 
majority owner is the Government and minority owner is Vodafone). A number of competitors 
have also set up mobile banking services to compete with M-PESA, including three further 
operators : Zain (with its product “Zap”); Essar Telecom Kenya (with its product “yuCash”); and 
Telecom Kenya (with its Orange brand). 
Such services typically operate through agents such as small shopkeepers, mobile phone renters 
or petty traders operating cash transfers for customers. By 2012, 10 microfinance-orientated banks 
had over 14,000 active agents in Kenya. A number of interviewees reported very fierce 
competition for mobile business and banks have set up networks of competing agents and ring 
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fencing of M-PESA, especially by Equity Bank, has become a method of creating a dominant 
position in the banking market. 
Prior to 2008, M-PESA was unregulated. The Central Bank of Kenya allowed Safari.com to 
operate M-PESA outside the provisions of the banking law and without regulation. In 2008, after 
a lobbying attack from the banking industry seeking to shut down the service, the Central Bank 
did an audit of M-PESA, including the security features of the technology platform, at the request 
of the Ministry of Finance, and declared it sound but it did not enact regulation (Mas & Radcliffe, 
2010). 
In 2012, the National Payments Act was enacted, setting responsibilities for the management of 
agents and the control environment, but it remains at initial implementation stage and is limited 
in scope (source: Central Bank of Kenya). 
This raises concerns relating to the soundness of what is effectively a national payments system. 
Despite the assertions of supporters of mobile banking that M-PESA is “the least risky, the fastest, 
most accessible and one of the least expensive channels” (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 
2009, p.24), a number of issues exist that suggest it is a potential source of systemic and 
institutional risk. 
Firstly, management and control of agents depends on their integrity and competency. The Central 
Bank of Kenya guidelines set out requirements for checking the “moral and professional 
suitability” of agents. In reality, this is difficult to achieve and interviewees reported instances of 
fraud and incompetence, especially as agents make cash transactions. KWFT, for example, 
reported fraud amongst its agents. In 2011, the Central Bank of Kenya issued agency banking 
guidelines, giving responsibility to banking institutions for managing agents, but as these have 
only just become operational it is not yet known how effective they will be in practice. 
Secondly, and unregulated by current guidelines, more sophisticated institutions have built direct 
interfaces between their technology platforms and M-PESA into their mainframe banking 
systems. Other, less sophisticated institutions also reported developing such interfaces in order to 
allow them to compete effectively with customers who demand the seamless operation of bank 
accounts via mobile banking. This development creates a risk of internet fraud and errors, 
especially as mobile technology is vulnerable to fraudulent infiltration in the absence of strong 
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internal controls. The Central Bank of Kenya guidelines set some general guidance for managing 
this, such as stating that “technology risks regarding information and data security in wireless 
networks shall be properly identified and mitigated,” and requires the encryption of pins and 
transactions. However, no interviewees – even at the most sophisticated institutions – reported 
installing sophisticated technology security environments to manage these risks. With a reported 
30 million agency transactions annually (source: Central Bank of Kenya) this environment is 
susceptible to fraud. To date, no major breaches of security have been publically reported. System 
downtime is frequent (Mas & Radcliffe, 2010), but it has yet to cause a delay or the collapse of 
the payment system. 
Thirdly, M-PESA is increasing being used not just for money transfers, but also for deposit-
taking, despite it being unregulated for doing so. In 2010 Safari.com and Equity Bank launched 
M-KESHO, which will offer fully-fledged financial services by mobile phone, including deposits 
and withdrawals, interest-bearing deposits and loans using automated credit-scoring. In 2011 
Safari.com was made subject to certain regulatory requirements, such as deposits had to be kept 
in trust accounts at regulated financial institutions and limits on transaction sizes were imposed 
to address money laundering concerns. This deposit-taking is growing and is effectively 
unregulated making this an area of potential losses for deposit-makers if there were to be fraud or 
failure at M-PESA. 
 
7.2 FINANCIAL ACCESS’S CONTRIBUTION TO FINANCIAL SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.2.1 DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION 
As discussed previously, deposits in microfinance-orientated institutions have risen from Khs 
37.5 to Khs 191.4 billion between 2006 and 2011, a more than fivefold increase. As illustrated in 
Figure 30 below, the number of depositors has increased from 103 per 1,000 adults in 2004 to 
652 per 1,000 in 2011. Consistent with the expansion of financial access, average deposit balances 
declined until 2006 and then remained approximately constant at Khs 90,000. This would indicate 
both that deposit mobilization is successful at the macroeconomic level and that the there is an 
increase in savings amongst the poor. 
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Figure 30. Average deposit per person and depositors per 1,000 people (2004-2011). 
 
Source: IMF elaborated by the author (nominal values). 
Note: Blue bars indicate average deposits and are read against the left hand axis. Red line 
indicates deposits per 1,000 adults and is read against the right hand axis. 
 
However, the fieldwork challenges this conclusion. Firstly, the increasing number of deposits 
may be overstated as many interviewees commented that it was very common practice for their 
customers to hold multiple savings accounts, often for different purposes, such as sight deposits 
for daily use and time deposits for longer-term accumulation. This is also consistent with 
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household survey data that illustrates, for example, a reported 1.55 accounts per person (Financial 
Sector Deepening Program, 2009). 
Interviewees reported that savings were not largely from the poor but from middle class 
customers, with customers transferring balances from non-microfinance banks to microfinance-
orientated institutions. This is supported by data from household surveys that indicate that only 
29% of the lowest quintile by income had savings products in 2009 compared to 64% of the top 
quintile (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009). Similarly, the IMF reports that average 
savings, whilst much lower than loans, are 1.5 times per capita annual GNI and, thus, still 
represent a figure unlikely to be achieved by those on subsistence incomes. 
These issues indicate that the deposit figures in microfinance-orientated institutions alone are not 
adequate to reach a conclusion about access as they may represent net transfers between banks 
rather than incremental accounts. However, deposit mobilization in Kenya has increased from 
33.5% of GDP in 2006 to 42.5% in 2011 (source: International Financial Statistics), so whilst 
deposit mobilization in the economy has increased, it cannot be concluded from the fieldwork 
what contribution to this has been made by microfinance-orientated institutions mobilizing 
deposits through the expansion of financial access. 
 
7.2.2 INVESTMENT MOBILIZATION FOR STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
An essential function of the financial system in facilitating economic growth is its contribution to 
investment that increases productivity – one of the defining processes of structural transformation. 
The development impact of the expansion of financial access is dependent on how the funds 
mobilised are deployed in relation to this productivity growth. 
For Kenya, this issue can be examined through a sector analysis of the expansion of lending by 
microfinance-orientated institutions. This is presented in Table 17 and Figures 33 and 34 below 
that show loans analysed by sector for microfinance-orientated institutions from 2006 to 2011. 
Sectors identified are agriculture, business and consumer lending. As noted in Chapter 6, 
“business” categories were inconsistent across institutions and definitions were not disclosed. 
“Microenterprises”, however, comprised 55% of total “business” loans (averaged from 2006 to 
2012). Other categories that made up the remaining 45% included retail, wholesale and trading. 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  211 
However, because of the inconsistencies and non-disclosure, no separate analysis was completed 
below the category of “business”. As a consequence, business lending is broadly defined and 
includes a number of categories including microenterprises, trading, wholesale and retail 
activities. Consumer lending includes payday lending. 
 
As illustrated in these figures , all sectors expanded. However, both absolute amounts (Fig. 33) 
and percentage growth (Fig. 34) – all stated in real terms, that is with inflation–adjusted figures – 
were differentiated by sector. Business lending expanded more than threefold, from Khs 29.9 
billion to Khs 81.8 billion. Agricultural lending grew from Khs 3.9 to Khs 5.7 billion. However, 
the strongest growth was in consumer lending, which expanded seventeen-fold, from Khs 3.2 to 
Khs 33.7 billion in the same period. 
The much greater growth in consumer lending and the much lower growth in agricultural lending 
has led to a relative shift out of agriculture in favour of consumer lending. The share of lending 
to agriculture fell from 14% to 5% of outstanding lending from 2006 to 2011. By contrast, 
consumer lending grew from 11% to 28% of outstanding lending. Business lending fell as a 
percentage of lending from 75% to 68% of outstanding lending. 
 
Table 17 Loans by sector: All institutions (2006-2011). 
 Business     
 Micro 
Enterprises 
Retail & 
Wholesale 
Trading All 
business 
Agriculture Consumer & 
payday 
Other TOTAL 
2011 43,364 33,406 5,229 81,999 5,714 33,707 -129 121,291 
2010 43,530 30,295 5,907 79,732 6,625 28,249 -358 114,248 
2009 38,932 27,091 47 66,070 5,971 24,082 1,083 97,206 
2008 37,511 21,302 40 58,853 5,028 16,399 676 80,955 
2007 22,401 21,092 32 43,525 5,150 6,887 394 55,956 
2006 13,862 16,083 21 29,966 3,993 3,240 256 37,454 
Source: Financial statements & interview material elaborated by the author  (inflation-adjusted 
basis). 
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Figure 31. Loans by sector: all institutions (2006-2011)
 
Source: Financial statements & interview material elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted 
basis). 
Figure 32 Loans by sector: all institutions (2006-2011). 
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Source: Financial statements & interview material elaborated by the author. 
These trends can be examined by institutional category. Table 18 and Figure 33 show that 
microfinance-orientated banks experienced the largest overall expansion of lending. They were 
the main institutions driving the rise in consumer lending, accounting for 97% of the increase in 
lending for consumption from 2006 to 2011. In that time, they accounted for Khs 30.5 billion of 
the Khs 31.5 billion of increase in real terms and the percentage of their portfolios in consumer 
lending rose from 10% to 28%. In particular, Equity Bank expanded its consumer lending from 
Khs 2.1 billion in 2006 to 40.2 billion by 2011 (in nominal terms), a twenty-fold increase. 
By contrast, agricultural and microbusiness lending, although increasing in absolute terms, 
declined in relative terms. Business lending changed from Khs 25.1 billion in 2006 to Khs 72.0 
billion (in real terms) but declined as a percentage of the portfolio from 79% to 65%. Agricultural 
lending increased in absolute terms from Khs 3.3 billion to Khs 4.8 billion (in real terms), but 
declined in relative terms from 10.4% to only 4.3% of the portfolio. 
 
Table 18. Loans by sector: microfinance-orientated banks (2006-2011). 
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 Business     
 Micro 
Enterprises 
Retail & 
Wholesale 
Trading Agriculture Consumer 
& payday 
Other TOTAL 
2011 33,369 33,406 5,229 4,819 32,748 -129 109,44
3 
2010 32,064 30,295 5,907 5,871 27,664 -359 101,44
3 
2009 28,037 27,091 47 4,863 23,852 528 84,416 
2008 28,274 21,302 40 3,879 16,332 447 70,272 
2007 15,191 21,092 32 4,362 6,839 359 47,875 
2006 9,050 16,083 21 3,350 3,202 234 31,940 
Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author  (inflation-adjusted 
basis) 
 
Figure 33. Loans by sector: microfinance-orientated banks (2006-2011). 
 
Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author. 
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In deposit-taking microfinance institutions – illustrated in Table 19 and Figure 34 – business 
lending has remained the majority of the portfolio, with increased lending in absolute terms from 
Khs 3.6 billion to Khs 8.6 billion, with a static percentage of the portfolio of 85%. However, post-
transformation from unregulated microfinance institutions to regulated deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions, these institutions rapidly increased consumer lending, from 0% of their 
lending in 2008 to 7% by 2011 – although absolute amounts remained small – and decreased 
agricultural lending from 15% of total portfolios to only 6% between 2006 and 2011. 
 
 
Table 19. Loans by sector: deposit-taking microfinance institutions (2006-2011) 
 Business     
 Micro 
Enterprises 
Retail & 
Wholesale 
Trading Agriculture Consumer & 
payday 
Other TOTAL 
2011 8,689 - - 664 713 0 10,065 
2010 10,129 - - 567 401 427 11,098 
2009 9,080 - - 953 170 17 10,649 
2008 7,678 - - 1,066 - 12 8,762 
2007 5,190 - - 730 - 21 5,933 
2006 3,635 - - 603 - - 4,260 
Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted 
basis). 
Figure 34. Loans by sector: deposit-taking microfinance institutions (2006-2011) 
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Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author. 
 
By contrast – and illustrated in Table 20 and Figure 35 – there was little consumer lending 
amongst unregulated microfinance institutions. It was mainly accounted for by one unregulated 
microfinance institutions which was set up exclusively for commerical payday lending in Nairobi. 
In contrast to other institutions, microbusinesses continue to dominate their loan portfolios. 
 
Table 20. Loans by sector: unregulated microfinance institutions (2006-2011). 
 Business     
 Micro 
Enterprises 
Retail & 
Wholesale 
Trading Agriculture Consumer 
& payday 
Other TOTAL 
2011 1,305 - - 231 246 0 1,783 
2010 1,336 - - 187 184 105 1,707 
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2009 1,816 - - 155 61 191 2,141 
2008 1,560 - - 83 67 19 1,921 
2007 2,021 - - 58 48 -0 2,148 
2006 1,177 - - 39 38 - 1,254 
Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author (inflation-adjusted 
basis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Loans by sector: unregulated microfinance institutions (2006-2011) 
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Source: Financial statements and interview material elaborated by the author . 
Interviewees commented that consumer lending is commercially attractive and that these trends 
reflect the rapid drive in the sector towards commercialization through both the entry of 
microfinance-orientated banks and the transformation of unregulated microfinance institutions 
into deposit-taking microfinance institutions This is because, typically, consumer lending by the 
formal sector is not directed at the poor engaged in informal employment, but to those with regular 
salaried incomes and, as such, the more affluent middle class. Such relatively affluent customers 
are much more creditworthy than the poor in terms of both income and assets available for 
collateral. In addition, because repayments are typically made by direct deduction from salaries, 
their less volatile incomes make credit management easier. Target customers are concentrated in 
urban areas, particularly Nairobi, and so are cheaply serviced via branch networks. Such 
customers are suitable for low-cost credit management techniques such as credit scoring and for 
inclusion in the credit bureaus. Such customers however, borrow at the same rates as higher risk 
customers. This combination of high interest rates compared to risk, good collection rates and 
low costs of service makes the consumer-lending business very commercially attractive. 
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This was confirmed by the Financial Sector Deepening Program Financial Access Survey 2009 
which comments that “the increased availability of banks credit appears to target consumer 
lending to public sector employees” and that there is “a bias ... towards the formal wages 
employed, particularly public sector workers”, concentrations in Nairobi and Central Province, 
Kenya’s most affluent regions, and that the “bulk” of loans growth was attributable to increases 
in the average size of loans rather than expansion of access (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 
2009, p.13). The report concluded that “income, education ... and employment status are strong 
predictors of the use of financial services” and that “low income is still the most prominent barrier 
for the unbanked” (p.17). Similarly, regression analysis of survey data show that income is “one 
of the strongest predictions of usage of both formal and informal services” (Financial Sector 
Deepening Program, 2009, p.23). 
This interpretation is also supported by the increases in the size of average loans. As illustrated 
in Figure 36, IMF data shows that the size of average loans, while declining as access initially 
expanded, stabilized from 2006 onwards at a high multiple of per capita GNI. Indeed, in 2011, 
the average loan size was 6.7 times the per capita annual GNI of $820 (source: World Bank). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Average loan and borrowers per 1,000 people (2004-2011). 
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Source: IMF elaborated by the author (nominal values). 
Note: Green bars indicate average loans and are read against the left hand axis. Blue line 
indicates borrowers per 1,000 adults and is read against the right hand axis. 
 
Other research findings are consistent with this rise in consumer lending but also indicate that 
borrowing is common amongst the poor as well as the middle classes. For example, household 
survey data found that between 2006 and 2009 borrowing had increased from 38.8% to 52.4% of 
the population (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 2009). This discrepancy is explained 
because borrowing is conducted in the informal sector for poor households and through the formal 
sector for middle class households. Indeed, despite these high figures for household borrowing, 
only 5.2% of the 2006 borrowing (or 13.4% of total borrowing) and 7.3% of the 2009 (or 13.9% 
of total borrowing) came from the formal sector with the remainder being lent by the informal 
sector (Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, 2009). 
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Interviewees’ comments were consistent with the commercial attractiveness of the sector. They 
reported there has been fierce competition for business amongst institutions in Kenya in terms of 
consumer lending to the middle classes. This has included very heavy marketing by both 
microfinance-orientated banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions of consumer lending 
products to the middle classes, typically for mortgages and consumption goods such as cars and 
household goods, high-end clothing and vacations. Indeed, the rise of the aspirant middle classes 
has been observed by the international banking community and has been one of the drivers for its 
investments in the microfinance sector. For example, the Financial Times comments, “Kenya’s 
capital is full of aspirational buyers … Kenya’s banks now offer loans for everything from home 
furnishings to indulgent spa days for female customers”.52 
From an individual institution’s risk perspective, the expansion of middle class consumer lending 
versus other sectors is probably a net positive as it carries a lower innate credit risk. Indeed, 
interviewees at the Central Bank of Kenya specifically commented that it was leading to a net 
reduction in risk due to the greater proportion of lending to salaried workers. 
However, some interviewees expressed concern over excessive lending in consumer finance and 
they underlined that this was one of the areas where over-indebtedness and multiple indebtedness 
were occurring. For example, the chief executive officer of a microfinance-orientated bank 
described consumer lending as the “biggest worry” and that it was “out of hand” due to the high 
levels of competition for the same customers, thus driving a lowering of lending standards. 
Central Bank of Kenya interviewees commented that although microfinance-orientated banks had 
managed consumer credit risk well in the past, it was “deteriorating” and accounted for the “bulk” 
of provisions. 
By contrast, lending to sectors important for structural transformation has grown more slowly. 
Business lending has declined as a percentage of total lending as financial access has expanded 
but has, nevertheless, expanded significantly in absolute terms. Interviewees reported this as 
constituting lending to small business, typically for short-term working capital or small capital 
needs. 
                                                             
52 The Financial Times. 6 July 6 2011. “Aspiration drives Kenya’s status struggle”. 
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Agricultural lending has stagnated in relative terms. Microfinance-orientated banks shrank 
agricultural lending from 11% of lending in 2006 to 4% by 2011. Similarly, deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions shrank agricultural lending from 14% of their portfolios to 7%. Only 
unregulated microfinance institutions increased agricultural lending from 3% in 2006 to 13% in 
2011. However, this was due to the establishment of a new unregulated microfinance institution 
dedicated exclusively to agricultural lending for value-chain finance in dairy products (Juhudi 
Kilimo). 
Again these changes are consistent with commercialized incentives. Interviewees consistently 
reported that their view is that agricultural lending is high risk and subject to correlation risk 
between lenders. Agricultural risk has given rise to very material losses for institutions due to 
drought and political unrest in 2007 and 2008. As a result of these risks, a number of interviewees 
– including those at microfinance-orientated banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions 
– stated that their organizations explicit policy was to withdraw or reduce agricultural lending 
that is commercially unattractive due to substantial and repeated credit losses and the high costs 
of operations in rural areas. 
However, from an economic development perspective, the marginalization of agricultural lending 
is problematic. A critical process in development is a structural shift from labour intensive, 
subsistence agriculture to high productivity, high capital intensity agriculture and a restructuring 
of the economy away from agriculture towards industrialization. In Kenya, the agriculture sector 
remains economically dominant in terms of both labour and GDP. It is labour-intensive with low 
productivity and low capital intensity. Especially in rural areas, the majority of the population 
remains in subsistence agriculture. Some rural areas, particularly those in the North and East, also 
have poor quality land and suffer from an arid climate. Their need for investment capital for 
agricultural development is high. The trend seen in microfinance – whereby agricultural lending 
is being marginalized – can only be detrimental to agricultural development. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter the thesis has built on the findings presented in Chapter 6 relating to institutions in 
order to generate a systemic view. Two critical questions were examined in relation to the impact 
of the expansion of financial access on the financial system: its impact on both financial sector 
stability and contribution to the intermediation of funds to investment that will add to structural 
transformation. 
In relation to financial stability, the research has found that expansion of financial access has had 
a mixed impact. Due to “winner takes all” tendencies, an oligopoly market structure has evolved 
with a few systemically-important institutions. This means that the financial system’s stability is 
highly dependent upon their individual institutional soundness. 
The financial market has also seen changes in liquidity risks and related contagion risks. This has 
included a deepening of interbank markets and growth in domestic payments systems (especially 
M-PESA). The changes in liquidity risk are particularly relevant to institutions – primarily 
deposit-taking microfinance institutions – that have failed to mobilize adequate levels of deposits 
to match the expansion of lending or to attract international private capital. This has led to an 
increased dependence on domestic interbank markets. The deepening of domestic interbank 
markets has allowed such institutions to access liquidity provision. However, it is also increasing 
financial fragility through increasing contagion risks and coordinated failure risks between 
domestic institutions. 
Overall the growth of financial access has brought both positives and negatives in relation to 
financial stability. In Chapter 9, the thesis will discuss what policy approaches should be 
considered to ensure that the benefits continue whilst ensuring financial stability is maintained. 
In relation to the impact on intermediation of funds to investment that will contribute to structural 
transformation, the fieldwork findings were less positive. The research found that the expansion 
of financial access is contributing moderately to deposit mobilization, but that may be being 
impaired by weak confidence in institutions and by non-incremental deposit-raising. 
Most importantly, the research found that capital is being intermediated primarily into business 
and consumer lending. The majority of increased lending to business is in “microbusinesses” that 
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make little contribution to large-scale industrialization or service sector development (Nissanke, 
2001). This is discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
The growth in consumer lending is less positive as, although it may be assisting the poor in 
consumption smoothing, it also appears to be mainly offered to middle class households and is 
less likely to contribute to economic development. Of most concern is the reduced relative level 
of lending to agriculture, a key sector that requires investment in order for it to be transformed 
from a low to a high productivity sector. Furthermore, this trend towards expansion of lending 
into sectors with little transformative potential was strongest in the dominant institutions, notably 
Equity Bank. 
In the next chapter – the final chapter that presents the research and fieldwork findings – the thesis 
will turn to a new topic, the role of financial access in the financial lives of the poor. The chapter 
will represent findings that support the conclusion in Chapters 6 and 7, including the low level of 
deposit mobilization from poor households and the continued constrained credit for agriculture 
and business investment. In addition, it will examine, from the perspective of the poor themselves, 
the “barriers” to greater financial access.   
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  225 
8. Financial Access: “The Voices of the Poor” 
 
Recent research into financial access in developing countries has focused on the “financial lives 
of the poor”. This approach has yielded new insights into the financial needs and behaviour of the 
poor, especially the way in which they manage through finance the risk and uncertainty caused 
by the low and volatile incomes that are prevalent in their lives. In this chapter, we build on this 
developing body of research relating to the financial lives of the poor by presenting the results of 
semi-structured fieldwork interviews with the poor in urban and rural areas in Kenya that 
investigated their financial lives and place the expansion of financial access in those lives. 
At a macroeconomic level our findings suggest that the expansion of financial access through the 
private sector is sub-optimal in deposit mobilization and in intermediating investment. Lending, 
in particular, is being directed towards sectors, like consumption, which do not contribute to 
structural transformation. This chapter further supports these findings. Barriers remain against the 
use of formal financial services by the poor, including “voluntary” barriers due to the services 
being offered by microfinance-orientated institutions not serving the needs or wants of the poor. 
Furthermore, lack of financial access undermines the goals of financial sector development, 
including mobilization of savings and the use of credit for investment in small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the formal sector 
 
8.1 THESIS METHODOLOGY FOR INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS 
 
As discussed in the introduction in Chapter 1, the thesis has sought to incorporate the voices of 
the poor in its research and places their views and opinions of financial access and its advantages 
and disadvantages in a position central to the research. As such the methodology included 
fieldwork with low-income households.  
As will be discussed, fieldwork interviews were conducted with individuals between March and 
May 2012 in Kenya (subsequent to the interviews with practitioners, regulators and investors). In 
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total, 109 interviewees participated in 14 focus group interviews, with 55 being conducted in 
Kibera and 56 in Kisumu. 
In designing the methodology, a number of factors had to be considered including selection of 
the sample frame, selection of the individuals within the frame, the form of the interviews, and 
the method to obtain accurate information in an area which may be sensitive or confidential – 
people’s financial lives. These factors and how they were handled – and some critical comments 
about it – are discussed below. 
The selection of the sample frame was driven by a number of factors. Existing individual surveys 
were examined to provide guidance. The surveys were those from FSD (Financial Sector 
Deepening Kenya, 2009). They showed a number of demographic dimensions upon which 
financial access can be examined. These include age, sex, education, income and location. They 
showed that the level of financial access is positive correlated with older age groups, with men 
relative to women, with greater levels of education, and with higher levels of income. For the 
purposes of the thesis – which sought to interview poorer individuals but not the “poorest-of-the-
poor” – it was hoped to select lower-income individuals, but to randomise age and sex. Education 
was captured within this because of its positive correlation with income. 
In addition to this – and as discussed in Chapter 5 – mainstream literature identifies barriers to 
financial access. Many of these barriers are associated with location, particularly with remote, 
rural areas where barriers include physical distance to bank premises or the cost of travel to 
premises relative to levels of transactions. The FSD surveys confirmed different levels of access 
between rural and urban areas in Kenya53. In particular, urban areas of Kenya – such as Nairobi 
and Mombasa – had higher levels of financial access than rural areas, and the remotest rural areas 
– such as the North-Eastern Province – had the lowest levels of access (FSD, 2009). As one of 
the goals of the research was to critically examine these “involuntary” barriers to financial access, 
it was decided to use two comparative sites, one rural and one urban. 
                                                             
53 Kenya has eight provinces: (with the capitals in brackets): Central Province (Nyeri), Coast Province 
(Mombasa), Eastern Province (Embu), Nairobi (Nairobi), North Eastern Province (Garissa), Nyanza 
Province (Kisumu), Rift Valley Province (Nakuru), Western Province (Kakamega). 
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Based on these two factors – the need to interview low-income individuals in an urban and a rural 
site – specific sample frames needed to be chosen. This was determined mainly by selecting sites 
with the best access. 
Firstly, SOAS requires students to act upon the UK Foreign Office advice regarding which 
locations not to travel to. At the time of the fieldwork the Foreign Office had issued warnings 
against travel to the eastern and coastal areas of Kenya –including Coast Province (Mombasa) 
and the North Eastern Province - so these were ineligible for consideration. 
Given this, and because it is Kenya’s largest city, Nairobi was chosen as the urban location. As 
the fieldwork wanted to focus on poor individuals, interviews needed to be conducted in poor 
areas. Kibera was chosen as it is a large slum area in Nairobi but not amongst the most 
impoverished. Also, Kibera has been an area where many MFIs – including microfinance-
orientated banks – have been active in establishing physical branches and marketing their 
products according to the earlier interviews with banks and FSD. 
In rural areas, after Foreign Office advisory sites had been excluded, the remaining potential 
locations were a number of rural areas in central Kenya. Provinces in the Rift Valley and Mount 
Kenya were also relatively affluent according to the FSD household surveys and so the 
interviewees were more likely to include those that were poorer - but with above subsistence 
levels of income. As will be discussed further, the final choice was Nyanza Province because of 
the assistance provided by an NGO, Farm Africa. 
Once the sample frames had been determined, individuals within the frame needed to be selected. 
In this regard, interviewees were again determined by practical considerations relating to access. 
In Kibera, the British Institute in East Africa (BIEA) – a charitable institute in Nairobi associated 
with the University of Nairobi and where I lived during the fieldwork – helped to identify a 
research assistant. The assistant had worked previously in a secondary school in Kibera and the 
BIEA guard was a resident and member of a Baptist church in Kibera, and they both helped me 
find interviewees. The assistant contacted a former teacher at the school and we worked from his 
home in Kibera to network through the neighbourhood to ask for interviewees. This included 
meeting a number of interviewees in their own homes throughout Kibera. I also attended the 
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church with the guard on Sundays and, via the minister, members of the congregation were invited 
to be interviewed. 
For the rural areas, I contacted a charity – Farm Africa – after reading an article about their work 
in “Farmers’ Weekly” magazine. They were involved in supporting farming projects in Kenya 
which sought to help farmers develop projects to increase their yields and incomes, such as 
through introducing improved seeds and fertilisers, diversifying farming activities and increasing 
agricultural processing. After discussion with their staff in London and Nairobi, they agreed to 
introduce me to their staff and the people they worked with in Nyanza in return for me writing a 
report about my findings relating to their projects. We agreed I would visit all projects that they 
were supporting in Nyanza in order to avoid any selection by local staff of only the best projects. 
Their local staff met us in Farm Africa’s offices in Kisumu and they arranged the meetings and 
other practical arrangements for the interviews. The staff accompanied us for interviews with the 
cassava farmers but not for the fish farmers when I went unaccompanied (although local 
representatives joined us for some of the meetings). 
Fees were paid to the interviewees but not to the Farm Africa staff or organization. In Kibera, 
each interviewee was offered a fee of Khs 100 (about $1). For the interviews in Kisumu, a lump 
sum fee was paid to the group leader of between Khs 2,000 to 4,000 (about $20-40) and the groups 
were left to decide whether to use it collectively or individually. On occasions we also gave small 
gifts such as paper, pens and food. 
There is a consideration to be made regarding whether such compensation to interviewees distorts 
research results. It can be argued that payments are ethically justified to compensate interviews 
for their time and inconvenience in participation. This was the view of the author. 
Ideally, payments should also increase participation – and hence the representativeness of the 
sample of interviewees, but without distorting outcomes. This is more of a concern when 
payments are large, but research suggests that modest payments increase participation without 
excessive distortion. (Grady, 2001) This is especially the case when it is combined with 
information to participants to remind them of the voluntary nature of both their participation and 
of any responses, including their choice as to whether to provide the requested information or not 
(Grady, 2001). Such reminders were included in our introduction for focus groups. 
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In the case of this research, the amount paid was deliberately set at approximately half days’ 
casual salary as this was approximately the time given by the interviewees and this has been 
defined as a fair financial inducement, but not so much that it might distort results (Fisher & 
Anushko, 2008). Although some interviewees did seem to be motivated to participate in order to 
receive the fee – most notably in Kibera – there did not seem to be any evidence that it distorted 
responses. However, the presence of these payments may have distorted the representativeness of 
the sample or their responses. 
The interviews were conducted using a questionnaire that sought to gather quantitative data on 
formal sector engagement. This is given in Table 21 below. The original aim of the questionnaire 
was to collect quantitative and qualitative data about the individual interviewees’ financial lives 
and financial access in a structured way and to provide consistency across the interviews. This 
included topics related to the holding of deposit and loan accounts, loans and savings balances 
and data on asset holdings and income. 
Table 21. Interview questionnaire. 
Topic Detailed questions 
GENERAL 
 
1. What is your age? 18-30; 31-45; 45-60; Over 60 
2. What is your occupation(s)? 
3. Please estimate your current monthly (cash) income? 
DEPOSIT / SAVINGS 
DEMAND - GROUP 
 
Have you used a savings product in the last year? 
x With a group? 
x As an individual? 
If yes, for GROUP SAVINGS (For each group): 
1. Describe the main characteristics of the group? 
a. Name 
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b. Registered or unregistered 
c. Number of members 
d. Time it has been active 
e. Regular contributions e.g. weekly or monthly amounts 
f. How often does the group meet 
g. Lending amounts and time 
h. Interest rates (Members and non-members) 
i. Business (Projects) activities 
j. Distribution patterns 
2. What is the purpose of the group’s savings? 
a. Business/Projects (Describe details including income & 
employment) 
b. Emergency funds (e.g. Health) 
c. Education 
d. Other (Describe) 
3. Does the group have a formal bank account? If so; 
a. Which bank is used and why? 
b. How often & how much is typically money banked 
c. What is the typical (Average) balance in the account? 
d. What has been the maximum ever in this account? 
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DEPOSIT / SAVINGS 
DEMAND - 
PERSONAL 
SAVINGS: 
 
 
1. What type of product have you used? 
a. Formal Savings: Bank account / MFI account / M-PESA / Other 
(Specify) 
b. Informal Savings: Secret place / friends or family / Other 
(Specify) 
2. Which formal provider did you use (Name of bank or MFI)? 
3. What were the purposes of your savings? 
Everyday household needs / Emergency funds (e.g. Health) / Business / saving for 
house or household goods / Education / Marriage or Funeral expenses / other long 
term savings 
4. What is the average balance in the account? 
Less than 200Khs / 200-1,000 Khs / 1,001-10,000 Khs / Above 10,000 (Specify) 
5. What has been the maximum ever in this account? 
Less than 200Khs / 200-1,000 Khs / 1,001-10,000 Khs / Above 10,000 (Specify) 
6. What is the average monthly deposit made into this account? 
Less than 200Khs (Specify) / 200-1,000 Khs / 1,001-10,000 Khs / Above 10,000 
(Specify) 
If “No” savings in the last year: 
7. If you have had no cash savings, why is this? 
No money to be saved / Irregular income / Unemployment / Difficulty of finding 
or accessing (e.g. due to distance) a savings method / Barriers such as minimum 
deposits / Put off by formality of some types of savings / Other (Specify) 
8. Have you ever had non-cash assets you see as primarily savings? 
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If so, what type of assets are these? 
Land or housing (Rural or Urban) / Livestock / Other (Specify) 
Why did you prefer these to cash? 
Security / Convenience / Inflation / Other (Specify) 
 
CREDIT / LOAN 
DEMAND 
 
Have you used a loan or credit product in the last year?   Yes / No. 
If yes, for each product used: 
1. What provider have you used? 
Formal Loan: Bank account / MFI account / M-PESA / Savings club (Including 
ROSCA and similar) / Other (Specify) 
Informal Borrowing: Friends or family / Other (Specify) 
2. What was the purpose of your loan? Please indicate up to three purposes. 
Everyday household needs / Emergency funds (e.g. Health) / Business working 
capital (i.e. short term) / Business investment (Specify) / Agricultural working 
capital / House or household goods / Education / Marriage or Funeral expenses / 
Other long term savings 
3. What is the typical (Average) loan amount? 
Less than 200Khs / 200-1,000 Khs / 1,001-10,000 Khs / Above 10,000 (Specify) 
4. How long was the loan outstanding? 
Less than 1 week / Up to 1 month / Up to 6 months / Up to 1 year / More than 1 
year(Specify) 
5. Have you had more than one loan outstanding at the same time? 
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If yes, what is the maximum and typical number of loans you have outstanding 
simultaneously? What is the reason you use multiple lending sources?  Have you 
used one loan to repay another? Has having multiple loans made interest or 
principal payments difficult? Have you disclosed other loans to lenders? 
6. Have you experienced any problems with lending or borrowing? 
If “No loans” in the last year: 
7. If you have not borrowed any money, why is this? 
Never needed / No source to borrow from / Did not know how too / Not enough 
money or income to be able too / Did not meet other lender requirements e.g. for 
employment or collateral or guarantor / Concerned would not be able to repay / 
Do not believe it is a good or ethical option / Other (Specify) 
Source: The author. 
However, although the questionnaire was originally planned to be used for each individual 
interview, it became a more general checklist for focus groups. This was because it rapidly 
became clear that the less structured discussions in focus groups was giving richer and more 
complete material than the responses that were generated from either rigidly following the 
questionnaire (which had been predetermined by the researcher) or from discussions conducted 
with individuals only. For example, it was found that the interviewee discussions brought up new 
issues that had not been addressed in the initial questionnaire and that the group discussions were 
producing a richer picture of their financial lives when they were not constrained by 
predetermined topics, and these were then discussed between the interviewees in the focus group 
which drew out more detail.  
This has been observed in other methodology research where the use of such focus groups has 
the key advantage of allowing large numbers of observation within a relatively short time and a 
wider and more complete range of topics and responses (Smithson, 2008; Kruger & Casey, 2009).  
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As a result, the mix of structured versus unstructured interviews and the combination of individual 
versus group focus evolved as the interviews progressed, with greater emphasis being placed on 
unstructured focus group interviews. 
However, focus groups can introduce issues that need to be managed carefully during the research 
process. One issue that can arise in focus groups is that the moderator can unconsciously introduce 
bias of various forms into fieldwork interviews (Smithson, 2008). A number of steps were taken 
to manage these issues. Care was taken to not present leading questions but to use “open” 
questions that do not constrain responses, and the emphasis on this increased during the fieldwork. 
The researcher has been trained as a “neutral” interviewer (as a clinical psychologist) and this 
was helpful. 
A further disadvantage of focus groups is that dominant individuals in the group can influence 
the results (Krueger & Casey, 2009). This was observed in some of the focus groups in the 
fieldwork. For example, men or older men and women were more forthcoming with their views 
and comments. This probably reflected their relative status in the focus groups where they not 
only had higher social status but were also known as leaders – both formally and informally – 
among the group. This observation was used in the moderation of the group where we sought to 
encourage initial discussions by asking the first speaker to be such a forthcoming individual and 
this appeared to be effective in encouraging others to become more open in sharing their opinions. 
However, care was also taken to direct questions specifically to individuals who were not 
participating – such as younger women – to solicit their comment. This had mixed results, because 
even when spoken to directly some women did not wish to respond – although others seized the 
chance very willingly to give their opinions. 
Lastly, a key issue was how to extract material from the interviewees regarding their financial 
lives, given that this might be a sensitive topic. This issue can often be observed in research 
involving issues such as financial lives and needs to be handled carefully (Christensen, 1993). 
We approached this by using the focus group format where interviewees were members of saving 
and loans clubs and so were already familiar with each other’s financial lives. Similarly, a female 
research assistant from the local area was chosen as it was considered that women would be more 
relaxed when discussing issues with another woman from their region. This also allowed 
interviewees to speak in their first languages, thereby ensuring that those who did not speak 
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English were able to participate. We also included in our introductory comments a statement that 
the information was confidential and would only be used for research, while interviewees were 
asked only to give their first names and permission was sought to make tape recordings of the 
group. 
As interviews progressed, we also found that it was most productive to ask groups to describe the 
workings of their clubs first. As this was already common information, interviewees were relaxed 
when giving detailed information. This also created a relaxed atmosphere. We would then ask for 
more individual information that seemed more sensitive – such as personal savings goals – before 
asking what appeared to be the most sensitive information - such as bank account balances and 
asset holdings. 
It is also worth noting that it was not clear to what extent interviewees felt financial life 
information was private and if they were reluctant to share this with each other and the 
researchers. In European cultures, asking for information regarding your earnings, the value of 
your assets or bank balances etc, by friends or neighbours would be largely taboo. However, in 
Kenya, it is not clear if this was the case as many interviewees seemed relaxed providing it – even 
to researchers who were relative strangers – and, in fact, only one person refused. Such cultural 
differences need to considered when conducting fieldwork (Christensen, 1993). 
The above discussion describes the methodology that was used for the fieldwork interviews. 
However, it can be critiqued in a number of areas. Firstly, the selection of the individual 
interviewees within the sampling frames – although not subject to a clear bias or other systemic 
approach – was also not randomised. As noted, the approach tried to address major sample bias 
found in the FSD surveys – such as age, sex and location – through the selection of appropriate 
sample frames for the research questions. 
However, there was not full randomization of individuals. Other research has used techniques 
such as random selection from voter registers (although this introduces bias of a different type 
because marginalised groups are less likely to be registered), random selection through mapping 
of the sample frame with random selection of households within the sample frame or even simpler 
methods such as selection of periodic houses in a given location. However, in this research such 
approaches were not used. This was partially due to practical problems including a lack of 
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resources for a PhD student and security considerations as a lone researcher. However, it needs 
to be recognised that these issues means that the sample may be subject to selection bias. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, the use and form of the questionnaire evolved during the fieldwork 
and there was a greater emphasis on focus groups. However, this approach of using unstructured 
interviews and focus groups can also introduce bias in results (Devereux, 1993). In retrospective, 
it would have been better to conduct a pilot study and then rework the questionnaire to reflect the 
feedback. This effectively took place during the study. Had a pilot study been conducted however, 
greater consistency could have been achieved between the interviews. 
These issues are particularly important in relation to the quantitative data collected. The validity 
of any aggregates may have been impacted, both by the lack of randomization and the lack of 
interview structure (Devereux, 1993). Again, this can be contrasted with the method used in, for 
example, the FSD surveys, which deployed standard questionnaires with pre-determined 
responses with no element of qualitative discussion but that yielded strong quantitative data (FSD, 
2009, 2012). Overall, the quantitative data – although suggestive of outcomes – would ideally be 
verified through more systematic questionnaires and sampling than was conducted in this thesis. 
Thirdly, the fieldwork relied upon self-reporting by interviewees. Ideally, interview responses 
should be verified against independent information. However, in this research, it was not possible 
to verify statements made by interviewees against independent evidence. This was because this 
was not asked for, as it went beyond the scope of the focus group or was not available – for 
example the value of non-cash assets. It also included responses to quantitative questions– for 
example, bank balances or asset holdings – where responses could have been confirmed by 
independent evidence. For example, bank balances could have been checked against bank 
statements or assets against title deeds or purchase records. These issues mean that the responses 
could be inaccurate.  
Misreporting might be deliberate. For example, it might occur where interviewees are reluctant 
to provide sensitive information and instead provide false information on sensitive issues about 
matters such as, for example, financial status or sexual behaviour (Christensen, 1993). It can also 
occur because interviewees are relying on recall and this may be inadvertently inaccurate 
(Devereux, 1993). 
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It is not possible to objectively assess whether such issues were present. Subjectively, most 
responses did appear genuine and open. This was particularly because many of the interviewees 
were already familiar with the financial lives of the other interviewees through the various savings 
and loans clubs. They also cross-checked and agreed responses on issues including, for example, 
club practices and balances during the discussion, thus making errors due to faulty recall less 
likely. 
However, it was also noted that on occasion some responses did not seem credible or interviewees 
were evasive. For example, some young men in the case study relating to garbage collection stated 
they had large bank balances but this did not seem compatible with their stated income and other 
circumstances. Some people were evasive about their amount of personal savings, although only 
one interview refused to respond outright. It is possible that they wished to keep such information 
private or were concerned about its security if it became known that they had substantial savings. 
This is especially because in some areas – such as Kibera – having known savings might make 
people a target for crime. 
Finally, responses may have been affected by group dynamics. (Krueger and Casey, 2009). As 
noted, it was common for the established group leaders to lead the discussions. Also, women in 
the discussions sometimes deferred to men or younger women to older women, allowing the men 
or the older women to lead the conversation. This occurred even when women who had not spoken 
were specifically invited to do so by the researchers and, on occasion, they then provided limited 
answers or let the men respond for them. However, there was also an element of individual 
personality reflected in these observations – some women were quiet and deferential but others 
were extrovert and freely offered bold opinions and information. Again, it is not possible to 
objectively determine whether these observations caused bias in the interview material. 
Overall, it is believed by the author that the interview material that is about to be presented 
remains valuable in providing insights into the voices of the poor and their interaction with 
financial access. Nevertheless, these methodological shortcomings should be noted. 
 
8.2 URBAN FINANCIAL LIVES OF THE POOR 
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All of the 56 interviewees were resident in Kibera, which is one of the largest slums in Nairobi 
with an estimated population of one million. It is home to both long term-residents and low-
income immigrants from rural areas. Living conditions, whilst poor, are not those of “the poorest 
of the poor,” as not only has Kibera an established housing stock and services (such as electricity, 
shops and non-running water), but also well-established social structures. 
Living conditions include crowded homes and buildings made of low quality building materials 
such as scrap wood, mud walls and tin roofs. In the homes and other buildings (such as the local 
church and shops) where interviews took place, the interiors of the homes were simple and often 
included not only furniture, such as beds and sofas, but other possessions, such as televisions, 
stereos and bicycles. Most of the interviewees lived in collective compounds. The compounds 
typically had electricity (although it is “jerry-rigged”), tanked water and pit latrines. Between 
buildings in Kibera there are large amounts of rubbish and open sewers. Interviewees reported a 
fear of crime and the presence of limited and poor quality government schools and health centres. 
The majority of interviewees lived with extended families and many had dependents, including 
children. There is a large market in Kibera (“The Toy Market”) where a number of the 
interviewees conducted petty trade and it is served by a local minibus (“Matatu”). 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Figure 8.1 Selected images of Kibera 54  (illustrating the living conditions of 
interviewees). 
                                                             
54 Images are publically available third party pictures as cameras were not taken on fieldwork at the request 
of research assistants due to security concerns. 
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Source: http://www.stanford.edu/~siegelr/kenya/kibera2008.html 
 
Source: http://www.stanford.edu/~siegelr/kenya/kibera2008.html 
 
Kibera is an area where institutions focusing on microfinance clients have very active marketing 
and branch network expansion. Equity Bank has been very active with a large branch in the main 
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street in Kibera and included active marketing advertising throughout the slum. This is reflected 
in the number of interviewees who have opened accounts at Equity Bank. Other banks with 
branches in Kibera include Cooperative Bank and Jami Bora. M-PESA agents are scattered 
throughout the area. 
Interviewees were chosen as those with incomes above subsistence level and so had some 
disposable income with potential savings capacity. In total, 95% were informally employed or 
were employed in low-pay work. Income averaged Khs 250-750 daily. Typical occupations 
included collective businesses within Kibera (such as water or latrine provision, garbage 
collection or child-minding), collective low-skill manufacturing (such as weaving and spinning 
or soap manufacturing), small shop-keeping and petty trades or occupations (Such as selling 
vegetables or second hand clothes). Some interviewees had waged jobs, but these were often 
irregular and relatively low-skilled. They included, for example, security watchmen or drivers. 
There were a few exceptions, such as one informally qualified electrician, one primary school 
teacher and two salaried community workers. However, none had professional qualifications and 
all were employed within Kibera. 
8.2.1 Savings and Lending Groups 
It was very popular to be a member of a savings and lending group (SLG), including both 
registered and unregistered saving and credit co-operative societies (SACCO). In fact, 95% 
(53/56) of interviewees reported being a member of a savings and loan group with 24 separate 
savings and loan groups being included in the sample of the 53 individual interviewees. Savings 
and loan groups were organized by neighbourhood or community groups, such as local 
neighbours, women’s or church groups. They typically functioned by collecting monies on a 
regular basis, with members then being able to borrow monies from the group. However, as will 
be discussed further, their primary purpose is business investment and “self-insurance” for 
emergencies. 
Membership numbers varied widely with a mean of 24 members but a mode of 15-20 members 
and a range from a minimum of five to a maximum of 72 members. Interviewees who were 
members of the same groups showed throughout the interviewees that they typically knew each 
other well, including their financial lives, and there was a strong social and community aspect to 
the groups. The age of the group also varied with some being short-dated, such as less than a year, 
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and others up to “more than” 20 years. However, the mode age was 2-5 years. Collections of 
monies were weekly (50%) with an average collection of Khs 152 or monthly (50%), with an 
average collection of Khs 766. A minority of groups (14%) also made an annual collection of Khs 
500 or Khs 1,000, mainly for Christmas celebrations. Interviewees commonly commented that 
making contributions was easy, with members typically seeking to build a small amount each day 
or week from their income in order to collate the required sum. 
Savings and loan groups varied in their formality with some being very informal and others using 
detailed written terms and conditions. Kenyan savings and loan groups can be registered as 
savings and credit cooperative societies. They are required to be registered in order for the group 
to open a bank account. In our sample, 42% (10/24) of the groups were registered, with the others 
unregistered. However, 67% (16/24) had a group bank account, implying a disregard for 
registration requirements. The most popular bank to hold funds with was Equity Bank (63%), 
which dominated group accounts, followed by Cooperative Bank (31%) and deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions (11%). None had a bank account with an unregulated microfinance 
institution. In total, 34% of cash collections from group savings and activities was banked on 
average each week or month after collections, with the rest being spent. Average account balances 
were Khs 64,500 with a range of balances from Khs 30,000 to Khs 200,000. Those with larger 
balances were often associated with the accumulation of funds for specific purposes, particularly 
school fees that are paid out periodically over the academic year. 
Figure 38 details the most commonly-cited purpose by interviewees for their saving and lending 
activities. It provides separate figures for group and personal savings and respondents were 
allowed to give up to three responses. 
 
 
Figure 38. Urban interviewees stated purpose for saving. 
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Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
As can be seen, the most important function of savings and lending groups are not savings and 
lending per se, but income and employment generation through community businesses, with 58% 
of interviewees commenting this was the primary purpose of the group’s savings and lending. 
The interviewees described how the monies collected on a regular basis are invested in their small 
businesses. Critical to understanding the substance of these activities is not only the collective 
nature of the savings and loan group, but also the character of the businesses, almost all of which 
were collectively, not individually, managed and owned. 
In many instances, the business also provided the primary employment for the group members 
and profit-shares that represented important income. Profit shares often had a savings-like 
component because income distribution was periodic, such as annual distributions. 
The investments being made were in business assets, such as equipment or property for use in the 
business, or as working capital. This funding is of considerable importance. It adds a different 
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dimension compared to what is discussed in the mainstream literature. In most cases, studies of 
microfinance fail to analyse the collective nature of many small businesses in developing 
countries. Moreover – and again in contrast to much existing literature – no groups reported 
having received any formal loans, and businesses were entirely self-funded. Many interviewees 
saw this as preferable as it avoided the costs and collateral risks of formal bank loans. 
The second most common purpose for savings was for “emergencies,” with 34% citing this as an 
important purpose for the savings and loan group, and 20% as the exclusive purpose for the group. 
This shows that an important savings and loan group function is to provide a fund for members 
to draw down on in the event of emergencies. Group members saw this ability to “self-insure” 
each other against adverse events as a critical reason and purpose for the group. There was a 
strong community and social element to the ability of a collective business to provide mutual 
support and assistance to members. Typically, an emergency was identified as warranting funds 
during group meetings that would then authorize release of funds. Examples included health 
emergencies or funeral expenses. Often emergency loans were in fact gifts and were not repayable 
by members. For a number of groups, these were the only reasons members could borrow funds. 
The third important purpose for group savings was education, with 29% of groups citing this as 
an important purpose. Many members put a high value on education, either for themselves or for 
their children. Often, they actively sought educational opportunities in the private sector, given 
the poor quality of government education. Fees are paid annually or each term in lump sums and 
were a major financial burden. Savings clubs functioned to allow structured savings towards this 
goal or allowed accumulation of profits from collective businesses to fund the required payments. 
Most groups allowed borrowing by both members and non-members and many interviewees 
reported taking occasional loans from the group. Loans were typically agreed at weekly or 
monthly group meetings. Average loans were Khs 1,600 with the amount that could be borrowed 
varying from Khs 1,000 to 3,000 and repayable within one week or month. As such, loans were 
typically short term and for relatively small amounts, reflecting their function as a “service” to 
group members. Interest rates averaged 12% per month for group members and 22% for non-
members. Many commented on these rates being significantly below other possible sources of 
loans, including formal banks and moneylenders. They noted that the loans also had a key 
advantage of creating income for the members and the return was put into the overall returns from 
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the collective businesses. Collateral was usually taken and took the form of small assets, such as 
household goods or similar, and was particularly common for non-members. 
 
8.2.2 Individual Savings, Borrowings and Assets 
In addition to group financial behaviour, interviewees were asked for information in relation to 
their individual financial lives. Of the 56 people interviewed, 66% (37/56) have a formal personal 
bank account, 34% (19/56) savings in kind and 21% reported having neither. 
In relation to formal bank accounts, all were deposit accounts. The most popular banks were 
Equity Bank where 38% of those with an account held their account and Cooperative Bank where 
27% were customers. In addition, for personal accounts, M-PESA was also engaged with 22% of 
interviewees reporting using M-PESA for savings. Interviewees reported using banks for longer-
term savings and M-PESA for short term, daily cash flow. A number reported that this was 
because they liked the discipline that limited access to funds, such as the inconvenience of visiting 
the bank, compared to the security and convenience of using M-PESA to access small, daily cash 
requirements. 
However, whilst some interviewees reported accumulating reasonably large sums of up to Khs 
70,000, the average balance for the majority was smaller at Khs 4,300 and the mode much smaller 
at less than Khs 1,000. This is illustrated in Figure 39. Only 8% (5/56) reported having significant 
accumulated savings, defined as balances over Khs 10,000. In contrast, 66% (37/56) of 
interviewees reported having less than Khs 1,000 in their bank accounts and a further 25% (14/56) 
reporting having between Khs 1,000 and Khs 10,000. Furthermore, 82% (45/56) reported not 
making regular savings, such as on a weekly or monthly basis. 
The reasons given for this lack of regular use of deposit accounts and low balances, was that that 
although they had opened accounts, it was often under the influence of advertising and promotion 
by microfinance-orientated banks and after opening the account they had not found them to be 
useful. Others reported only holding deposit accounts in order to meet the requirements set by 
formal banks to access loans at a later date. Overall, although 66% had deposit accounts, of these, 
only 6% reported actively using the accounts with the other 94% have effectively dormant 
accounts. 
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Such findings indicate that the level of access reported in surveys is misleading. Financial Sector 
Deepening Program surveys simply record if a respondent has a bank account, but not their actual 
account usage or its utility value to their owners. The fact that we found that the actual account 
use is low suggests lower financial access than currently reported by such surveys. 
Figure 39. Urban Interviewees stated average deposit balance. 
 
Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
When asked about purpose of savings, illustrated in Figure 40, interviewees reported similar 
results to those for group savings, including the importance of business (36%), emergencies 
(16%) and education (23%). However, two important differences between group and individual 
savings existed. Firstly, the importance of using savings for businesses was far lower for an 
individual’s savings than for group savings, with 36% reporting this as an important purpose for 
individual savings, contrasting with 58% for group savings. Interviewees reported this was due 
to the importance of collective business enterprise, compared to a much lower level of individual 
business enterprise. This reflects the desire to work communally and cooperatively, thus sharing 
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the risk of business failure and enabling the accumulation of much larger sums of capital for 
business investment through pooling savings. 
Secondly, the most frequently cited goal for individual savings was asset accumulation. In total, 
38% of interviewees reported this as their primary goal in savings, with savings acting as an 
interim stage to acquiring non-financial assets. Interviewees also commented that this was an 
important goal of the savings and loan groups business activities as well, with returns from 
businesses, such as income distributions, being channelled into accumulating cash for the ultimate 
goal of hard asset acquisition. 
Figure 40 illustrates this savings and asset-accumulation cycle. Income is generated through 
individual or group businesses and employment, accumulated in cash into material sums, and then 
used to acquire hard assets, but with hard assets being the ultimate goal and the preferred store of 
long term value. 
The cycle also illustrates an important point – that capital investment is largely through collective 
savings and investment. Individual capital investments in businesses were almost non-existent 
with only one interviewee reporting having made such investments and then only for trading 
capital. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40. The process of hard asset accumulation 
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Source: Interview material. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 41, this strategy was successful for many, with 34% of interviewees 
reporting owing non-financial assets. In total, 29% of interviewees owned land or housing and 
25% owed livestock (some own both). As part of this, a common practice was to remit funds to 
the rural areas from which interviewees had originated to their extended families, all in order for 
them to buy rural land and livestock. However, half of those reporting land and property owned 
these assets in urban areas including, for example, rental and self-occupied land and housing in 
Kibera. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. Urban interviewees’ individual asset portfolios. 
Percentage of those reporting holding such assets 
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Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
Hard assets were seen as preferable by interviewees for a number of reasons. Firstly, almost all 
interviewees noted that these were income-generating assets producing rental or farming income. 
In addition, assets were used by themselves or their families to fund accommodation or 
subsistence farming. 
Secondly, interviewees made direct comparisons with financial assets and found non-financial 
assets to be preferable for reasons relating to the deficiencies of the former. In particular, they 
cited the low return received on deposits – 2-5% per annum was noted – compared to the return 
that could be generated by hard assets and the opportunity cost in terms of use value of financial 
savings compared to hard assets. 
A few interviewees commented on how, by using savings and loan groups for lending and 
borrowing between themselves, there was a benefit to all, as “deposits” returns were retained 
within their community rather than being lost to microfinance-orientated institutions. 
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Such comments by interviewees challenge the views that the poor are in need of “financial literacy 
education”. We found, on the contrary, a reasonably pragmatic grasp of basic costs and benefits 
involved in formal banking offerings compared to other options. 
However, an important exception to this was found in relation to the costs of loans from savings 
and loan groups compared to formal sector ones. Interviewees noted the differential between 
stated savings and loan group rates and bank rates, but did not adjust for some rates being quoted 
as monthly compared to annual rates. In fact, this is highly material as average savings and loan 
groups’ loans are made at 10-20% per month, equivalent to a compounded 214-792% annually, 
which compares to an average rate of 30-45% annually for bank lending. These responses indicate 
that the interviewees did not have a sophisticated understanding in relation to comparing interest 
rates presented on different basis. 
As for group lending, formal bank borrowing was negligible, with only one person reporting 
having had a formal loan (2%). By contrast, almost all interviewees reported using informal 
lending from savings and loan groups at one time or another and expressed a strong preference 
for doing so. 
When asked from their perspective what were the “barriers” to formal lending, the responses 
could be broken into “voluntary” and “involuntary” barriers. Most important in relation to 
voluntary barriers was their dislike of the rigid nature of formal loans. Many expressed concern, 
given the volatility and low-levels of their incomes, that they might have unforeseen difficulties 
making on-time and regular payments. The anxiety over loss of collateral was very frequently 
cited but, interestingly, not that collateral was unavailable. Indeed, collateral requirements could 
be met and interviewees reported having household assets or other property that had been used as 
collateral in savings and loan group borrowing. But the issue was the rigid and uncaring nature 
of the formal bank agreements under which collateral could be seized. Indeed, many cited their 
strong preference for borrowing from savings and loan groups where the group would be able to 
differentiate between an inability and an unwillingness to pay, and act more sympathetically to 
those in genuine difficulties. By contrast, formal banks were perceived as being harsh and 
uninterested in the circumstances of those in arrears. 
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In relation to over-indebtedness, the majority of interviewees expressed a very conservative 
approach to borrowing beyond their ability to repay. Indeed, none reported multiple borrowing 
or borrowing for consumption and only one person (2%) reported using one loan to pay off 
another. Attitudes to debt were very cautious and a number of interviewees expressed high levels 
of anxiety about the consequences of incurring a debt that may lead to repayment problems. Many 
cited examples in their communities of people who had become over-indebted and the adverse 
consequences of this. For these people who are sustaining themselves but still have a relatively 
small gap between their current stable and reasonable livelihoods and destitution, this risk 
aversion was understandable. The consensus seemed to be that security and a modest but 
sustained level of consumption and business activities was preferable to risk-taking that, whilst 
possibly leading to an improved life, could also lead to the loss of basic livelihood requirements. 
These points are now further illustrated through case studies. 
 
 
 
8.3 URBAN CASE STUDIES 
 
8.3.1 The Garbage Collectors: “The bank is not your friend” . 
Interviewees were an informal group of 14 young men whose ages ranged from 17 to 25. They 
lived together in adjacent houses in a neighbourhood next to the railway track that runs through 
Kibera (Fig. 45). They were living cooperatively, with some being brothers, but mostly friends. 
None had parents present and the two older men, aged 24 and 25, demonstrated their leadership 
of the group. Their occupations were patchy and informal with interviewees variously describing 
themselves as “hustlers”, “businessmen,” or “students”. One was an informal electrician. Some 
had attended primary and secondary school and all spoke good English57. 
                                                             
57 There were some women present during the interview, who one older man described as being “ladies 
who make house calls”. They only observed and so have not been included in the interview material. 
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Figure 42. Kibera railway track neighbourhood (illustrating the living conditions of the 
interviewees). 
 
Source: http://lori4twb.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/394/ 
 
Their main source of income was the collective collecting of garbage from households in the 
neighbourhood. They had been running the business for about three years and had received start-
up help from a local NGO who had given them a wheelbarrow and bags. They had a weekly 
collection when they distributed bags to homes in the neighbourhood and collected the full bags. 
They collect garbage from about 150 houses and charge Khs 20 a bag, providing average income 
of Khs 3,000 to 4,000 a week. However, on occasions they reported there are problems with 
collecting their fees as households sometimes cannot pay. Of the amount earned, about 50% of 
the weekly collections are distributed to the individuals who have participated in the garbage 
collection. They commented this was often used for immediate needs, not only food but, like all 
young men around the world, on fun things, including “beer” and “grooming”. 
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The remainder, however, is saved. Typically, about Khs 2,000 is banked weekly. They have a 
formal bank account at Cooperative Bank but otherwise the savings group is very informal. They 
also use funds for emergencies and lending to members. The group members can borrow Khs 
1,000 at 5% interest for the month and they also lend to non-group members at 10%. The leader 
cited a balance of “up to Khs 100,000” in the account and the balance accumulated was distributed 
to members annually. 
Of the fourteen, nine (64%) had individual formal bank accounts at Equity Bank, Cooperative 
Bank, Kenya Commercial Bank and the Postbank. Six (43%) also (or exclusively) used M-PESA 
for savings. M-PESA was seen as useful for small amounts and short-term savings as it is 
particularly convenient as there are many agents in the neighbourhood. For example, one man 
commented that “when you don’t have money to eat, it’s easy” as he could go and get small 
amounts of money for such daily basics. 
Despite the majority having one or even two accounts in formal banks, a high proportion cited 
negligible savings balances. Half of them (7/14) had a balance below Khs 1,000 with a minimum 
balance of Khs 30. Such low savings resulted from the reality of the low income generated from 
garbage collection. 
This reality contrasted with their enthusiastic financial plans. For example, they expressed the 
ambition to buy housing and to save for their college fees. They also wished to develop a more 
substantial business and said that they had been discussing a plan to open a “video shop”. These 
are quite common in Kibera and are essentially a bar with a TV showing programs or videos. The 
group was interested to make their video shop a specialist in sports video and had been looking 
to rent a shop in the neighbourhood and were hoping to accumulate sufficient savings to use as 
start-up and working capital. 
The group lends to members and most of the members had borrowed at one time or another, and 
were comfortable with that. However, the group said it would not consider borrowing from a 
formal bank. The reasons given related to collateral and the lack of understanding of personal 
circumstances by banks. One commented that, “the group are my friends and understand,” 
comparing this to the lack of a personal relationship with a bank. Another commented that, “the 
bank is not your friend”. Another commented that “I fear loans” and that the bank will require, 
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and will seize, collateral, regardless of the impact on the need to be able to provide the most basic 
requirements for yourself. The bank “want your house” one young man commented. The 
electrician commented they might take his tool box which he had acquired via careful savings. 
When I commented that it might be wise to avoid indebtedness, another commented “then you 
are on our side, the side of the poor here”. It was clear that the use of formal bank loans was very 
unattractive due to risk aversion relating to the potential loss of collateral. They saw the formal 
banks as being anti-poor and even as an adversary of the poor. There was a deep distrust of formal 
banks. Instead, their preference was for self-help through their friendship and family groups. 
 
8.3.2 Collective Businesses in Kibera: “The group ties us all together”.   
Amongst those interviewed in Kibera, 26% (10/38) were members of community-owned business 
groups. These businesses were typically small, locally-based enterprises with a savings and loan 
group that funded the businesses. Some were exclusively owned and managed by women. The 
types of businesses included local services such as schools, water provision (in large tanks within 
Kibera which are filled by tanker lorries and are the main source of fresh water for residents) and 
public latrines. They also included small manufacturing and trading businesses, such as food 
manufacturing, soap manufacturing and spinning and weaving. The related savings and loan 
groups typically took contributions on a weekly or monthly basis to fund investments in the 
business, with periodic pay-outs. These periodic distributions were very important to members as 
a source of income. The groups also had a strong component of community engagement and self-
help. For example, and similar to regular savings and loan groups, they usually had a “social 
fund” which provided emergency funds for members, to whom they lent on an unconditional 
basis. 
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Figure 43. Kibera local water tank business premises (illustrating a typical business that the group 
interviewed managed).
 
Source: http://www.kwaho.org/pd-watercan-kibera.html 
Examination of these businesses detail the way in which they are managed and developed by 
community groups and the nature of their engagement with formal financial services. For 
example, one older lady described her involvement over 20 years with her savings and loan group, 
“The Shuka Group”. The group had been started by women in order to “put something on the 
table” but had then evolved into businesses running pit latrines and water tanks in the 
neighbourhood. They had purchased a soap-making machine and now collectively make soap and 
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individually sell it throughout Nairobi on the street and house-to-house. Today, the group has 30 
members and contributions of Khs 40 per week plus estimated weekly profits of Khs 4,000 to 
6,000 weekly. Members can also borrow for one month at 10% and typical uses are household 
needs and for individuals’ petty businesses, such as making baskets or charcoal, or crocheting. 
The groups are registered and have an account at Equity Bank, after switching from Post Bank 
due to preferential fees. They use the account for savings and the maximum accumulation has 
been approximately Khs 70,000, which is shared out prior to Christmas. However, although they 
regularly use their savings accounts for banking and the safe storage of funds, the group have 
never applied for, nor ever wanted a loan. The interviewees’ comments were that they “fear rules 
and regulations” and that “if you don’t pay on time they will come and sell your properties and 
maybe your things at home, and we are afraid of that”. In addition, she commented that the “rates 
are very high and we cannot afford them”. 
In another example, an interviewee described her group “Action Speaks” which had 11 members 
who were all widows. She described the group as “ty(ing) us all together”. The women in the 
group had a pooled monthly contribution of Khs 1000, saving enough to open a nursery school in 
Kibera. They have one paid teacher and 30 children currently between the ages of 3 and 6 years. 
The school charges fees. Contribution and income is accumulated in a savings account at Equity 
Bank and then an annual distribution is made. Funds have been used for on-going investments in 
the school, such as equipment and books and the recent renovation of the building. However, 
when the group had applied for a loan from Equity Bank they had been refused for lack of 
collateral, despite having a good savings records from income for over two years. This was 
because the bank had required the title deeds of the school for collateral and these were not 
available. 
In another example, two male interviewees described the collective business they were involved 
in. The business was owned by 24 members, collected contributions of Khs 1,000 monthly and 
had used the proceeds to invest in a crisp-making business. The business now had two employees 
with salaries. The group also had a social fund for emergencies, such as health emergencies, and 
lends to members. A member can borrow a maximum of Khs 5,000 at 10% a week but there are 
no requirements as to why a member can borrow. The group has registered bank accounts with 
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Equity Bank and accumulated savings of up to Khs 70,000. However, they had never sought or 
been granted a loan. 
In a final example, an older woman, aged 55 years, described how she is involved in a women’s 
spinning and weaving group. The group has 32 members and has been running for about 20 years. 
The group originally formed through friends from church who met via door-to-door prayer 
meetings. The members make contributions of Khs 100 a month and use the funds to finance 
materials for spinning and weaving by the women members in their homes. The group is 
registered and has two bank accounts at Equity Bank and Cooperative Bank. The group have 
accumulated funds of up to Khs 300,000. Funds are distributed at the end of the year and members 
use them mainly for school fees. Such fees are about Khs 30,000 annually and she has eight 
children. She emphasized how their children’s education was both a priority for any income they 
had as well as, in common with many comments from interviewees, a significant financial burden. 
However, the group has never borrowed from a bank as they are “afraid” and they prefer the 
social aspects of the group. 
Overall, many interviewees were involved in collective businesses. However their engagement 
with formal finance is limited to using savings accounts to accumulate and manage safely the 
collective funds prior to distribution to individuals. The interviewees’ main problem with bank 
borrowing was risk aversion relating to collateral and high interest costs. Such barriers to access 
are both rational and largely voluntary. The costs and risks involved in the offerings of 
commercialized microfinance institutions are not regarded by small business enterprises as 
outweighed by the benefits offered by immediate and larger-scale capital. 
Instead, participants prefer to share risk and “self-insure” within their communities. It was 
apparent that the social and community basis of the businesses and their ethos of self-help 
amongst members were important, not only in sharing the risk of businesses and emergencies, but 
also in providing personal support and encouragement in their lives. Such a social and community 
self-help ethos is, in fact, the dynamic that originally inspired microfinance. 
8.3.3 Individual Businessmen in Kibera: The bank conditions are “too high” . 
As noted, the majority of interviewees are engaged in collective businesses. Indeed, almost all 
small businesses were run through collective enterprises. However, two interviewees ran 
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individual businesses. One was an M-PESA agent and the other was an importer of second-hand 
clothing. They are interesting as both would seem to be excellent candidates for formal loans, 
given their respective track records running small and successful businesses. However, their 
formal sector financial access was limited, especially in relation to loans. 
The first businessman was an M-PESA agent who ran a kiosk in the main street in Kibera selling 
phone cards and rental phones and similar small electrical goods. He was 23 years old and 
fashionably and well dressed. His earnings were above average at Khs 8,000 a month, mainly 
from M-PESA commissions. He was an active saver with a formal bank account at Equity Bank. 
He does not, however, use M-PESA for his personal finances. His purpose for savings was to 
accumulate capital for his business. In particular, he wished to buy a kiosk, as the one he currently 
had is rented, and because he wished to expand into additional goods. He banked money monthly 
from his commission and typically the amount is Khs 1,000 to 1,500, depending upon his living 
expenses. To date he has accumulated savings that average Khs 10,000 to 20,000 and that have 
reached a maximum of Khs 20,000. The amount is not high relative to his income, however, and 
he commented that this was due to emergencies and living expenses, as well as variable income 
due to fluctuating M-PESA commission. He also noted that competition between agents has 
become more intense recently due to the growing number of M-PESA agents and new agents 
from Airtel and others who are competing for the same customer base and driving down 
commission rates. 
This businessman commented that he had never had a formal loan from a bank, either for personal 
expenses or for his business. He has had casual loans from friends and family, but is not a member 
of a savings group. Such borrowings are on a fairly informal basis and for small sums, typically 
about Khs 1,000 to 3,000 for up to two months and at no interest. He commented that greater 
sums than this are difficult to borrow because people do not have a high level of surplus funds, 
although it would be useful to access large sums for his kiosk. However, he would not consider a 
formal loan as he commented that he prefers to borrow informally and not from a bank because 
the bank conditions are “too high” in relation to both requirements and interest rates. Also formal 
banks tend to lend lump sums and he was concerned about whether his business would 
realistically be able to support regular repayments, including the high interest costs. Such 
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comments indicate that the perceived high costs of microfinance loans are disincentives for small 
businessmen to take loans for business expansion.. 
The second businessman was an importer of second-hand clothing. Second-hand clothing is 
widely sold in Kenya including in Kibera’s “Toy Market” and is considered by fashionable young 
Kenyans to be preferable to new clothing as it is more individualistic and expressive. The 
businessman was interviewed as part of the group that met at church, where he was one of the 
wardens. He was middle-aged and well dressed with a gold watch and was generally more 
prosperous than other interviewees. He had been running his business for 14 years and was 
involved in importing second-hand clothing by the container load and then finding petty traders 
to sell it in the markets throughout Nairobi including the Toy Market, where he had a permanent 
stall. 
In relation to his financial life, he had a savings account and had accumulated significant savings 
that he had used to purchase a house and pay for his children’s school fees. He had had accounts 
at various times with Equity Bank, Cooperative Bank and Family Bank. Of all the interviewees, 
he was the only one who had taken out large-scale loans. He told us he had borrowed up to Khs 
100,000 to use for his business. Typically, the loans were used for working capital to pay for the 
imported clothing until it was sold and also, on one occasion, to purchase a stall for clothing sales 
in the market. His preference was to take loans from a savings and loan group that consisted of 
tradespeople and of which he was a member due to the cost. He reported the rates as being 7-
14%, compared to the 36% charged by formal banks58. He had not considered loans from formal 
banks because of the requirement for savings accounts to be held and accumulated. 
Overall, although both businessmen were well established, and with above average incomes, they 
both showed a reluctance to borrow from a formal bank to expand their businesses. However, and 
unlike other employees, risk aversion in relation to loss of collateral was not the key reason and 
this can probably be linked to their greater prosperity and more regular ability to generate well-
                                                             
58 This comparison is incorrect because the comparison is between annual and monthly rates without 
compounding. This mistake was made by a number of interviewees. It is discussed further in the 
conclusion. 
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above subsistence levels of income. Instead, cost was the central barrier to borrowing for business 
expansion from formal banks. 
8.4 RURAL FINANCIAL LIVES OF THE POOR 
The circumstances of the rural poor interviewed during fieldwork contrasted with those in urban 
areas. The interviewees lived in Samia and Kisumu districts in western Kenya. Kisumu is the 
regional centre and the farming areas visited were on the shores of Lake Victoria and close to the 
Ugandan border. The area is relatively affluent but based firmly in an agricultural economy and 
is fertile especially compared to eastern areas of Kenya. Subsistence and cash crops are farmed. 
Cash crops include sugar cane that is farmed on a large-scale, mechanized basis. Other crops 
include wheat and rice. Living conditions are reasonable, but some areas have poorer farmland 
and there have been high rates of AIDS infection and urban migration which have both 
differentially affected the young, male population. Residents were mainly in traditional thatched 
housing but some of the richer farmers had brick and tin-roofed homes. 
In addition, and in contrast to Kibera where many microfinance-orientated institutions are active, 
the presence of formal financial institutions is more limited. Many have city branches in Kisumu, 
the regional centre, but in rural areas there are no branches. However, there are agents, both for 
banks and M-PESA, and these were used by participants who were accessing formal financial 
services. In addition, there had been some promotion including “financial literacy” based 
marketing. 
The interviews were sponsored by a regional NGO, Farm Africa, which has been active in projects 
aiming to build productivity and incomes in the agricultural sector. The interviewees we met were 
involved in two projects, one introducing new disease-resistant and higher yielding varieties of 
cassava and one to develop fish farming. Both included training, marketing and processing efforts 
to build value-chain activities. The overall goals of the projects have been to increase farm 
productivity and related incomes. 
In total, 56 people were interviewed in focus groups. Some of the groups had collective 
enterprises, but most ran their business individually as they each owned, or took responsibility 
for, individual parcels of land that were cultivated and had individual family compounds with 
livestock. Nevertheless, each group came from single communities and had a strong communal 
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attitude towards helping one another and exchanging information. In addition, three of the seven 
groups had formed savings and loan groups, with the training and assistance of the NGO. The 
savings and loan groups were formed to provide collective assistance for the agricultural 
programs that they supported. Some individuals also participated in neighbourhood savings and 
loan groups. 
Income sources reflected the agricultural basis of the economy of the areas, with the main 
occupation and incomes of interviewees being in and from agriculture. Interviewees were 
involved both directly in farming and in selling their products. Few had diversified sources of 
income outside of agriculture. Crops were mixed and included cash crops, subsistence crops and 
livestock. The latter was mainly for household consumption and included cows, goats and 
chickens. Cash crops were sold in local markets or to intermediaries supplying urban areas such 
as Nairobi and Kampala, the Ugandan capital, which is not far across the border west of Kisumu. 
The level of mechanization in agriculture remains very limited with much work being done by 
hand, including planting, harvesting and preparing crops for storage. The interviewees ranged in 
their levels of income from quite affluent to close to subsistence income levels. 
The interviewees’ financial issues related directly to their primary occupation in agriculture. In 
particular, the farming cycle requires significant capital because, during planting and 
establishment of crops, there are significant inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, and these are 
required to be paid for in advance of the sale of crops. For some products, this cycle can be 6-12 
months long. In addition, during the period immediately prior to crop sales, household, school 
fees and other on-going consumption is required to be paid for from savings. 
Figure 44 shows the purposes of savings as provided by interviewees. The responses reflected 
these issues with the need for investment in agriculture cited as the most important reason for 
accumulating savings with 73% giving this as the primary purpose. In addition to working capital 
for inputs to manage the agricultural cycle, interviewees were accumulating savings for capital 
investments. These included, for example, basic machinery for processing cassava and fish as part 
of their efforts to add value to the crops. 
Following funding of agricultural cycles and equipment, the second most important goal of 
savings was for education, with 68% citing this as its purpose. This figure partially represented 
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the high level of female interviewees with multiple dependent children because AIDs has 
increased male adult mortality. Interestingly, free primary education is available in the areas we 
visited. However, interviewees saw this as inadequate and preferred to suffer the financial burden 
of paying for private education. A high value was placed on education, even for interviewees 
whose income was very close to subsistence levels. 
Figure 44. Rural interviewees stated purpose for saving. 
 
Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
Interestingly, unlike the urban interviewees, asset acquisition and emergencies were reported as 
a relatively unimportant savings goal. However, and as illustrated in Figure 45, asset ownership 
was already very high, with 73% owning land, often acquired through inheritance, and 93% 
owning livestock. Indeed, with the exception of landless and single women, all interviewees 
owned land and livestock, although there was variation amongst them as to their respective 
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quantity and quality. Even amongst the landless women, who typically rented agricultural land, 
almost all owned livestock of some type, including goats and chickens. 
Figure 45. Rural Interviewees individual asset portfolios. 
Percentage of those reporting holding such assets 
 
Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
Figure 46 shows that the proportion of interviewees having a bank account was low at 48% 
(contrasting with urban levels of 68%), and levels of dormant accounts was high with 91% (i.e. 
of the 48%, 44%) of accounts being dormant. Nevertheless, 12% reported having had loans, which 
was higher than for urban interviewees. 
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Figure 46. Rural interviewees with bank accounts and loans. 
Percentage of those reporting having an account or loan and those no longer actively using the 
account 
 
Source: Interview material (see Appendix for detailed workings). 
 
The differences of the savings and loan behaviour of rural compared to urban interviewees can 
be viewed in various ways. Rural people enjoyed lower absolute levels of income hence, other 
things being equal, they accumulated less saveable surplus. Indeed, a number of interviewees 
commented that income levels did not allow for any surplus. Secondly, rural interviewees 
reported greater basic security provided by land ownership, both in terms of assets and in terms 
of provision of a livelihood through agricultural work. Land ownership also means that there was 
less of an incentive to accumulate sums for asset acquisitions as reflected in the purposes given 
for savings by urban respondents. Similarly, living in tight-knit, long-established agricultural 
communities provides a higher level of security than in urban ones, particularly as related to the 
availability of mutual help. This might explain the absence of emergencies cited in stated savings 
goals. 
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It appears reasonable to propose that the relatively low level of account ownership in rural areas 
also reflects the lower level of promotion and advertising by financial institutions in these areas 
compared to urban markets. This is also reflected in the wider range of institutions being used, 
including a variety of microfinance-orientated banks (Family Bank, Barclays, Equity Bank, 
Kenya Commercial Bank, Cooperative and Postbank) and deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions (KWFT). Equity Bank, in particular, was far less dominant in rural areas with only 
15% of those having a bank account holding it with Equity Bank, compared to 38% in Kibera. 
Interestingly, the low usage did not seem to reflect rural isolation. Rural interviewees generally 
reported agents as being available at a reasonably close distance, including minor towns. 
The very high level of dormancy of accounts is remarkable. Various reasons were given for letting 
accounts fall dormant. Some interviewees had changes to their circumstances that meant that 
accounts were no longer useful. For example, one man had had a salaried job that had ended and 
his bank account had been used for receiving his salary. However, many interviewees allowed 
bank accounts to be dormant because they preferred to use bankable surpluses elsewhere. For 
example, there was again a strong preference to use surpluses to self-fund agricultural inputs or 
livestock. There was also the use of funds for small-scale improvements and diversification of 
income. For example, one interviewee had brought an egg incubator or another a bicycle in order 
to serve markets further afield. Interviewees commented that these assets were simply seen as 
more productive compared to low returns on deposits when interest rates, charges and fees are 
considered. 
In contrast to urban interviewees, loans to rural people were more common. Borrowing fell into 
two categories, group and personal. Two groups had applied for loans, one from KWFT and one 
from Equity Bank. However, the loans had not generally been seen as a success. Problems, in 
addition to high interest rates and fees, were related to a lack of willingness by lenders to match 
the agricultural cycles. In relation to personal loans, four had successfully sought loans from 
banks. They had used them for business capital and school fees, but reported that they were 
struggling to repay them. 
Like urban interviewees, rural people frequently commented on a respective lack of trust in and  
perceived usefulness of loans as provided by formal banking. In particular, the need for collateral 
and the risk of losing it was very important. Formal bank loans generally required collateral over 
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land and, in these agricultural communities where basic security is ensured by land ownership 
and agricultural work, the risks of losing land or housing were perceived as unacceptably high, 
therefore interviewees were very averse to offering land as collateral. In addition, there were many 
stories relating to harassment and aggressive debt collection by formal banks and the dire 
consequences for those who had lost their homes, land and livestock. This included stories relating 
to the seizure of collateral during the political violence of 2007 and 2008 and there seemed to be 
a view amongst some interviewees that such seizure was partially politically and ethnically 
motivated. 
 
8.5 RURAL CASE STUDIES 
 
8.5.1 Wealthy Cassava Farmers: “We are banking within the community”. 
These interviewees were from the wealthy farmlands in the fertile river delta south of Kisumu in 
the market town of Ahero. The farms are lush with maize and cassava under cultivation. 
Interviewees had well-established farm buildings, including some of brick and tin roof 
construction and all had plentiful livestock. The interviews took place at a wealthy farmer’s house 
with large brick buildings with family graves, orchards and lawns. Two interviewees arrived by 
motorbike and the coordinator, who was crippled by polio, had a hand-operated bicycle for 
transport. The main occupation of interviewees was farming, but a number of interviewees had 
other sources of income as well, such as petty trading. The interviewees were Luo and spoke Luo 
as well as Swahili and English. In total 63% (5/8) had personal bank accounts but, of these, 20% 
(1/8) were dormant, giving an active bank account holding of 50% (4/8) of interviewees. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Ahero farmhouses and interviewees illustrating the higher standard of living of the 
group. 
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Source: Author 
The farmers had been involved in projects to establish new improved cassava cultivation in order 
to diversify their agricultural activity. Cassava varieties have been well established and widely 
grown by the group of farmers and added significantly to crop yields and reduced the length of 
the harvest cycle from 2 years to 8 months. The project has been led by CREP, a local NGO, who 
started with a demonstration farm in the district to display new strains from the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute. As well as new varieties, the projects were focusing on cassava 
production and value-added processing such as drying, making crisps and processing cassava into 
flour for chapattis and bread. The group also had sold or donated propagated cuttings and seeds 
into the local community. 
Farmers have replaced maize and other crops with cassava and the reported increment to income 
was significant. Individual farmers reported increases in their incomes ranging from Khs 10,000 
to 20,000 per harvest to Khs 400,000 to 600,000 per harvest. This made this group of interviewees 
the wealthiest interviewed. Because of this newly acquired surplus income, this group of 
interviewees made a particularly interesting case study as clearly – unlike other interviewees – 
there was a bankable surplus available as well as a need to store value over agricultural cycles. 
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Interviewees held a strong antipathy to banking this surplus in the formal banking system. Instead, 
there was significant self-organization around a number of goals. Firstly, the surplus was used for 
business – largely agricultural – investments. The group, who nearly all owned substantial 
farmland, were investing in diversification and value-added projects. For example, the group has 
invested in larger-scale poultry farming, including buildings and purchasing incubators, and were 
currently saving for cassava processing machines. They were also developing new products from 
cassava to add value, such as cassava porridge and beer. 
Secondly, education was also a key purpose of savings, but was seen as being dependent upon 
increasing their agricultural incomes. One interviewee commented that,  
education is number one as it is the key to everything. With no education you cannot get 
anything ... we put education as number one priority as we want our families to be number 
one ... farming is where we get money for the education. We need our family to be a role 
model. In this area we have one engineer and he is the role model because of education... 
we need not only one but many (such educated people).  
They commented that educational fees are a substantial burden, but education for their children 
was a critical aim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48. Cassava farms at Ahero illustrating the farmland and cassava crop. 
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Source: Author 
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Thirdly, the surplus has been used to start a savings and loan group with 30 farmers as members. 
The savings and loan group was established with training from the NGO and is quite formal being 
divided into “shares” with different members having different numbers of shares depending on 
how much they input. One share is Khs 50 and each member buys between one and ten shares 
each week with proportional income distribution. They have been active in lending to members 
with interest charged at 10% a month. However, the group is not registered and has no bank 
account, as all the savings is lent out. Emergencies are also financed through the savings and loan 
group but as a gift, not a loan, between members. 
The interviewees saw significant advantages of their cooperative savings and loan group over 
formal banking. They commented, for example, that they have “no need to go to Kisumu for a 
bank, but use the money locally ... We are not going to Kisumu (to formal banks) but banking 
within the community”, thus identifying retaining and using capital within their communities as 
important. Similar, an interviewee commented that  
The Luo are afraid of taking loans but I have a strong feeling that group lending will really 
revolutionize the thinking and the attitude as controlled by the community... if we give 
money I know he will pay and when they come together they already know each other, they 
know their capabilities and they know their strengths.  
Others compared the costs of group versus formal banking and saw a clear advantage in the 
savings and loan group cost and requirements. One interviewee said simply of the savings and 
loan group that “It’s cheaper”, another that banks’ “Interest rates are not within reach”. 
They were also had very low levels of trust in formal banks, especially because of the risk of loss 
of collateral. The interviewees commented on a number of examples of people in the 
neighbourhood who had been impoverished by debt collection and loss of collateral. One 
commented that he had never taken a formal sector loan and that this was because “when they 
want their loan back they are harassing you, and this is why people are afraid to take a loan, 
especially in our area”. Another commented that  
Some of these financial institutions ... like Equity and Kenya Women ... they came to the 
community and induced them to take money. Then at time of getting back that money it 
was a very bad experience. Actually at some point some people were left with nothing, in 
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poverty. Rumours go around ... (people think) they had better be careful ... you take a loan 
and somewhere along the way something goes wrong. 
This distrust increased during the 2007 and 2008 election violence and the accompanying 
collection of bad loans by banks has fostered strong anti-bank views. For example, an interviewee 
commented, “I remember the post-election violence ... the repayment rate was very, very low for 
a few months, they were people that you know and had very, very good records but were not able 
to pay and put in very bad situation ... some institutions were very impatient and went raiding … 
they took the (roofing) sheets”. The interviewees recalled a number of instances in the 
neighbourhood of people who were having trouble repaying and who were harassed by the banks 
and foreclosed on. KWFT, in particular, was criticized as they foreclosed on a number of people 
in the district and took collateral including livestock, domestic household goods and roofing. An 
interviewee commented that they “sold the compound while they were inside ... came with the 
auctioneers and take the properties in the house, all of them, even sell your house while you are 
in it ... we have seen many here” and another stated that “they come around and are not leaving 
anything”, concluding, “that’s why we are afraid to take a loan from the bank”. When I asked if 
this was just rumour or their direct experience, they commented that this was direct experience. 
For example, one commented “I saw them selling the animals, removing the chairs and tables 
from the house, and the iron sheets ... they come around and are not leaving”. 
The level of advertising and promotion was also commented on as irresponsible and they again 
contrasted this with their savings and loan group. For example, one interviewee commented that, 
“Some of these people caused excitement with advertisements ... later on along the way things go 
wrong ... but (our group) starts from the ground roots and slowly, slowly”. They commented that 
people were attracted by the advertising without a proper understanding of the loans and 
repayment responsibilities. They could also use loans for irresponsible purposes such as non-
essential items, vacations or a new second wife who “must be treated lavishly”. 
Identified barriers in mainstream research, such as distance to banks, seemed relatively 
unimportant in their negative views of formal banking. Indeed, they commented that the “Banks 
are near,” with Equity Bank and Cooperative Bank agents within walking distance in Ahero, so 
accessibility was not an issue. One did comment, however, that formal ID was an issue, saying 
that, “you don’t need so many things to take a group loan. Even ID is not necessary because we 
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know one another ... that’s why people in this area have not embraced taking loans from the 
banks”. 
Overall there was a strong commitment to self-help through agricultural cooperation and 
community banking, with an ethos of self-sufficiency and independence. There was also a deep 
disregard for help from private and government sources and a deep risk aversion to debt. They 
saw reinvesting their surplus funds in their agricultural businesses and their community as an 
option that offered them many advantages over placing funds into the formal banking system. 
They were also prepared to accept a slower pace of improvement in return for it being solid and 
under their control. They did not see using private loans, with its ability to accelerate change, as 
worth the risk of loss of collateral and the impoverishment that it might also bring. 
Indeed, interviewees identified this as part of their moral philosophy, commenting that 
traditionally the Luo had given help to each other through “seed” but now saw this tradition as 
continuing through their communities self-help efforts. One commented that from these benefits 
“your life can change” and through cooperative banking “In the 5 years to come there will be 
very, very good chance ... (that) these are the innovations we need to serve the community’s 
needs”. 
 
8.5.2 Poor Cassava Farmers: “Not saving, because whatever I get, I use 
immediately”. 
West of Kisumu, the rural area is more remote and poorer than the farmlands south of Kisumu. 
The area the researcher visited for two group interviews was in Malanga district and both groups 
had been part of a cassava development project established by Farm Africa and CREP. In total, 
25 interviewees were met in three groups. The interviewees were all subsistence farmers. They 
spoke Luo and Swahili and some spoke English. The farms were about three miles from the main 
road on a dirt track and some were only accessible by foot as the dirt roads to the farmhouse were 
not accessible by vehicles. The farmhouses were traditional thatch houses with enclosed 
farmyards with livestock and some with garden orchards. Crops included maize, corn and wheat. 
The areas has also been badly impacted by AIDS with infection rates of c. 25% and a number of 
interviewees were widows heading households with AIDs orphans. Interviewees also reported 
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high levels of migration to Nairobi and other urban areas, although they said they rarely received 
remittances from relatives. Overall, the interviewees were generally much poorer and closer to 
subsistence levels of livelihoods than other groups interviewed during fieldwork. 
The introduction of the new varieties of cassava has been successful with high adoption rates 
following successful demonstration projects in the area. Cassava was reported as having become 
the main cash crop, replacing other cash activities such as day labouring on sugar plantations or 
banana-selling at local markets. Income levels from each harvest were reported as between Khs 
5,000 and 12,000. The cassava harvest is particularly valued because it bridges the “hungry 
season” between the harvest of maize and corn when it is used for both cash crops and 
consumption. Indeed, the improvements in food security from cassava were seen as more 
important than as a cash crop. However, success had also lead to high rates of theft from fields, 
although theft seemed to be ignored as it was attributed to hunger. They also experienced 
problems in selling cassava as they were only able to access local markets where “middle men” 
from Nairobi and Kisumu drove down prices. For example, one woman reported a “farm gate 
price” of Khs 20 a cassava tuber that then sold for Khs 60 in a market. Consequently, there was a 
strong focus on developing value-added processing to the cassava crops, including chipping and 
drying and by production of cassava crisps and ugali, and through collective efforts to access 
markets directly. 
All interviewees were members of various savings and loan groups. A critical goal of the savings 
and loan groups was to save to invest in the cassava business, especially in collective processing 
equipment. This was seen as critical to increasing the value-added potential of their crops and a 
key path to further improving their incomes. The contributions to the savings and loan group were 
low, typically Khs 20-50 a week with members able to take loans at 10% a month. There was 
concern to make sure that contributions were set at a realistic level that could be attained without 
too much difficulty. There were also “social funds” for emergencies that are given as a gift, not a 
loan. Key personal goals of savings were to rent or buy further land and livestock, and to provide 
for school fees. They were also planned to be used for smaller, everyday needs such as housing 
improvements (including tin roofing), household items (blankets and cooking pans), clothes and 
year-end celebrations. 
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However, a number of interviewees reported a lack of any savings capacity with a “hand to 
mouth” use of cash and “not saving because whatever I get I use immediately”. Assets were also 
less substantial. Most owned land. However, there were lower levels of livestock and only two 
had other assets, such as a bicycle. All participated in savings and loan groups and such groups 
provide an important social and community function as well as a financial one. 
Livelihood problems were particularly acute amongst the women who were both widows and 
supporting large numbers of dependents, including their own and orphaned children. Their 
situation was worsened by the higher percentage of cassava used for consumption because of their 
dependents. In addition, they were responsible for multiple school fees that were reported to be 
between Khs 10,000 and 25,000 per annum per child. Where children or other relatives had 
migrated to Nairobi and elsewhere, remittances were rare, and in fact the women reported that, if 
visited by relatives, those relatives then took crops themselves for sale in the city and so were a 
negative drain on resources. 
Borrowing from the savings and loan group was, however, reported as quite frequent due to the 
closer proximity of the interviewees in this poor area to subsistence living. Unusually, a number 
of defaults by members were reported. Defaults had occurred because of illness, including those 
who fell sick and died due to AIDS. Such defaults were taken to the chief if they were not resolved 
and next of kin were expected to take responsibility for debts. 
Attitudes to formal banking were negative or apathetic. Ownership of bank accounts was one of 
the lowest of any interview groups at 40%, with 50% of these being dormant, giving an active 
bank account ownership of only 20%. None had ever had a formal loan. Several interviewees 
expressed fear of formal loans commenting that “many people” had lost household goods, land 
or livestock when they had defaulted. Interest rates were also seen as excessive. Remoteness was 
also reported as an issue. 
Overall the interviewees’ main problems were not accessing finance, but simple income 
generation beyond a subsistence level. However, the lack of capital for assisting with this – such 
as the need to access funds to buy equipment for cassava processing which would then allow more 
value to be created from their crops – was clearly a barrier to increasing incomes. Nevertheless, 
the interviewees’ views were that the best way to access such funds was through collective 
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savings, even where this was slow and difficult. Formal bank lending, which would accelerate 
this process, was seen as too expensive and too high risk in relation to loss of collateral. 
 
8.5.3 Fish Farmers in Nambototo: “We are not passive, only powerless”. 
Interviewees were part of the collective groups organized by the NGO Farm Africa who are 
assisting in the development of cash farming, including programs for poor rural farmers. Prior to 
the project, all had been subsistence farmers with some petty trades and similar diversified income 
sources. The new project, dating from 2010, was intending to build fish ponds with farmed fish 
stock. Groups have been organized to give mutual aid, although the ponds are individually owned 
and harvested. A government grant was received to help meet start-up costs, including 
construction of the ponds, but has not provided on-going support. The fish being farmed are 
catfish and tilapia. They are organized by a local trader who also has a shop selling fish food and 
other supplies. 
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Figure 49. Fish farmers’ ponds in Nambototo illustrating the fish pond project and surrounding 
farmland.
 
Source: Author. 
The agricultural cycle is important to the fish farming as the ponds are stocked with approximately 
1,000 baby fish and then fed artificially for 8-12 months until a size suitable for sale is reached. 
Difficulties have been faced including theft of fish, especially during the “hungry season”. There 
are also problems with predators, including snakes and birds, and the ponds have been designed 
to prevent the latter gaining access to the fish stock. Local flooding has also washed fish stocks 
away. Sale of the fish is difficult because there is no facility to store the fish, either dried or frozen, 
and so all fish are sold locally on the day they are taken from the ponds. To date, two-three 
harvests have passed since the project started in 2010. Profits varied considerably by farmers, 
with some making up to Khs 29,000 in revenue and Khs 15,000 profit from each cycle whilst 
others, due to losses in stock, made only Khs 1,000 to 3,000 at most. Overall, the project’s 
profitability has been limited and the group is still struggling to establish it as a viable on-going 
business. 
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Part of the difficulty has been because inputs for each cycle are high and funding these costs 
through the 8-12 month cycle has been difficult. Costs include the expense of building the ponds, 
although as noted the government grant covered some of this and the farmers provided their 
labour. However, each cycle requires baby fish and artificial food from the organizer’s local shop 
(although one farmer reported having solved this issue through the production of food himself 
using white ants and dung). However no credit is provided by the project to fund this long cycle 
and the farmers reported an on-going struggle to self-finance due to lack of surplus funds. 
Unusually, the group had not organized a savings and loan group, although they reported some 
vague plans to do so. Most, however, participated in non-farming, small-scale savings and loan 
groups, although these were largely directed towards savings for education and household needs. 
In total, 68% (11/18) had personal bank accounts, but of these the majority (7/11) were dormant 
leaving an active account holding of only 28% (4/18). They commented that “Savings culture is 
a big challenge” and that they “can have accounts but don’t save,” and described either a lack of 
surplus income to save or the preference for hard assets, especially farming assets such as 
livestock and land. 
Instead, unlike other groups and encouraged by the NGO staff, they had attempted to apply for 
formal loans from banks and MFIs, but had been turned down. The group had applied to KWFT 
and Equity Bank, for example, who had come to visit the ponds but refused loans. Two main 
issues had caused this refusal. Firstly, the banks and MFIs were not willing to adjust their lending 
terms to match the agricultural cycle or the farmers’ situation. So, for example, KWFT required 
monthly repayments and would not allow credit for the full 8-12 months until fish sales were 
made, making the servicing of such a loan almost impossible. The banks also required established 
savings which, as one interviewee commented, if they had, they would not need a loan. 
Secondly, the banks and MFIs demanded collateral. They had refused collateral for the ponds 
themselves and required collateral on land or property. However, either this was not available – 
for example, interviewees said that the land ownership remained with the older people or that 
there were no formal deeds, so they could not offer formal collateral – or there was a deep 
unwillingness amongst the group to provide this as it was the basic asset needed for their 
subsistence farming. Indeed, there was a clear anxiety about the potential loss of collateral. 
Interviewees commented, for example, that they were “scared” of loans and that “if you default 
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on the loan your land will be taken”. Several recounted anecdotes about people in the community 
who had had land or property seized or been harassed by debt-collectors. Several interviewees 
had attended training from Equity Bank, but were still reluctant to take a loan and there seemed 
a general scepticism about the information that had been provided. 
They had also approached government agricultural banks who are active in the area in financing 
larger-scale commercial farming of tea and sugar beet, but they had also not been willing to lend 
to small farmers, only “serious farmers”. There was complaining about the lack of knowledge or 
engagement by government officials in charge of the program and their comments “land on deaf 
ears”. 
Interviewees commented that they were interested in cooperative banking as it was “friendly and 
approachable” and avoided the problems of rigid terms and collateral. They commented that the 
group would be well able to judge how a person should be dealt with in the event of default and 
whether or not they could not or would not pay and, in the instance of understandable problems, 
if they should be treated more leniently. However they did not consider they had adequate 
knowledge or training to establish a cooperative banking scheme. 
The interviewees had a strong vision of how to develop the fish farms, including marketing. For 
example, they wanted to buy a refrigerated lorry to take fish to Nairobi where, rather than selling 
at Khs 50, they sell at Khs 700 or more, and saw the opportunities that commercial cash farming 
offered them, but were frustrated at their inability to build their businesses, including finding the 
capital for expansion. The group seemed at a loss as to how to break this cycle of lack of capital, 
as well as a lack of knowledge, in order to establish commercial farming. 
The government agents, banks and MFIs had been unable or unwilling to provide the required 
help, including the adoption of any risks to them. One commented that it is “easy for farmers to 
produce ... but for production to become high (is difficult) as policies and mechanisms are out in 
place ... if we overlook other challenges you still get a minimal harvest”. There was a view that 
there was no support or assistance to help them realize their plans or share the risks of the 
entrepreneurial developments. An interviewee commented that, “even donors or sponsors don’t 
want to take risks” and left all the risks of both the new entrepreneurial projects and the farming 
cycles with those least able to bear their downsides, namely the farmers themselves. 
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One commented, “We are supposed to move from subsistence to commercial farming but we are 
not even half way through. The knowledge for managing is also necessary because the types of 
seminars, the few we have attended, have not educated us enough to be able to manage the ponds”. 
Another remarked that, “The money is never enough” and that “it is a matter of planning for that 
money. It is that planning knowledge that we don’t have and require”. Another stated that, “if 
(we) had (a) loaning system, fish farming would develop very fast”. 
Overall one interviewee summed up their situation in trying to start up entrepreneurial farming 
without any support and the rejection of their enterprises by microfinance-orientated banks, MFIs 
and government agencies, arguing, “They think we are passive, but we are not passive. We are 
only powerless”. 
 
8.5.4 Women Fish Traders in Port Sia: High levels of formal sector debts. 
Port Sia is a small town on the shores of Lake Victoria and the main economic activity is fishing. 
The interviewees were ”ziababu” or fish traders, a traditionally female role intermediating trade 
between fishermen and local markets. The interviewees were all members of a women’s self-help 
group aimed at social and community development. The group was headed by a woman who had 
spent time in Nairobi and had been involved in community-based organizations to help slum-
dwellers with goals that included “teach(ing) women their rights and (to) empower them”. Their 
group had created a “manifesto” and there was a strong impression of an ethos of self-help and 
self-sufficiency. 
The women were, however, amongst the most impoverished interviewed. Average monthly 
incomes were reported as Khs 4,000 to 6,000 per month and are at a subsistence level only. Their 
incomes were largely derived from fish trading, but the volume of trading had declined because 
of low water levels in Lake Victoria, due to climate change, and by overfishing. They also 
engaged in subsistence farming and limited cash crops, such as maize and oranges. The 
subsistence farming was challenging as the land they farmed was arid, and also because many 
were tenant farmers and did not own land themselves. The group had tried to develop other 
sources of income, ranging from basket weaving and cage fishing, but incremental income had 
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been limited. The women also reported working casually as labourers for wealthier farmers and 
on road building. 
Figure 50. The Port Sia Women’s Group illustrating their “manifesto”. 
 
Source: Author 
The group’s individual financial lives centred on informal services. It had formed a savings and 
loan group with “clusters” of 10 members. Contributions were Khs 50 to 100 daily and funds 
were distributed on a merry-go-round basis. They are also paired with a “sweetie” whose 
responsibility when you have the merry-go-round is to provide an additional gift or similar that 
they believe their partner will find useful, such as children’s clothing or groceries. The lump sum 
from the merry-go-rounds was rarely used for business, however, and instead was reported as 
being used primarily for household needs, including school fees. School fees, in particular, were 
repeatedly mentioned as a major financial burden for the women, the majority of who had 
children. 
The group members also reported being involved in pawn brokering and bartering in many 
instances. For example, they reported pawning chickens or bicycles with local people during the 
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hungry season in order to raise funds for basic needs or when sickness required emergency funds. 
One interviewee reported that her husband had suffered medical emergencies and she had pawned 
her bicycle and taken chickens as payment to the local hospital. They commented on the 
importance of hard assets in their lives in creating some level and sense of security, with one 
commenting that it’s “not about the cash that you have,” but the assets available. Indeed the 
majority reported some level of assets, despite the lack of land ownership. The assets included 
poultry and bicycles. However, some commented that they did not have control of their assets as 
they required permission from their husbands to “slaughter or even sell a chicken”. 
Of the interviewees engaged with, 33% (5/15) had formal bank accounts, but of these 40% were 
dormant, leaving only 20% (3/15) with active accounts, the lowest of any interviewee group. 
Accounts were held at National Bank, Kenya Commercial Bank, KWFT and Equity Bank. For 
those with bank accounts, balances were low. Only one, an old lady who reported savings that 
had been accumulated over many years, had a balance over Khs 1,000. None had obtained formal 
loans from microfinance-orientated banks as they commented that they had no collateral 
available. However, two had received loans from MFIs, namely KWFT. One had used the loan 
for fish stocks, but had also held back over 10% of the loan to ensure funds for repayment. 
Another had used the loan for school fees. 
There are two notable aspects of this group. Firstly, providing for themselves and their children’s 
basic needs at a minimal subsistence level was a constant struggle. Even with reliance on self-
help it was apparent that a daily struggle to provide was always present. Indeed, one interviewee 
simply commented that “(We are) always short of income”. There was also a notable lack of 
business or entrepreneurial activities amongst the group. Secondly, of all the interview groups, 
for those who had gained “financial access” the level of debts was highest and the level of savings 
was lowest with 40% of the interviewees with access gaining loans from microfinance-orientated 
banks or MFIs. Indeed, this was the most impoverished group and the  least active in business, 
while they also the most successful in accessing formal sector debts, leading to an interpretation 
of forced indebtedness. 
 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
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Two main lessons can be drawn from the fieldwork. The first is about the financial lives of the 
poor as presented by the poor themselves. The second refers to views regarding the barriers, 
values and preferred alternatives of the services available to them. Both challenge mainstream 
research in relation to its empirical methods and its presentations of “barriers” respectively. 
To turn to the first point: how do the poor represent their financial lives? The interviews show 
how critical the ability to generate, and ideally grow and diversify, stable income sources is. Risk 
mitigation and aversion are important issues in the lives of the poor. In the absence of an 
opportunity for formal sector employment with a regular and fixed income, the interviewees 
showed a strong motivation to establish and invest in small businesses and many exhibited skills, 
entrepreneurial zeal and ambitions. However the key strategy in doing so, and that was expressed 
in multiple forms by interviewees, was to share and mitigate the risk and effort of entrepreneurial 
enterprise through collective action. These took a number of forms including collective 
businesses, mutual interest groups (such as the farming initiatives) and mutual assistance through 
savings and loans groups. Such collectivization shared both the need to generate capital for 
entrepreneurial enterprise and the risk of failure, and as such “crowded in” capital. This was 
reflected in the relatively high levels of capital within collective businesses and the almost 
complete absence of capital in individual businesses and employment. Such collective enterprises 
was then further diversified by individuals through other income sources, such as from petty 
trading or employment, which generally carried far lower levels of capital investment and 
consequently a lower risk of failure for individuals. 
Such “portfolios” of work represent a search for stable and growing income in an environment 
where formal employment or government safety nets are absent and have been noted in other 
studies. However, past research has not consistently emphasized the importance of collective 
sharing of risk or its importance as a social and community support network. Many offered not 
only financial help but also gifted assistance through “social funds” and “soft” help through 
personal support and encouragement. Such community and personal support is an enabling 
“capability” as described by Sen (1999). Indeed, the ethos of self-help and community was a 
strong interviewee theme. 
Another important aspect of the poor, including their management of risk within their financial 
lives is the importance of hard assets. The most popular assets were business investments (such 
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as various pieces of equipment), land, housing and livestock. As the fieldwork showed, one of the 
key purposes of savings is to accumulate lump sums for the acquisition of hard assets. Indeed 
there was a disregard of financial assets as a store of long-term value59 and they were largely 
represented as a short-term store for longer-term non-financial asset accumulation. The reasons 
for the preference for hard asset included both their ability to not only store value in the long run, 
and hence provide assets for security, but also to be productive assets in their own right, hence 
providing additional income streams. Such income included that generated from business assets, 
rents and livestock-based incomes. Such stores of value in hard assets are, of course, common in 
many developing countries with the asset varying – livestock, jewellery and land are all common 
– but in this study there was a greater emphasis on income generation as a key advantage. 
The poor’s views of their financial needs were set within this context of income generation goals, 
hard asset accumulation and risk mitigation. Interviewees saw a need to save and borrow small 
amounts of money for consumption, including the smoothing of daily needs and managing 
consumption requiring lump sums such as education and healthcare. For those on subsistence 
incomes, the poor were also borrowing in order to meet their most basic daily needs such as food. 
However, they also expressed a need for capital for further income generating assets, including 
business investments. Such assets were important, in particular for increasing productivity, 
especially in small industries and agriculture where the alternative was manual labour. Indeed, 
those groups who had been successful in sourcing and applying even relatively small sums of 
capital to their projects had significantly higher levels of income than those who were continuing 
to struggle to fund investments. The need to raise such capital for business investments was a 
major barrier to overcome when creating small businesses and is consistent with mainstream 
thinking on financial access and small and medium-sized enterprise development. 
However, for both consumption and investment, the poor’s preference to accessing monies, either 
for capital for businesses or for consumption, was through collective savings and loan groups. 
The majority preferred this because of flexibility in repayments and collateral. Collective savings                                                              
59 Hard assets are also a “hedge” again inflation as their real value is retained despite the high inflation 
that prevails in Kenya. However, inflation protection was not given as a reason by interviewees despite 
Kenyan high inflation rates.  
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and loan groups were seen as having “soft” terms because the group was able to judge fairly a 
person’s reasons and circumstance in the instance of non-payment and act accordingly. In 
particular, in relation to collateral, it was seen that this discretion by your own social or 
community group was a very real advantage and, again, a method of risk sharing and mitigation 
for borrowers. 
Furthermore, for both income and borrowing, collective action provides risk mitigation. When 
considering the broader context of the lives of the poor it is clear why this is so important. Most 
of the interviewees lived on, or slightly above, subsistence levels. Consequently, the difference, 
even for the wealthiest interviewees, between their current levels of security and livelihoods and 
impoverishment is small, where not even basic needs such as food, housing, educational and 
healthcare can be met. In addition, their lives are set in the context of volatile income from 
employment, trading and agriculture, and without social security nets. Consequently, 
interviewees are very risk adverse. Their preference to avoid downside risk is much stronger than 
their preference to take risks that might lead to an upside. In addition, and as shown through their 
preference to self-fund capital investments through savings and loan groups, risk mitigation is 
more important than speed when they consider business investments and their view is that it is 
better to slowly build a business that is secure and funded through savings, than build a business 
quickly on borrowed money. 
This central concern also feeds directly into interviewees’ negative views of formal financial 
services and their low levels of participation. As noted previously, 66% of interviewees had bank 
accounts but only 40% actively used them, indicating a high drop-out or dormancy rate. In relation 
to borrowing, only one interviewee had ever successfully accessed a formal sector loan and only 
two groups had attempted to access a loan. Negative views of formal banks were almost universal 
and almost no one presented a positive perspective. There was a deep distrust of banks, 
particularly relating the latter being outside of the community’s concerns and issues. This was 
despite active marketing and promotion by banks in their areas where interviewees lived including 
“financial literacy training”. The key reason for such negative views and voluntary non-
participation in relation to borrowing was the risk of collateral loss. In the case of payment 
problems, the banks were seen as inflexible and likely to seize collateral, without any 
consideration of the impact this might have on the borrower. Recall of the catastrophic seizure of 
TYSON/.  6/30/2015. PhD Thesis 
  284 
essential assets – housing, land, and livestock – from members of the community was frequent. 
Such seizure would have been likely to cast defaulters into destitution but the banks were seen as 
unconcerned about this consequence compared to recouping their loans. Overall, and despite the 
need for capital for business investments, the interviewees did not see formal banks as presenting 
an attractive option to raise funds. 
Figure 51. Cartoon from The Daily Nation, 27 October 2011.
 
Note: The cartoon illustrates the populist view of the banks involved in expanding financial access 
as behaving in an exploitative and commercial manner. 
 
Equally, deposit accounts, which carry no downside risk in the way loans do, were also viewed 
negatively by most interviewees. A common experience was a bank account had been opened but 
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had fallen into disuse. The “barriers” to using these accounts were not, however, those identified 
in much research, such as distance, formal documentation or formality. Instead, they were 
“voluntary”, including the perceived low rates of interest paid on deposit accounts compared to 
those received through alternatives uses of funds such as business investments or lending through 
in savings and loan groups. In addition, some of the more sophisticated interviewees saw deposit 
accounts in formal banks as removing capital from their communities that could be more usefully 
employed within them if used in community banking. These findings contradict the finding of 
mainstream research [ref] in two ways. 
Firstly, they challenge the identified involuntary barriers to financial access found in other 
research. The majority of past research attributed barriers to involuntary exclusion, including 
requirements to open and maintain an account or loan such as formal identification or other 
documentation, minimum balances, fees and other costs and collateral requirements, as well as a 
lack of “financial literacy”. In addition, some past research focused on limitations in service, such 
as “lack of respect and missing trust in the safety of banks” (Financial Sector Deepening Program, 
2009, p.27) or “documentation and qualifications, product characteristics, literacy and 
geography” (p.23). Although some of these “barriers” were raised, the most significant for 
interviewees were the voluntary barriers of low returns on deposits, high risk of loss of collateral, 
lack of flexibility in loan arrangements and loss of investment potential for the immediate 
community. 
We also contradict the findings and methodology of mainstream research about the levels and 
measurement of financial access. Past research has reported high levels of financial access in 
Kenya. However, such financial access is measured as the number of registered accounts but fails 
to measure the degree of effective use of such accounts. We found a high level of dormant 
accounts or insubstantial use following the opening of bank accounts such as negligible balances 
and infrequent use. The levels of financial access, as represented by substantive and regular 
engagement with the formal sector, may be materially overstated by existing surveys. 
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9. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS FINDINGS 
 
In this concluding chapter we return to the core question posed by the thesis: the role that the 
expansion of financial access is playing in financial development that supports structural 
transformation in developing economies. 
The chapter does this by examining three themes relating to this core question that we have 
examined in the thesis. These are: 
x Is the expansion of financial access contributing to structural transformation? 
x What is the effect of the expansion of financial access on financial stability? 
x What role is the expansion of financial access playing in the financial lives of the poor? 
Each section will begin with a summary of the thesis findings reported in earlier chapters and 
then considers the implications for policy and for theory. 
The chapter concludes by returning to its theoretical framework regarding applying the balance 
sheet approach to examine financial access and financial development. 
 
9.1 THE EXPANSION OF FINANCIAL ACCESS AND STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
The structural transformation of economies that defines development includes the transformation 
of sectors – especially agriculture and industry – from low to high productivity. Pro-poor 
transformation requires employment creation, the creation of public services and equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. 
Structural transformation requires investment to achieve these goals and the fundamental function 
of the financial system in structural transformation is to mobilise and intermediate financial 
resources into “pro-development” investment. Pro-development investment is defined as being 
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investment that not only contributes to growth but, in conditions of scarce capital, maximises that 
contribution to growth. 
The thesis found that the expansion of financial access is contributing to the mobilization of 
resources. 
This includes domestic deposit mobilization. However, the extent to which deposits being 
mobilised are incremental was unclear as deposits may only be shifts in deposits between 
institutions. This issue requires further empirical research to conclude whether deposits being 
mobilised by microfinance-orientated institutions are incremental or not. 
The thesis findings also suggest that the binding constraint on savings – and hence mobilization 
of domestic deposits – at low levels of income is not access to finance, but household income. As 
income increases the binding constraint then changes to become – in addition to access – the  
perceived returns (in the form of interest rates) and security of deposits in formal financial 
institutions. This issue requires further empirical research to examine the relationship between 
financial savings and household income in developing countries and how binding constraints 
evolve as GDP per capita increases. 
The thesis found the main source of resources being mobilised for the expansion of financial 
access is domestic and international private capital. The main form of this was debt. This is 
accompanied by incentives relating to profit-making by these private investors. Again, it cannot 
be concluded from the thesis whether these resources are incremental to the economy or not, or 
whether they have crowded out investments in other sectors compared to the financial sector. This 
requires further empirical research. 
In order for mobilized resources to contribute to structural transformation, those resources need 
to be intermediated into investments that make a contribution to the transformative process. The 
thesis found that the expansion of financial access has made a limited contribution to this. This is 
because significant resources are being intermediated into the expansion of credit in sectors that 
are likely to make either a weak or no contribution to structural transformation. The thesis links 
these outcomes to the incentives of private financial institutions in relation to the relative risk and 
return in those sectors. These include the following findings: 
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x Business lending has expanded. However, the contribution of this expansion can be 
questioned in relation to a number of points. Firstly, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
majority of the lending has been to “microbusinesses”. Research indicates that small and 
medium-sized enterprises in developing countries make a limited contribution to 
structural transformation because they are typically located in low productivity activities 
and there is little graduation of small and medium-sized enterprises to larger-scale firms 
(Nissanke, 2001). Structural transformation requires the development of higher-
productivity firms and on a scale that can provide mass employment and this is unlikely 
to be achieved through the form of business lending made by microfinance-orientated 
institutions. 
x However, this conclusion is more ambiguous in relation to lending to other “business” 
categories such as “wholesale”, “trading” and “retail”. It is possible that such lending is 
not closely associated with outcomes that underlie structural transformation – such as the 
emergence of large-scale manufacturing – but to small-scale and short-term trading 
activities. However, it is also possible that these may be linked to, for example, export 
growth that would contribute to structural transformation. For these categories, the links 
to structural transformation require further research for a conclusion to be reached 
including investigation as to what these categories represent and examination of their 
relationship to structural transformation. 
x The expansion of financial access has been accompanied by a relative – but not absolute 
– contraction in lending to the agricultural sector. This is because of its perception by 
private microfinance-orientated institutions as a sector that is unattractive due to low 
profitability and high risk. Increasing productivity to move the sector from low-skilled, 
labour-intensive subsistence agriculture to higher-productivity commercial agriculture is 
at the core of structural transformation. This is especially the case in sub-Saharan Africa 
where large percentages of the population remain employed in subsistence agriculture 
and its low-productivity is associated with high poverty levels. The relationship of the 
expansion of financial access to the relative contraction of agricultural credit makes the 
long-term transformation of the sector more difficult and is an actively damaging 
outcome derived from the expansion of financial access through private institutions. 
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x The thesis found that the expansion of financial access is also associated with the 
expansion of consumption lending. This is because private microfinance-orientated 
institutions see it as a high return and low risk business. Use of mobilized resources for 
consumption diverts them from investment in sectors such as agriculture and industry and 
represents a negative “opportunity cost” in countries that suffer from capital scarcity. 
Backward linkages are more ambiguous, as they may be positive – for example, increased 
consumer demand for consumer goods or for construction – or negative, namely, they 
may increased import for consumption. The relationship of increased consumer lending 
to economic growth and structural transformation in developing countries requires further 
study to conclude what the effect is on economic development. 
 
The theories discussed in Chapter 2 present one of the functions of the financial sector as the 
efficient allocation of resources in the economy. However, the allocations that have occurred 
relating to credit - as discussed above - reflect the incentives of private agents only. This approach 
is inadequate because in developing economies, firstly, capital is scarce, and secondly, there are 
externalities associated with the contribution of investment to structural transformation. A 
different approach needs to be taken to understand the “efficiency” of the allocation of capital by 
the financial system that takes into account these two issues. 
As noted earlier, the thesis assigns these outcomes to the incentives of private financial 
institutions. However, this implies that similar sub-optimal allocation of credit would be observed 
where credit growth has occurred through private financial institutions acting in liberalized 
financial systems. This includes in all types of institutions – not just microfinance institutions – 
and in other countries. If this is not observed, it could be concluded that the observed outcomes 
are not the result of processes related to private financial institutions generally, but only those in 
the microfinance sector in Kenya. 
Further research is required to conclude on this point. However, the author has begun such an 
analysis based on examining all banking institutions in a number of sub-Saharan Africa countries 
and consistent results have been found. The research is examining the empirical relationship 
between the expansion of private sector credit by private banking institutions – not only 
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microfinance-orientated institutions – and the sectors that receive that credit. The analysis is based 
on the balance sheet approach used in this thesis and analyses the balance sheet structures of 
institutions. This analysis shows consistent findings with the thesis: credit has expanded greatly 
but the expansion has been directed into consumer finance and low “development return” 
businesses (such as commerce, finance and real estate). Credit expansion in manufacturing, 
agriculture and infrastructure – critical sectors for structural transformation – remains limited. 
Figure 52 below show results for Kenya. Consistent results were found for Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Ghana and Zambia (Tyson & Patel, 2015). This work requires further research to confirm these 
initial findings.  
Figure 52. Total credit growth in Kenyan banking institutions by sector (2006-2012).  
 
Source: Tyson and Patel (2014). 
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In relation to pragmatic policy, we conclude that there is an immediate need to develop policies 
that will improve the development externalities of the scarce capital that is being mobilized from 
the private sector. This is because public funds are likely to be limited as international 
development agencies – such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank – are 
developing a “knowledge bank” strategy, in which financing is being replaced by technical 
assistance (Griffith-Jones & Tyson, 2012). 
Various policy approaches have already been developed by international development agencies. 
Approaches include partnering with the private sector in order to leverage private capital into pro-
development sectors. For example, international development agencies are executing new 
approaches that seek to partner with the private sector in funds or subordinated financing in 
infrastructure. Direct credit policies – including direct regulatory controls, such as lending limits 
on private institutions or contingent lending programs for international development agencies and 
government funds – are being developed. For example, the EIB in Emerging Europe and Andean 
Development Corporation in Latin America execute such programs (Tyson et al., 2014). However, 
they require strong institutional environments in order to ensure they are well executed (Griffith-
Jones & Tyson, 2012). In addition, their effectiveness in directing private sector credit into sectors 
with positive externalities for development remains open because thye are relatively new 
approaches and so have not been operational for long enough to allow a conclusion.  
For some sectors, notably the agricultural sector, a different approach is required: direct 
government finance. Climate change is increasingly adversely affecting agricultural areas in sub-
Saharan Africa and increasing the risk of lending to the agricultural sector. The tendency for 
private lenders to drain capital from the sector is likely to increase. Ensuring that capital is 
available for agricultural investment not only promotes its modernization and broad economic 
development, but also serves other basic needs including food security. It is unlikely that private 
financial institutions will provide such financing even as partners with development agencies. In 
fact, such a gap in financing is another example of “missing markets” – as discussed in Chapter 
2 in relation to the “missing markets” in lending to the poor – that has been addressed by 
development banks. Financing should instead be directed though dedicated public agricultural 
development banks whose function in developing countries has been to fill “missing markets” 
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where that lending is constrained or missing and where its potential positive externalities warrant 
it. 
 
9.2 THE EXPANSION OF FINANCIAL ACCESS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
Expansion of financial access in Kenya has been achieved through the growth of private financial 
institutions that have the dual goals of being “sustainable” – that is profitable – and providing 
assistance to the poor through financial services (although a few have purely commercial goals). 
The expansion has been funded primarily through private capital – and predominately debt – 
including international private capital flows. 
This has been reflected in changes in the balance sheet structures of microfinance-orientated 
institutions. Institutions have experienced rising credit, foreign exchange and liquidity risks. 
Existing mitigation of these risks is through building institutional and regulatory capacity with a 
focus on microprudential regulation, including the introduction of “best practice”. 
The thesis identified a number of problems associated with these developments: 
x Important aspects of the rising credit, foreign exchange and liquidity risks cannot be 
mitigated. In particular: 
o Credit risk cannot be fully mitigated because assets are concentrated in 
uncollateralized lending to the poor that has inherently high risk. The thesis 
found that this has materialized in high levels of bad debts in response to credit 
shocks from political, natural (weather) and economic events. 
o There has been a growth in linkages to pro-cyclical international capital inflows 
and domestic interbank funds. These can enhance liquidity and facilitate risk 
management during periods of market tranquillity (Minsky, 2008) while 
increasing liquidity and foreign exchange risk within institutions and the 
financial system (through contagion and coordinated institutional failure) in the 
event of market disruptions. 
o Hedging strategies are limited for these risks. There is very limited liquidity in 
conventional hedging instruments for foreign exchange and interest rates risks 
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such as foreign exchange futures and options or interest rate swaps. For credit 
risk there are no hedging instruments60. 
x The reliance on institutional capacity building has limitations as identified by the thesis 
including: 
o Weaker institutions are finding building institutional capacity difficult. 
o An oligopolistic market has emerged with systemically important institutions 
whose continued soundness is critical to financial stability. 
x The thesis found weaknesses in the current microprudential regulatory framework 
including: 
o The fieldwork indicates that there is weak compliance with regulation. 
Regulatory and financial reporting can be inaccurate and incomplete. This 
undermines the efficacy of liquidity and capital ratio regulations. 
o Multiple and over-indebtedness are present although hard to measure precisely. 
Progress is being made to contain the problem – for example, in 2013, Kenyan 
credit bureaus made nearly 3 million annual credit checks resulting in over 
600,000 “names” being banned (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013b). Further 
progress is needed. 
o There is a need for a formal financial services registration for employees of 
regulated institutions to prevent fraud. 
Addressing these issues requires greater institutional capacity at microfinance-orientated 
institutions and regulators. Building such capacity is difficult and requires a long-term approach 
and remains a policy constraint in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2013a). In addition, risk 
mitigation is reliant on the development of capital and derivative markets that facilitate risk 
management but which are only likely to develop in the medium-term. 
Microprudential regulation must be complemented with macroprudential regulation to manage 
systemic risk if regulation is to be effective (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011). Current 
macroprudential regulatory approaches in Kenya are limited to high capital thresholds for 
                                                             
60 However, credit risk could be managed through alternative strategies such as securitization or asset 
diversification. 
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institutions and some minor limitations on mortgage lending, such as prohibiting foreign currency 
denominated mortgages (IMF, 2013). The Central Bank of Kenya’s 2012 Financial Stability 
Report (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013a) fails to discuss systemic risks in relation to the expansion 
of financial access. 
Macroprudential issues of relevance to the expansion of financial access are identified by 
international bodies. For example, the recent G20 report emphasizes the need to capture the 
systemic risk in the shadow banking system, defined broadly as “the system of credit 
intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regulated banking system”. [ref] 
As such, shadow banking in low-income countries includes microfinance institutions. For such 
shadow banking activities, monitoring of concentration of risk within the system is important, 
including common exposures and interconnectedness among financial institutions, which are 
issues identified in the thesis as increasing in relation to microfinance-orientated institutions. 
Strengthening of macroprudential regulation is needed. Specific measures that the Central Bank 
of Kenya could consider for microfinance-orientated institutions include the following: 
x Limits for loan to deposit ratios to limit risks from interbank funding. Such measures, 
although likely to slow growth due to forcing institutions to build funding based on 
deposits rather than interbank financing, will reduce liquidity and contagion risks. 
x Monitoring leverage amongst institutions and using macroprudential instruments 
designed to control excessive credit expansion, such as risk-weighted capital 
requirements or ceilings on credit and credit growth. 
x Introducing stress testing for individual institutions and the financial system as a whole. 
Such a procedure is likely to give an early warning of problems arising either in 
institutions or at a systemic level. This is of particular relevance to the expansion of 
financial access in developing countries because of the susceptibility of institutions to 
credit and liquidity shocks – as highlighted by the thesis – including inflation, political 
and climate shocks. 
More generally, pro-cyclical capital inflows and outflows have often been identified as a cause 
of financial crisis. As reported by the thesis, such flows are linked to the high growth rates of 
microfinance-orientated institutions in Kenya. Consideration should be given to constraining 
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these flows. This could be achieved through introducing capital controls at an institutional level, 
such as limiting the amount of inflows in absolute or relative terms as measured against 
institutional size or against deposit base, imposing equity or subordinated debt requirements for 
senior debt investors, or imposing maturity requirements on debt investments. It could also 
include macroeconomic capital controls, including temporary ones imposed during any crisis, in 
order to prevent destabilizing capital flows. 
 
 
9.3 FINANCIAL ACCESS & THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF THE POOR 
Poor individuals in both urban and rural areas confirmed the findings of other research such as 
Collins et al. (2008) that they use formal and informal financial services for consumption 
smoothing. This is important to them given their low and volatile incomes and is to be valued. 
Poor individuals strongly prefer informal financial services and support community and self-help 
programs. These provided high levels of control and transparency and fostered community 
businesses, investments and profit-sharing. There were “voluntary” barriers to using formal 
finance because of a distrust of microfinance-orientated institutions and aversion to borrowing 
due to the possibility of loss of collateral compared to the “soft” lending terms offered by informal 
finance. Poor people do have short-term – but not long-term – savings capacity. Income was a 
constraint on savings and when savings capacity was present they preferred savings in the form 
of hard, not financial, assets, which offer productive uses as well as being a store of value. 
These finding need to be reflected in policy so that the voices of the poor are heard. However, 
current organizational structures for informal services are a limited foundation for the 
development of financial institutions that can not only serve the poor but also mobilize deposits 
and intermediate investment within the economy. 
Cooperative banking may be an alternative approach. In sub-Saharan Africa, including in Kenya, 
cooperatives have been common especially for agriculture (Bank of Tanzania, 1988; Bagachwa, 
1996; Ojo & Adewunmi, 1980; Ijere & Okorie, 1986; Ijere, 1992). However, state-ownership and 
sponsorship of cooperatives was substantially dismantled as part of structural adjustment 
programs. 
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Despite this, cooperative movements continued but evolved from state sponsorship to 
independent and autonomous organizations (Wanyama, 2009a). Examples in sub-Saharan Africa 
include self-help savings and loans organizations such as these studied in this thesis (Smith & 
Ross, 2006). Self-help activities offer significant advantages to members and their communities 
which profit-seeking, commercially-owned organizations do not. These include being under the 
control of members, the ability to have “soft” collateral and repayment terms controlled by the 
members and allowing members to retain “profits” for their own and their community’s benefit. 
Problems have been experienced in these organizations including inefficient and corrupt 
administration, over and multiple lending, and lending for non-policy purposes. They have 
resulted in a series of institutional failures and widespread bad debts that undermined public 
confidence in them. In Kenya legislation was established to try to control these issues. This 
included the Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act of 2004, which sought to re-enforce state 
regulation through widening the cooperative commissioners’ powers and scope of regulation, and 
the SACCO Societies Act of 2008, which established further licensing, regulation, supervision 
including deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and a supervisory body (Wanyama, 
2009a). 
This chequered history and recent adverse experiences with private cooperatives suggest that 
cooperatives are problematic, which is an argument in favour of commercially-led microfinance. 
This history can be used to support the case that cooperatives have governance weaknesses, 
including corruption, inadequate regulation and supervision and that the use of external funds by 
cooperatives can “decrease the incentive to mobilize deposits” (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2005). 
However, these problems are equally present in commercial microfinance-orientated institutions 
and are not unique to cooperative institutions. Indeed, the issue of the pressure of private capital 
with its profit-seeking incentives is, arguably, stronger than organizations with a commitment to 
“social returns”. There is a need for stricter regulation of all types of institution, whatever their 
ownership structures. 
The reestablishment of cooperative banking as a policy choice to address these issues should be 
actively considered. 
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9.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: LINKING FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION THROUGH BALANCE SHEETS 
 
We have offered an alternative definition of financial development, namely the contribution of 
the financial system to structural transformation and economic stabilization. This sets a new 
research agenda: to identify and examine empirically the transmission channels from credit 
growth in the financial system to structural transformation and economic stability. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, current theoretical frameworks relating to financial development 
including microfinance does not present a coherent framework for analysing these channels. The 
theoretical approach we adopted as an alternative – the balance sheet approach – has enabled us 
to explore the impact of increasing financial access to the Kenyan financial system. It has also 
guided our enquiries into the resulting impact on the real economy. 
Nevertheless, the thesis definition of financial development – namely its contribution to structural 
transformation – and the implication that development in financial systems is determined by its 
relationship to the real economy, has some affinities with the structuralist approach. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, both approaches seeks to link structural transformation in the real sector – defined 
as productivity increases – with finance acting to efficiently mobilise and allocate capital for 
structural transformation (Lin & Xu, 2012). It also allows for the concept of an “optimal financial 
structure” that performs these functions and that changes dynamically as development progresses 
(Lin & Xu, 2012).  
However, the structuralist approach proposes exogenously-determined financial systems with no 
specified transmission channels. The thesis challenges this approach and instead sees the financial 
system as subject to endogenous processes – such as responses of financial institutions to risk – 
and requiring transmission channels to be specified – in the thesis through balance sheet analysis.  
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The structuralist approach also presents the financial system as embedded in the neo-classical  
“rational choices of economic agents” (Lin, Xifang & Ye, 2011, p.25). The thesis accepts this as 
valid in some instances – for example, the determination of lending to different sectors is 
determined by the choices of individual agents as represented by private institutions – but 
considers it as incomplete. Important financial phenomena – for example, coordinated 
institutional failures or herd behaviour in markets – are determined by systemic, not individual 
agent, behaviour. The neo-classical foundations of the structuralist approach remain a “necessary 
but not sufficient” theoretical framework to understand the role of finance in development.  
The thesis also challenges the Stiglitz view of non-clearing financial markets as being due to 
imperfect information. The thesis proposes that information is another example of a “necessary 
but not sufficient” condition for financial markets to function. This is because it proposes that 
financial system agents respond primarily to risk, not information. This thesis illustrates by 
showing that, even in the presence of near-perfect information, there are “missing markets” in 
credit to the poor. This includes in the agricultural sector or where there are credit bureaus61 many 
would-be borrowers are still denied credit despite good information because the risk of lending 
to them is too high and private institutions then refuse credit outright because of the information 
they have – not the information they don’t have - about these borrowers and the related risk of 
lending to them.  
Empirically, the structuralist framework also remains underdeveloped, with “financial structure” 
being defined clumsily in terms of institutional structures and financial development by growth 
of credit. These empirical weaknesses are of interest because the body of research as performed 
in the structuralist school seeks to use a broader and more sophisticated empirical definition of 
financial structure and development, but the actual empirical measures selected are, by admission 
of its authors, “primitive” (Lin, Xifang & Ye, 2011, p.25).   
However, the key advantages of the structuralist approach of linking finance to productivity leads 
to an important question: can the thesis findings extend the structuralist approach to address some 
                                                             
61 In Kenya since the introduction of credit bureaus more than 600,000 people have been denied credit after credit bureau checks exposed their lending histories (source: CBK, 2015). 
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of its weaknesses whilst retaining its important innovations linking finance and productivity 
change in the real sector?  
If this is to be achieved then we suggests a number of goals need to be addressed as follows: 
x The framework needs to retain the important innovation of the approach – its focus on 
productivity changes as the essential process of development – and address the 
fundamental issue that this defines regarding how the financial sector serves productivity 
changes in the real sector. This makes the growth and cost of credit secondary issues in 
the context of this fundamental question;   
x It needs to have endogenous processes within the financial system, driven – not by market 
imperfections including those relating to information – but by risk. Here market 
imperfections (such as imperfect information) may exist, but removing them does not 
create an equilibrium. This is because risk remains, even in the presence of perfect 
information;  
x These endogenous processes need to incorporate the independent and interdependent 
choices of agents within the financial system in response to risk. The interdependent 
choices then define systemic phenomena within financial systems;  
x Empirical research then needs to be more sophisticated in order to examine the 
relationship of the financial system to productivity changes via its endogenous processes 
determined by risk. 
This framework – while having the same start and end point for the financial system as the 
structuralist view – the intermediation of savings into productivity-increasing investments, is 
different from the neo-classical view of financial systems. For example, markets can be non-
clearing due to risk – that is due to reasons other than market imperfections – while agents are not 
independent but interdependent and information is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
well-functioning financial markets.  
The thesis has attempted to use the balance sheet approach to examine the development of the 
financial system. It adopted the generalised empirical approach that focuses on aggregate ratios 
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such as leverage, temporal and currency ratios as used in previous research (e.g., Cozzi & 
Toporowski, 2006), but with greater detail regarding institutional assets and liabilities.  
We suggest this greater detail has the potential to provide an improved empirical and theoretical 
basis to examine how finance relates to productivity changes. The approach is an improvement 
on the existing empirical work relating to the structuralist approach (including Lin, Xifang & Ye, 
2011). This is because it provides an empirical and theoretical foundation for specifying 
transmission mechanisms that reflect independent and interdependent agent choices in relation to 
risk within financial systems.  
Nevertheless, it has significant limitations and requires deeper development. In particular, it does 
not capture well the dynamic role of risk in the financial system’s endogenous processes. It also 
needs a more specific and rigorous theoretical structure. Nevertheless, it presents a field of further 
research that moves towards an improved representation of the financial system and its role in 
development that the author plans to pursue in future research.  
 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
The findings indicate that the recent growth of financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa through 
private financial institutions – including the expansion of financial access – is not maximizing its 
potential contribution to structural transformation. 
There are open questions as to how much of the resources being mobilized in deposits and private 
investment is incremental. More importantly, the resources being mobilized are not being directed 
to uses that maximize their contribution to structural transformation. This is of concern because 
of the scarcity of capital in sub-Saharan Africa. 
There is an open question as to the impact of the expansion of financial access on financial 
stability. The thesis has shown that there are serious weaknesses in some microfinance-orientated 
institutions and in the regulatory framework for microfinance and that risk – both within 
institutions and systemic risk – are growing. 
These findings lead to the need to redefine “financial sector development”. We offer an alternative 
definition of financial development, namely that financial development is the contribution of the 
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financial system to structural transformation and economic stabilization. Without contributing to 
structural transformation, the financial system is dysfunctional and cannot be considered to be 
“developing” – inferring as it does progress to a more desirable state. The externalities associated 
with incentives of private agents in the financial system need to be understood more fully 
including how they aggregate into systemic phenomena and how they interact with information 
and risk. Equally, given the importance of financial stability to economic growth – and the 
economic damage that is done by financial instability – financial growth needs to be combined 
with financial stability. A deeper understanding of the relationships that this definition infers – 
those between the growth of finance, its contribution to growth, and its effect on financial stability 
– is needed. 
This requires the development of an empirical framework that measures these relationships. 
Current research exclusively defines financial development by the size of the financial system. It 
measures the scale and growth of credit, for example, the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to 
GDP, ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, and ratio of deposits to GDP (source: World Bank’s Global 
Financial Development Database; Beck et al., 2008). 
It fails to capture the vital link as to whether credit growth is being intermediated into purposes 
that serve structural transformation. More recent research that aims to develop an understanding 
of this relationship remains “primitive” and focused on an excessively narrow set of parameters.  
We have laid the groundwork for such a renewed empirical approach, using the example of 
financial access, by presenting a detailed examination of the changes in the structures of balance 
sheets at individual microfinance-orientated institutions and the systemic implications of their 
interconnectivity. 
It remains for this theoretical approach to be used to build a more general theory that extends 
beyond financial access to encompass all financial institutions and the systems of which they are 
a part and apply it to financial systems in developing economies. Such a development would 
provide greater insight into the developing financial system, including its potential to stabilize 
and promote growth as well as being the source of financial crisis.  
Critically, it would provide insights in the linking of the financial system in structural 
transformation and redefine “financial development” through its contribution to the latter. The 
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author plans to continue research in this area to develop this approach and to contribute to the 
theoretical framework and its policy implications. Generating a deeper understanding of the role 
of the financial system in structural transformation is needed if the goal of the development 
community of which we are part – an end to poverty in developing countries – is to be achieved. 
 
EPILOGUE  
During the writing of the thesis between 2010 and 2015, the economic environment for sub-
Saharan Africa underwent a structural shift. In the 2000s, external economic factors were 
supportive and economic growth was strong. But by 2015 these factors had faded with “the new 
mediocre” bringing sharp declines in demand from the regions major export markets – including 
Europe, the United States and China – and in the commodity prices which many sub-Saharan 
African countries are dependent upon. Political instability and insecurity was again affecting the 
region. These factors have led to a decline in growth expectations (IMF, 2015). 
More worryingly, however, was evidence that the strong growth of the 2000s was superficial, 
with limited structural change in domestic economies. Economies remain dominated by low 
productivity agriculture, and manufacturing has only gained traction in a few countries. The 
continuing rapid urbanization and on-going demographic transition – unlike that in Europe or 
Asia – has not being accompanied by the absorption of surplus labour into higher productivity 
industrial activities. Instead, growing urban populations are engaged in low productivity services, 
largely in the informal sector, and that serves to trap them in poverty.  
This “premature industrialization” – where levels of industrialization are peaking at ever lower 
percentages of GDP – raises concerns about the future path that sub-Saharan Africa can take to 
convergence with richer nations (e.g., Rodrik, 2015). It makes the understanding of the processes 
of structural transformation – including the role of finance – more urgent as new growth models 
are needed. Policy debate is currently suggesting looking to agri-processing or services as 
alternatives to industrialization or focusing on tackling “binding constraints” in trade and 
infrastructure. Nevertheless there remains an open question regarding what will be the sources of 
future strong and durable growth in the region and how productivity changes can be effected.  
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Also being questioned is the nature of finance and its role in development – echoing the themes 
of the thesis. In May 2015, the IMF published a report concluding that there is a bell-shaped 
relationship of finance and growth and a non-linear relationship of finance to productivity. The 
report also commented that measures of financial development that focus on size need to be 
complemented with measures of efficiency and access (Sahay et al., 2015). The authors conclude 
that “the pace of financial development matters. When it proceeds too fast, deepening financial 
institutions can lead to economic and financial instability. It encourages greater risk-taking and 
high leverage … when it comes to financial deepening, there are speed limits”. (Sahay et al., 2015, 
p.5) The empirical facts are increasingly supporting this view and imply that there can be too 
much finance as well as too little with “excessive” finance negatively impacting productivity. 
However, it is too soon to herald a new paradigm in thinking about development finance. The 
paper concludes with the same old policy approaches – “developing good institutional and 
regulatory frameworks” (Sahay et al., 2015, p.5). They may be the necessary condition to ensure 
that finance serves the real economy – rather than the opposite – but they are insufficient and, as 
the financial crisis of 2007-08 showed, on occasion are entirely inadequate.   
This author suggests a bolder period of rethinking is needed, one that incorporates the view that 
financial systems are inherently risky and unstable. This is an old view – long espoused by Keynes 
and Minsky – and one that cannot be tackled by neo-classical prescriptions aimed at perfecting 
markets. It requires a deeper recognition of the nature of financial markets and a more nuanced 
understanding of their potential contribution – and damage – to structural transformation.  
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